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INTRODIICTION 
The purpose of this essay is to examine the different 
possible bases upon which grants may be made from the 7ederal 
Government to the several State Governments in a Federation. The 
basic concept of federalism is sufficiently clear for general 
principles to be developed which will be applicable to any Federation. 
Nevertheless there are quite important differences between the main 
Federations of the present time. Each has evolved gradually and 
its form has been influenced by varied historical developments. 
It would be true to say that although general principles 
which will be valid for all Federations may be discovered, the 
application of those principles nvy differ in particular detail. 
Consequently, the examination which follows has boon made with direct 
reference to conditions in the Australian Federation. Australian 
terminology will be used, and at a later stage an examination will 
be made of the various types of grants made by the Federal 
Government in the Australian Federation. Despite the limitation 
of the analysis to a particular Federation, it is felt that the 
• 	 examination could be extended along the same lines to include the 
other maJor Federations. 
The examinatior will be divided into three parts. The 
first will establish alternative principles upon which federal grants 
could be made, and from the alternatives establish the principle 
which would give the most beneficial results. The second will 
analyse existing practice in Australia in the light of the principles 
which have emerged, and the third will draw conclusions as to 
possible lines of future development. 
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CHAPTER I 
h F 	F d 
istorically the :latlie form of government has been 
the unitary state. 	This state has had clearly defined boundaries 
and within the,e boundaricr one person or body, autoe at or 
popularly elected parliament, has had absolute control. 	Unions of 
such states have arisen from time to time, but in the majority of 
these cases they were formed y one state stronger than the rezt and 
this one inevitably dominated. 
he es. ential jifference between the unitary and the 
federal forms of government is that ir the unitary state there is 
only one body to control all afrairs of state. 	In the federal 
form there are several authorities each exercising control of 
domestic matters in a particular region or State and a federal 
authority controlling matters which affect all States. 
An eminent authority on federalism, i. G. ?heare, 1 
has defined the federal :Jrinciple of government as a "method of 
dividing powers so that the general and regional governmeuts are 
each, within a sphere, co-ordinate ard independent." 	In the 
Australian Yederation, the general government is the :ederal 
Parliament, and this has power to function in certain defined spheres. 
The regional governments are the''tate Governments with power over 
domestic matters in their own territories. 
A federation ths comprises a group of States with 
their own form of parliamentary government, and a 4ederal Government 
with a se-arate field of authority. 	It is a union of governments 
to their mutual advantage. 	Before federation, the ;-tates were 
completely eeparate entities with their own political, social and 
economic organisations. 	fiere may have been no common factor 
between them, but it maybe assumed that in. order for them to wish 
to join together in even a loose form of union, there will have been 
111111 400-01104•111.11101.16.0.11•01.4611111•■,110.IN 
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some aspect of community or economic life which is common to each. 
It may have been a common language, racial origin, allegiance or 
even colour. Again, it may have been a similarity in economic 
resources or natural conditions. It is not even necessary that 
the regions forming the federation should comprise a compact area. 
They could conceivably be scattered over a with area, interspersed 
with other States which remain outside the Federation. 	However, 
it can be conceded that conditions are more conducive to the 
formation of a federation if the boundaries of the several regions 
are concurrent. 
41e reasons why VAI several ';_-;tates consider it desirab-
le to form a federation may be many and varied. 	It can be 
atimmed, however, that all realise that there is some benefit to be 
derived from the formation of the federation. 	Foremost is the 
possibility that defence preparations may be more effective when 
carried out on a large scale than if undertaken by each State 
Individually. 	Again it may be possible for the States, when 
acting in coMbination, to arrange reciprocal tariff agreements with 
other nations. 	Cuch arrangcmonts would be impossible, or at 
least more cumbersome, when entered into by each state separately. 
Trade and travel between tates would be facilitated, and inevitably e 
as a reeult of federation, customs barriers betwt:J1 States would 
disappear. 	his would enable internal trade to flow freely to t:.0 
advantage of all r;tates, whereas previously tariff barriers between 
the states may have hampered interstate trade. 2  
At the formation of the federation it will be necesaaw 
to institute a central authority to aduinister those functions which 
impinge on all parts of the federation irreapective of State 
boundaries. 	Foremost amongst these will be such functions as the 
administration of defence and overseas relationships, both political 
and economic. This federal authority will be formed by 
111111.1M410..110.1.010..1111.11MOIIPM.M■■■ 
2. This was particularly evident in trade bet een the free-trade 
Colony of N. S.1W.and protectionist Victoria before Ilederation 
in Alk,tralia, 
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repro entative: of all ilember States of the federation. Ahether it 
shall be a body elected by universal franchise, appointed by the 
legislatures of the several Gtates or an . advisory body only, 3 is a 
matter to be decided by the Ltates themselves at the time of the 
foriaatiou of the Federation. 	However, it would appear tilat it the 
Federation is to function adequately, the ?ederal uovernment should 
be given absolute authority in its allotted spheres of activity. If 
this were not done, there would be danger of deadlocks should the 
legislatures of some 3tates be unwilling to adopt unequivocally the 
recommendations of an advisory body. 
The keystone of a ?ederstion is its Constitution. 
Ths will be devised and agreed to by the repre .Gntatives of All the 
atetes and will contain the provisions which will govern the acti,ins 
of both the 'Zederal and state Governments. 	it will set out the 
fields in which each may operate, and to be completely effective, will 
probably need to be subject to alteration only upon the passing of a 
referendum of all meMbers of the 'ederatioh. 	This is an aspect 
of federalism which is the subject of some controversy but it lies 
outside the scope of this enqu1ry.4 	The rigidity of a 
Constitution in a Federation prevents the correction of any mistakes 
which may have been made at the :outset and of deficiencies which 
arise through the passage of time and changing conditions. However, 
a certain amount of rigidity will be necessary in order that the 
Federal and :;tae Parliaments may be free to operate in their 
respective spheres without fear of amendment to this provisions under 
which they operate unless there is some presing need for change. 
The determination of the extent of the respective 
spheres of activity of the Federal Government on the one hand and the 
several State Governments on the other, will be decided at the time 
of the formation of the ?ederstion. 	his is one of the major 
constitutional problems and will probably give rise to perhaps the 
-----a------ 
3. The Australian experitnce was that a voluntary body with powers 
to make recommendations only was unsatisfactory. 	The elderal 
Council of Australasia, which existed from 1885 to 1899 was 
quite ineffective. 
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greatest, or at least the most difficult problem for which a 
solution must be found. 	That is the financial problem which ir 
the main subject for consideration in this Chapter. 
There are certain functions which obviously fall 
within the province of the Federal Government, and others which will 
equally obviously be the province of the state Governments. The 
primary test will be whether the function encompasses the whole of 
the Federation. If it is national in character, it is a field in 
which the Federal Government should operate. If it is purely local 
in character, ir is a function which can be performed adequately by 
the . tate Governments. 
This is not a matter upon which it is possible to 
generalise with any conviction. 	Apart from the fact that there is 
no clear line of division between a function which is national in 
its scope and one which Is purely regional, the character of functioni 
will differ in their importance in different countries. A function 
which is rightly considered to be of national importance in one 
Federation might, with equal justification, be regarded as of only 
local importance in another. 	However, for purposes of illustration, 
the division between the Federal and Ctate Governments in the 
Australian Federation may be taken as indicative of the type of 
division which will be made. 
The functions which are as wide as the 'ederstion 
and which have been given to the Federal Oovernment, include the 
power to conduct the defence of the nation, external relations of a 
political nature, the imposition of tariffs on international trade 
and tiie provision of sevvces which overlap the boundaries of several 
States. On the other hand, functions which are purely local In 
character and pre thus beat suited for administration by the several 
r;tate Goveftments incLtde the provision of health services, 
education facilities and the prer7crvation of law, order end public 
safety. 	Indeed it would probably be Oetrimental to their 
successful and efficient administration if they became a function of 
the 'Federal Government. 
This raises the question of the desirability or 
otherwise of introducing a third level cf government below the 
level of ltate government. 	The tAates themselves will probably 
be reasonably large in area, if tor no other reason than to justify 
the formation of a iederation In preference to a unitary form of 
government. 	If they are large, it may be in the interests of 
efficiency to introduce o third, local rcvernment, level to function 
in fir. Ida which are too narrow for the Governments of the States 
to administer successfully. It is thought, however, that the 
distribution of potters between three levels of government would 
surrender, through loss of efficiency, all the advantage that would 
be gained by loealisation of functions. Rather, the whole problem 
Is simplified if, as in Australia, the distibution is limited to the 
FeA:rel Government and the several State Governments with one of the 
functions of State Governments to organise local government within 
the geographical boundaries of each State. 
It would then be possible for a State to establish 
a local government organisation and delegate some of its powers. In 
this way administration would be kept as close as possible to the 
place where the functions are performed, and yet the difficulties 
which would arise if the Federal Constitution hsid to deal with the 
distribution of powers between three levels of government would be 
avoided. 	The extent of these difficulties will become more 
apparent after consideration has been given to the financial problem 
which will arise between the Federal and State Governments. 
There will inevitably be some functions on the 
borderline between those which are purely national and those which 
are purely local in character. To prohibit the State Uovernments 
from functioning in these fields would be incompatible with their 
retaining the maximum of independence. 	On the other hand, it 
would probably be in the beat interests of the nation if the 
Federal Government were given some voice in the administration of 
those particular functions. When suah functions are being 
considered at the time of the formation of the Constitution, s case 
may be made out for tee Federel and State Governments to share 
responsibility. 
;atperience hae shown in Auctralia that when 
responsibility is shared in the form of concurrent powers of 
covernment, the power has tended to be appropriated te the 'federal 
Government. This wee particularly evident in the case of concurrent 
powers to impo...e income taxation. It is through the agency of 
concurrent powers that the potentially stronger of the two types of 
government can expand at the expense of the other. It is therefore 
essential that if it is found necessary to give the Vederel and 
State Governments concurrent powers in certain fields, the 
Constitution should contain adequate provisions against the usurpation 
of those powers by one at the expense of the other. 
It is obviously impossible to enumerate and 
allocate every possible type of function which maybe distributed 
between the Governments in the Constitution. 	However, it is 
probable, and indeed desirable, that the mare important should be 
specifically mentioned and allocated. 	This will leave a eide field 
of activity which will not be specifically considered. The 
alternatives open are to permit both typea of government to function 
in this residual field, or limit the field completely to one or the 
other. In the interests of preserving the c .sentials of federalism - 
retention as far as possible of the independence of the member 
States - it is desirable that such residual powers should be retained 
completely by the state Governments. Power should only be given to 
the ederal Government where it is eesential in the interests of the 
eedcretion as a whole that certain functions should be performed on 
behalf of the States in order to obtain uniformity or co-ordination 
of policy. 	If a certain function is regarded as lacking sufficient 
importance to be specifically allocated by the Constitution, it 
would almost certainly fall outside this group of fuect5ons. 
Difficulty may arise at some future time if a 
function which by all tests is the province of the ::ederal 
Government, was not of sufficient importance at the time of the 
7 . 
formation of the Constitution to warrant specific trnnsfer to the 
Federal Government. It may be a function developed since the time 
when the Constitution was formed. 5 	In this case, if all residual 
powers are left in the hands of the .4mte Governments, the -!'ederal 
Government will be constitutionally prevented from assuming control. 
This can be overcome by amendment to the Constitution or by giving 
the Governments of the states authority to trAnsfer any power to the 
Federal Government if they so desire. This however, is n problem of 
political science and does not materially affect the financial 
problem. 
It can be seen that the distribution of functional 
powers should follow some definite pattern which will be determined 
by the nature of those powers. 	It is absolutely essential to the 
proper functioning of the Federation that the distribution of powers 
be made according to this principle. If functions which are 
essentially local in character are given to the Federal Government, a 
certain amount of inefficiency will result and dissatisfaction will 
follow if those affected are geographically remote from the seat of 
administration. Thus the distribution of functional powers should 
be determined by the nature of the FoJeration. 
The powers referred to in the preceding paragraphs 
have been called functional powers. By this has been meant the 
power to perform some act of administration. It could be 
interpreted as power to spend money on certain functions. Distinct 
from this group is another set of powers which can be referred to as 
financial powers. These are mainly powers to raise revenue. As 
with the distribution of functional powers, there may also be some 
automatic distribution of financial powers. Vol. example, it may 
be considered essential for the Vedcra Government to be given power 
to control international and interstate trade. If this is so, it 
will automatically carry with it the financial power to impose and 
collect customs duty. Similarly, the provision of ccrtain services 
Obi*■■■ 1.1114 011141MOIWOMOWOODIMO.W.V.O■ 
5. For example, in Australia control of air traffic was sufficiently 
unimportant to be ignored at the time of the formation of the 
Federation. *hen the necessity for control arose, it wa: a 
residual power and hence a function of the State Governments 
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may be national in character and hence become a function of the 
Federal Government. 
he Federal Government may also be given direct 
Amami*? powers. Foe example, at the outset of Federation it may 
be decided that it is In the interests of the Pederation as a whole 
that taxes on incomes should be uniform in all parts of the 
Federation and that this can beat be achieved by the transfer of the 
powers to tax incomes to the 4'ederal Government to the exclusion of 
the State Governments. These are three example of the types of 
revenue which the iederal Government may receive as the result of the 
allocation of powers at the time tif the formation of the Federation. 
There will be others of lesser or greater importance, but undoubtedly 
the i'ederal Government will be given some power to collect revenue 
by taxation or by the imposition of duties. 
The assumption of certain powers to collect revenue 
by the "ederal Government will mean the loss of those revenue fields 
to the member Statee. The retention of certain functional powers 
will mean that VA' State Governments will receive some revenue, if 
only as a corollary to the retention of those functional powers. 
they may also be allotted power to levy taxation in certain fields by 
the Constitution. This would be, in effect, merely a continuation 
of the practice which existed before the ?ederation was formed. More 
probably the allocation of powers, both functional and financial, 
will leave a residual field of revenue available to the Otates thus 
ensuring that they receive some revenue. The alternative is that 
the Federal and State Governments share certain revenue raising 
fields. 
This is the practice which was adopted in the 
Australian Constitution with respect to powers to impose taxation 
and experience has now shown that it can be unsatisfactory. 
Inevitably one or the other of the two levels of government must be 
given prior right to collect the tax and this may lead to the 
eventual exclusion of the other form of government from the particular 
field. The formation of concurrent financial powers will mean in 
9. 
effect the virtual allocation of the power to the authority with 
priority of collection. 	As in the case of concurrent functional 
powers considered earlier, it is In the interests of the Fedl;ration 
as a whole that when it necessary to institute such concurrent powers, 
it is ,qually necessary to ensure that they remain divided between the 
two types of government. This safeguard should be inserted in the 
Constitution. 
After the adoption of the federal principle there 
will thus be two levels of Government. On the one hand it will have 
created a Federal Government and on the other it will have retained 
the legislative and administrative organisations of the regions which 
have now become .aembev Z;tates of the Pederation. The bonstitation, 
agreed to by at least a majority, will have allocated powers both 
functional and financial between the two types of government. This 
distribution will have been determined, not by any arbitrary method, 
but by the needs of the Federation. That is, the distribution will 
have been made in such a way that the beet interests of the nation as 
a whole will be served. 
As a result, it is incvitable that there will be 
no designed relationship betweAl the functional powers and the 
financial powers of both the -ederal Government and the'rAate 
Governments. That is, the distribution of the functional powers 
will be determined in such a way as to produce the most satisfactory 
results. Generally, financial powers are of secondary consoderation, 
and will follow almost automatically from the allocation of 
functional powers. It can therefore be expected that little 
attention will be paid, or should be paid, to the degme of balance 
which will be achieved between the two sets of powers. ?or example, 
it maybe that the allocation of functional powers to the States 
carries with it revenue raising powers far in excess of their needs 
while the Federal Government has certain functions to perform but 
lacks the power to raise revenue to meet all revenue requirements. 
Conversely, the Federal Government might find itself with power to 
raise revenue greater than the amount necessary for it to perform 
10. 
its proper functions, while the revenue raisins power of the :::tate 
3overnments is far below their requirements. 1or the purposes of 
this analysis, the revenue requiremeats of a government in a 
Vederation may be taken as the amounts of revenue which it must 
receive to permit it to carry out the fuections allotted to it by 
the Constitution. Iii the latter case mentioned above, the revenue 
requirements of the 1-:tate lovernments are greater than their 
potential revenue. 
It Is not inconceivable that at a point in time the 
distribution of functional and financial powers between the two types 
of government will be roughly In balance. 	That la, the Federal 
aovernment will have •omer to raise just sufficient revenue to meet 
its requirements. 	Tamilarly with the Otate Governments. however, 
should this position arise accidentally it is almost certain that 
before long the relative signfieance of certain functional or 
financial powers will change, and hence the balance will be disturbed. 
If the required balance has been ingenioaely engineered, it may have I 
been at te expense of the optimen allocation of powers which is 
expected to produce the beet and, most beneficial results in the 
rederstion. If this 12 so, it will probably no be long before 
some change takes place which 1171 cause ecwee disparity, arid if it 
Is desired to maintain the original balance, 	can only be 
achieved by further eanipulation of functional or financial powers. 
Apart fron the difficelties associated with Cle periodic amendment 
of te :'fonstitution to maintain this balance, if it becomes necessary 
to re-distribute the functirmal powers, the new distribution will 
vary probably be from the optMmum distribution. 
The degree to which the disparity between the cost 
of the function which each type of adminietration la required to 
carry out and the financial resoarees available to each will vary 
according to the fundamental basis of the particular Federation. 
That is, the distribution of functional powers in any rederntion will 
be determined by such diverse factors as the geographical pattern, 
the distribution of the population, the financial resources of each 
11. 
coomunity, end so on. 	he complicated pattern will, if the 
distribution of powers is aimed at producitg the bast poesible result 
determine the degree of disparity between the cost of functional 
powers and the revenue which can be Obtained by the exercise of 
financial powtlis. The extent of the disparity can vary between two 
possible extremes. At the one end it is possible to visualise the 
FetIeral Government with limited functional powers but with aosolute 
financial poicrs. In other words, at the time when the Constitution 
was being framed it was found necessary to give all revenue raising 
powers to the Federal Government but it was desirable to transfer 
only limited functional powers to that authority. In this case, the 
State Governments will find themselves virtually devoid of income 
and yet be involved in conaiderable expenaiture in order to carry 
out their allotted functions. 
At the other extreme, the 2ederal Government may be 
given certain functions to perform and yet have no assured source of 
revenue. 	In this case, the tate Governments will have certain 
administrative functions to perform and their sources of revenue will 
be potentially greater than their revenue requirements. In practice 
it will probably be found that the actual distribution which is 
adopted will bring forth a situation somewhere between these two 
extremes. Either the Yederal or 7tate Uovernments will be found to 
have revenue resources in excess of their requirements. It follows 
that the other authority will have less revenue than it needs. 
It is of course, conceivable that in absolute terms 
both authorities may have potential sources of reveLae in excess of 
or less than their req.lirements. 	For the :ederntion as a whole, 
however, the financial resources and revenue requirements will 
balance. If they should be temporarily out of balance, than 	the 
occasions when financial resources exceed requirements, taxation up t 
the full potential will not be necessary. 	When revenue requirement 
exceed the revenue potential, some reduction of expenditure will be 
found necessary. 	Over the Federation as a whole, when revenue 
and expenditure are equated, it can be assumed that there will still 
1 2. 
be disparity between the functional and financial powers of both the 
Federal Government and the Governments of the several member States 
of the Federation. 
This disparity gives rise to the major financial 
problem of a Federation. TX' one authority has more revenue than the 
adequae performance of its allotted functions requires and the other 
authority has loss t4an its requirements, and if it is impossible 
or impracticable to transfer either functional or financial powers 
from one authority to the other, then recourse must be hod to the 
transfer of revenue from the authority which is in a position to 
produce surplus revenue to the authority which has insufficient 
revenue to meet necessary expenditure, 	Either the Federal or 
Covernments may he the authority enjoying the position of 
financial superiority. The determination of which it shall be and 
the degree of the disparity will result from the interaction of all 
the forces which caused the Atderation to come into being. Whichever 
authority happens to be in the position of enjoying surplus revenue, 
there will be * financial problem which will vary according to which 
authority is in this position. 
In the case where the tate ,:overnments can raise 
more revenue than the; revire, the problem of redistribution which 
pill have to be nolvel will n -,t be very great. 	'"!-ic.y will raise a 
certain amount of revenue and portion of this income wiU be used 
to meet necessary expenditure on the administration of the functional 
powers allotted to them under the Constitution. Any surplus revenue 
can then be paid to the Federal Government to be added to its other 
sources of income in order to meet its expenditure requirements. 
the main problem here is to ensure that there will be sufficient 
surplus revenue after the ;:tate Governments have met their necessary 
expenditure to permit the federal Government to function effectively. 
The position may erime that although the State 
Governments have a revenue potential sufficient to meet their own 
and the Vederal Governmtnt's firancial needs, they maybe unwilling 
to raise the revenue neceasary to produce the surplus for transfer 
1 3. 
to the Federal :;overnment. 	In :;n 1 a eituation it would be 
advisable to have some legislative or constitutional provision which 
would compel the governments of the }tates to transfer eufficient 
revenue to the Federal Government. It would be difficult, and 
indeed inadvisable, for the Constitution to provide that the a stated 
amont o or proportion of the total income of each state should be 
handed annually to the Federal lovernment. If the appropriate 
amount were correctly determined at the beginning, in the first 
year of Federation, it would soon become more tan or less than 
adequate. 	tier/lope VA., best method would be the establishment of a 
Commiseion or similar tJody of experts to determine the necessary 
amounts from time to time. It would then be mandatory foreech 
state Government to cubacribe the determined aaount to the finances 
of Cs Federel :;overnment. 
If, under these circumstances, both the ?ederal 
Government and the member :7,tates of the i'ederation have been allotted 
fields in which to raisk revenue r and tee tate Governments are 
unwilling to tax with severity sufficient to produce the revenue 
necessary to give a surplus which is to ,se available for transfer 
to the -eederal Oevernment, then the Federml Government may, if the 
taxation field allotted to each are supplementary - that is, they 
fall on the same person - increase the rates of taxation, in the 
fields open to it in order to correct the deficiency. However, if 
this could be done, it could be said that the fields of taxation 
were such that they could be manipulated to produce a permanent 
balance between functional and financial powers. There may possibly 
be other solutions which will produce the lesircd result with 
equal adequacy. 
The alternative case of (A,eparity between 
functional and financial .owers which may arise, is the situation 
■ 	 where the Federal Government is given potential revenue raising 
powers in excess of its requiremnts. In. the analysis which 
follows, attention will be concentrated on the correction of a 
disparity of this nature. The exclusion of. the possibility of the 
. other alternative situation arising can be justified on two grounds. 
The first is that in the major ve'erations which now exist the 
Federal Government is financially the stronger. In the jnited 
States of America, the Dominion of Canada and the Commonwealth of 
Australia, the 41deral Governments regularly make grants to the 
member States of each Federation in order that they may adequately 
perform their allotted functions. 
Uecondly, the nature of the functional powers 
which would reasonably be allotted to a Vederai Government are such 
that they carry with them considerable revenue raising power. It 
can be expected that control of tariff measures associated with 
international trade will be one of tie functions of the Federal 
Government, and this will automatically carry with it power to impose 
and collect customs revenue. 	Ucually the expenditure involved in 
the performance of this function will not be very great, while the 
revenue attached to it, if any protective tariff measures are adopted, 
will be substantial. 	Here then is a potential source of revenue 
to tAl Federal ';overnment which will probably be more than sufficient 
to meet all expenditure requirements. In addition, it is probable 
that the Federal 'government will be given control of post and 
telegraph services which may De potentielly profitable and yield 
revenue in excess of expenditure. :)ther services, also potentially 
profitable, may fall within its sphere of influence. Transport 
services which cover more than one State might be one example. 
One highly lucrative source of revenue which may 
conceivably be given to the Felieral Government is the power to 
Impose /led collect taxes on incomes. The only adequate reason for 
this is that it wee thought necessary at the time of the formation 
of the Federation that income taxes should be levied uniformly 
throughout the Pederation. This could only be satisfactorily 
achieved if there is but one taxing authority in the field, and the 
cderal Government is the only choice. 	If power t(3 levy income 
tax is given to tie eutrimity, then its financial superiority over 
the State alevernments will be assured and the financial problem 
will be related to the peening over of revenue from the Federal to 
15. 
to the State Governments. 6 
It can be assumd, then, that this is the problem 
which will arise. As pointed odt previously, although it is not 
inevitable that this will happen, it preKonts the greatest 
possibility, for tide reason, and for other that will ecome more 
apparent at a later stage, the position where the Federal Uovernment 
is the administartive authority which he potential financial 
resources in excess of its requirements will be considered 
exclusively in this essay. 
Briefly summarising the position which it has been 
assumed will arise, both the Federal Government and the Governments 
of the meatier States will have been allotted certain functional and 
certain revenue raising powers and the distribution of these powers 
will be such that the revenue raising potential of the -Federal 
Government will be greater than that which is required to meet all 
Its necessary expenditure. The State tovernments or the other hand, 
A 	if the, tax to the full extent in the fields remaining to them, will 
be unable to finance adequately the functions which have been allotied 
to them by the Constitution. It is then eneumbent upon the Pederal 
Government to raise revenue in excess of its immediate requirements 
and transfer the surplus revenue to the State Governments. 	Of 
course it will be impossible to determine exactly the revenue 
requirements of the member ;itates over and above the revenue they 
themselves can raise from the sources available to them. In any 
case it will be a matter of ju0gment as to the required level of 
necessary expenditure by each authority. Revertheleus, it should 
be possible to determine, with a small margin or error, how much will 
be required. In practice it will probably be found that both 
authorities will tax to the capacity that is politically desirable 
in the potential fieles of each, and avenues of expenditure will 
always exist to absorb all revenue that lc raised. 
.1.110MWIIM ...... 0.0 4.1.4M 
6. This proposition relates only to the present era. *hen the Australian Constitution was designed, the importance of income taxing powtre wee fair lees than it is now. However, in the establishment of a new Federation, or tne revision of the Constitution of an existing '-'ederation, the allocation of income taxing powers will be highly important. 
16. 
Given this situation, there will alet4t be an 
annual surplus in the hands of the Federal Government which is to be 
paid out to the several State Governments. The major financial 
problem of * Federation now becomes apparent. This is to determine 
how the surplus revenue of the Federal Government Is to be divided 
between the several States. The distribution can be determined 
according to one of several possible alternatives. These will be 
explained in detail in subsequent Chapters. &fore proceeding with 
this analysis, however, it might be of advantage to consider the 
probable organisation of the federation in order that the processes 
necessary to carry out the distribution according to whichever 
principle it he been thought advisable to adopt may be appreciated. 
As seen earlier,7 the member States of a Federation 
will be fully independent in their respective fields. They will 
presumably have thar own legislatures, executives and judiciaries 
. which are fully answerable to the people. It is almost inconceivtble 
that a Federation, as the concept is understood, could exist under 
any political philosophy other than democracy. On the other hand, 
the Federal Government will also be a complete entity with 
independence in its allotte1 field. Preaumably the legislature of 
this federal authority will be an elected body and in this r‘spect 
it will be repre,entative of all the electors in the Federation 
irrespective of the States in which t.ey reside. Thus, in each 
Otate there will be at least two authorities functioning. The first, 
the :.tederal Government, will deal with all matters common to all 
people in the Federation. The other, the State Governments, sill 
depl with all matters of purely local concern. It is esential that 
there ahould be no conflict or disharmony between the two authorities, 
for they should both be working to achieve he same ends, nnmely, 
the provision of good government and essential services. 0 
The executive, as the agent of the legislature, 
will in each ease be the body responsible for the raining of revenue 
and its proper expenditure, although the policy relating to thee* 
matters will be determined by the legislatures. It will be 
7. 	See Page I above. 
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convenient for the determination of the financial problem if each 
body adopts the same budgeting and accounting period. The precedure 
which should be adopted annually to achieve the desired results shouU 
be that the executive in each 4;rtete should prepare an estimate of 
the necessary expenditure and the expected revenue which will be 
raised from the sources available 	it. Thus the feederul authority 
will be aware of the amount in excess of its own requirements that it 
must raise for transfer to the several State Governments. This may 
be more or less than the revenue potential of the Federal 
Government. If it is less then taxation measures can be imposed 
which fall short of drawing off all available revenue from the 
taxpayer. If it is more tan the revenue potential available, then 
the executives of the States will have to inform their legislatures 
that expected revenue will be lower than anticipated and that 
.expenditure will have to be reduced. In this way, the overall 
balance maybe prLserved. 
This is the ideal situation with perfect 
co-ordination between each.1tate Government and the Federal Uovernmeni 
In actual fact it might not work out in this way. The difficulty of 
co-ordinating the bringing-down of budgets alone may prevent its 
attainment. It is probable that the Federal Government will be callek 
upon to estimate the requirements of the several Ctates and to budget 
accordingly. 	In this 7ay a specific amount will be allocated to 
each State from the anticipated revenue of the Federal Government 
during each particular financial year. If this procedure is carried 
out sufficiently early in the financial year, the authorities in each 
State will be aware of the revenue which will be available from the 
Federal Government and will be Ole to adjust expenditure accordingly, 
The great deficiency of this methoJ is that no allowance can be made 
for errors in estimation. The Federal Covernment may, at the 
beginning of the financial year, levy certain rates of taxation which 
it estimates will produce sufficient revenue to mLet its own 
requirements and the requirements of the r;tates above those which can 
be financed frau the sources of revenue available to them. 
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This supposition may not be realised for one or 
more of a number of reasons. For example, general economic 
conditions affecting overseas trade and incomes of residents may 
fluctuate unexpectedly thus altering the effect of a given schedule ol 
taxation rates during the course o? the financial year. Under such 
circumstances it will be neceseary for expenditure plans to be 
altered or alternatively, for governments to be prepared to accept 
a deficit or surplus on revenue account. 
It will be noticed that no mention has here beun 
made concerning the investment activities of the several authorities. 
This omission has been deliberate. The main concern will be with 
the revenue transactions of the various governments, and the part 
played by expenditure on capital development will be introduced at 
a later stage. 
The main financial problem which will be 
encountered in a 1-'ederction has now been stated and it remains to 
consider possible alternative principles which can be adopted as a 
basis for the distribution of the surplus revenue of the -et4e3-al 
Government to the member '.1tates of the Federation. 
fiefore doing so, it has been thought desirable to 
examine briefly the objectives of government financial policy. 
Although the specific powers and functions of the governments in a 
Federation are laid down in a Constitution, those functions are 
merely the details of a much wider purpose. The revenue requirements 
of the . *.ederal and state Governments should be sufficient to permit 
them to perform adequately their respective function.'The extent to 
which eiey should go when interpreting the range of a particular 
function is not, however, determined in a Constitution but is a 
matter of public policy which is itself formed in accordance with 
current views as to the scope of government and which can be 
expected to vary from time to time. 
miwows .............. 
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Objectives of Financial Policy in a Federation 
While it is difficult to elf/salty Objectives of 
governmental financial activity into watertight compartments, it 
does appear possible to distinguish four main Objectives in the 
modern developed economy. 	These may be termed the institutional, 
the redistributive, the developmental and the anti-cyclical 
Objectives. The first,tte institutional objective., contains the 
basic functions of government designed to maintain the framework and 
institutions of society. 	The redistributive Objective gives a 
government the responsibility of ensuring an adequate distribution of 
goods and services between the members of the coNanuaity. The third, 
the developmental objective is concerned with the part played by 
governments in procuring the most advantageous allocation of available 
resources, and finally, the anti-cyclical objective is aimed at 
influencing the achievement and maintenance of full employment. 
The process of carrying out theta) objectives 
involves a government in revenue and spending problems and these 
problems are Somewhat different in a Federation as compared with a 
unitary State. This is particularly so in connection with the 
redistributive Objective but it still applies, although with leszer 
significance, with the developmental and the anti-cyclic/1 
Objectives. 
.A._ The 	PbASSAYs 
0 far as this Objective is concerned, no very 
serious problem will be encountered. Certain activitics„ such as 
the preeervation of law and order, the supervision of public safety, 
the organisation of defence requirennts and the regulation of 
industry must be performed and their adequate performance- requires 
expenditure of a certain magnitude. 	This amount must be raised 
by taxation or by other means at the disposal of governments. The 
procedure will be almost identical in both a aederation and a state 
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with a unitary form of government, an can therefore be passed over 
in this analysis. 
24_11122011.21hatlysAkaallia. 
One of the features of the modern developed economy 
is the uneven distributim of incomes received by members of the 
society. Inequality of incomes is characteristically marked by a 
concentration of income earners in the middle and low income groups, 
with a smell number in the upper income brackets receiving n 
substantial proportion of all incomes. 	For example, in Australia 
in 1951-52. 3.25i of all taxpayere received 46.83 of all incomes. 
These people received actual incomes before taxation of over i42,000 
in that year. 	The remaining 96.75 had incomes of less than £2,000 
and together received 83.17 of all incomes. 2 
This purely statistical comparison should be 
tialified in that the low incomt earners in a country which has 
developed industrially are usually minors. Novertheleces it would 
be true to say that the distribution of money incomes of adults of 
labour-force age le concentrated at the lower end of the scale. 
Furthermore, it is usually found that it is the low-income earner 
who has the greatest family responsibilities in the form of 
dependents and sickness. 
In this respect, a clear distinction should be 
made between inequality of incomes and poverty. 	Undoubtedly the 
two are closely connected but tie motive behind the remedying of 
dire poverty is quite different from that behind the reduction of 
inequality. There can be no question that in modern developed 
society the prevention of extreme poverty is accepted as a basic 
duty of governments. It is carriail out for humane reasons. On 
the other hand, the reduction of equ ,aity, as part of the 
i. For a detailed examination of the historical development of views on the basic functions of governments, see /r. J. Baumol„ 
"Helfer. Economics and the Theory of the 3tate", Chapter 12, 
PP. 140 - 156. 
2. Commonwealth Budget Papers, 194-55: Parliamentary Paper F3321 p. 152. 
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redistributive objective is undertaken, as will be seen subsequently, 
with the purpose of increasing the welfare of the society. 
The degree of inequality which was mentioned above 
in connection with Australian circumstances is comm. to all 
civilised comlunities, and governments have undertaken to effect 
some redistribution by, in effect, taking from the rich and giving 
to the poor. This function of government is of fairly recent 
origin and it will be of advantage in understanding the implications 
of financial policy to understand by governments feel that one of 
their functions is to attempt to reduce the inequalities which exist. 
Undoubtedly one of the masons can be traced to 
the system of democratic government which exists in most of these 
communities. It follows that because the great majority of income 
earners are in the lower income groIaps, the great majority of electors 
are also in the low income groups. If 1 .t is the will of the 
majority of electors that the elected government should adopt as part 
of its financial policy the function of redistributing incomes, then 
it will elect a government which undertakes to follow such a 
procedure. , This is what the majority of electors will desire of its 
elected representatives if that majority comprises the lower income 
groups. 
however, this 'process will develop slowly. A 
newly enfranchised lower income group will not usually demand 
sweeping reforms in the direction of establishing greater equality 
of incomes. As small concessions are gained, the electors will 
become increasingly aware of the differences in income which exist 
and of the power which they, as electors, hold to reduce the 
Inequality, 
The process of the trend towards greater equality 
through deliberate financial policy of governments hes been hastened 
by the occurrence of what may be called national disasters. In 
iimes of emergency, governments have found it necessary to increase 
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their revenue substantially, and this has been done by the imposition 
of heavy taxation on the high income receiver. This was particularl; 
noticeable during the wars of 1914-18 and 1939-45. After the need 
for additional revenue has paz.sed, the high rates of taxation have 
b-en continued or reduced by less, than the former increase, and the 
revenue thus obtained used mainly for purposes to the benefit of 
persons in the lower income groups. 
Despite. the political aspects or the trend towards 
greater equality as part of the financial policy of governments, it 
would be true to say that the trend would not have taken place purely 
because the franchise was widened and the newly-enfranchised electors, 
as potential receivers of assistance, desired greater equality. There 
must be some ethical foundation which juotifies the movement towards 
greater equality, in part at least, in the eyes of income receivers 
who will suffer a reduction in income as a result of the adoption 
of the policy. 
An ethica justification of the policy is not hard 
to find. 	It stems from the fact that the wide differences in 
income which are evident between members of a Society are not caused 
solely by the ability of the persons concerned. If the only source 
of income available to each person in the commnity was the amount 
which he could earn by his own labour and initiative, it would be tru4 
to say that the range of incomes would be much narrower than it is at 
present. That is, a large part of the difference is caused by 
ownership of property and inequality of opportunity. 
Prom this hypothesis it follows that if the only 
source of individual income was that which could be earned by p4rsons1 
effort, the range of income in the community would be distributed 
according to ability. On the other hand, the absolute potentiality 
for satisfaction would be randomly distributed. It would be 
illogical to argue that because the ability of a person is less than 
that of his neighbour, his potentiality for satisfaction is 
correspondingly lower. There can be little doubt that this 
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potentiality foe sftiefaction will be differcn, for different persons 
but there seems no eeason why the distribution should be the eame as 
the distribution of abilities or of material wealth. 
This raises the ethical questien of whether a man 
should be restricted in the satisfaction of his wants because his 
relative ability is low. 	he answer to this question is one which 
has been debated for many years and the differences of opinion have 
given rice to the establishment of political philosophics, political 
parties and the overthrow of governments. From the cham,es which 
have taken place in the attitudes of governments, and particalsrly 
the emergence of the welfare state, it would appear to be now general-
ly accepted that while the incentive of tnose of greater ability 
should be preserved, the person with relatively lower ability, and 
hence receiving a relatively lower income, should not be restricted 
in the satisfaction of his "vents to the extent of his income. 	In 
other words, it is generally accepted that his income should be 
supplemented at the expense of the higher income receiver and so 
increase his satisfaction to a level nemrer that of a man with 
greater ability. At the same time, the txreet of the equalisation 
process should be limited to the extent where there is still 
incentive for all men to use their aoilitj to the greatest extent. 
As mentioned above, this attitude to the range of 
inequality of incomes in a community has led to the emergence of the 
welfare Ltate an4 for simplicity of exemition will be referred to as 
the "welfare or "redistributive function of governments. It has 
been generally accepted that the process . of redistributing incomes 
In a communitj will increase the welfare of the community as a whole. 
Aare correctly, it is a process designed to allow greater equality 
of the means to satisfy poecntial wants. 
Given that this is one of the major objectives of 
government financial policy in the modern state, the question of how 
financial policy can be adapted to bring about greater equality of 
incomes, and hence greater equality of the means to satisfy potential 
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wants must be considered. It i.,  not here necessary to explain in 
deteil the organisation . of the finances of governments. It is 
sufficient to say that on the one side, governments receive revenue 
from the imposition of taxation and various charges for services 
rendered, and also by means of public borrowing. On the other hand, 
the money received is spent on the provision of services. These 
services, interpreted in the widest sense, include the maintenance of 
the institutions of the society, the provision or social3 and general 
services, the provision of public utilities, the payment of debt 
management charges and investment in public capita/ works.4 Nithin 
this framework a government, if it is to perform the redistributive 
function referred to earlier, must bring about greater equality of 
incomes of rwlidents. 
The major source of a government's current revenue 
iv taxation in its various forma. 	In Australia in 1952-53, taxatior 
was responaible for W of all revenue of th Oovernment of the 
Cowonwealth of Australia. 5 	The taxation takes severni forms, the 
most important of which are income and company taxes, sales or 
purchase tax, stamp and death duties end customs and excise duties. 
Income tax can be levied on all income receivers whether they are 
wage and salary earniers, rentiers, professional men or companies. 
Sales tax can be imposed on all who purchase consumer or capital 
goods. Customs and excise duties will ultimately be paid in the 
retail price of the goods on which they are imposed, and will 
therefor* be paid by all sections of the community. 
It can Oe appreciated that if a government adopts 
a selective taxation policy it will be a highly effective implement 
for bringing about greater equality of incomes. Income tax is the 
greatest potential source of revenue and is at the aame time the 
most important moans at the disporal of governments for reducing 
inequality of incomes. 	ihile considerable inequality is to be 
found in the distribution of actual incomes before taxation, when a 
progressive rate of incrime tax L.; inpoe, tie degrce of inequality 
of incomes after taxation 'fill be lee r:oticeable. 	The extent of 
the inequality after taaLcion will depend on the extent of the 
inequality before taxation and the degree of progression in the 
rates of taxation. 
'he came principle can be applied to other forms. 
IME11.11.01.411111.0.11.sees------ 3. Social services provided by governments are of two kinds. The first is the provision of some actual physical services such as education. The second is a cash payment in the form of a pension or other cash benefit. 
The investment activities of governments will be dealt with as part of the developmental objective. See p3o -0Esqq. below. 
5. Financial Statement of the Treasurer of the Commonwealth of Australia, A952-53. 
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of taXation but the effects are leer spectacu3ar than those achieved 
b;,0 thu use of progressive rates of taxation on incomes. Taxation of 
estates of decessed persons can be steeply progressive, and in the 
pat, death duties have played an important part in bringing about g 
greater equa/ity of incomes by removing part of the source of 
inequality. There is less scope for selectivity with the other main 
forMs of taxation, namely sales tax end custom and exciaL duties, for the great majority of goods subject to these taxes are coneumed 
by those in the lower income groups. nevertheless, even in these 
cases there is some scope for selectivity by, for example, imposing 
high rates of duty or tax on goods which are normally consumed by 
people in thc higher income brackets. Furthermore, the imposition 
of duties on goods which are consumed by people in the lower income 
groups csn play an important part in a governmen4 anti—cyclical 
policy. 	This aspect will be treated in some detail later in this 
Chapter. 
Thus, through its taxation powers, a government has 
an important means for implementing a policy designed to bring about 
greater equality of incomes. This, however, is only part of the 
process. 'ale aim cannot be achieved by taxation policy alone. In 
its expenditure policy the government must also discriminate between 
the relative needs of the different income groups in the cOmmunity. 
As mentioned earlier, a government will spend its 
revenue on maintaining the institutions of the society, providing 
social and genural services, skating its interest arid sinking fund 
commitments and investing in new capital works. 	From the point of 
view of decreasing the degree of inequality in the community, the 
most important of these expenditure functions is *the provision of 
social services. 	hrough itn expenditure on social services the 
government will be able to discriminate between these in the high 
income groups and those in the /ow income groups. Hoth the 
provision of physical social survices and the disect payment of 
financial assistance by way of pent-ions rill be designed to benefit 
those who contributed least to the revenue of the government by way 
of taxation and other ch-sges. 
In the Australian economy, the manner in which the 
distribution is ;ado through the asency of social sorvices and 
direct financial payments can be re dily appreciated. All permit:as 
paid are rubject to a means test. That is, they are only paid if 
the recipient's income from other sources is very low. 	Child 
endowment is paid to all par nts of children under sixteen years of 
age irrespective of income, but the relative benefit is much greater 
to those in the lower income groups. In the field of the provision 
of physical services as opposed to the payment of direct financial 
eisistance, the main avenues of expenditure are in the provision 
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of medicel wed eduction services, 	These are avoilable to all 
members of the commurity irrespective of the level of their incomes. 
However, it has been founrl in some countries that people in the higher 
income groups avail themselves of private medical and educational 
facilities leaving those provided by the state for people in the 
middle and lower income groups. Thir practice is not, however, 
universal and there appears to be a growing tendency on the part of 
better-off people to use the available public services. kievertheles% 
as in the case of direct financial payments without 'a means test, the 
relative benefit derived Prom the service by the middle and lower 
income groups is far greater than that derived by those in the higher 
income groups who contribute through taxation a very much greater 
than proportionate shore of the cost of the services. 
These, briefly, are the processes which will be 
involved it a government wishes to pursue a policy, designed to bring 
about greater *quality of real income in the community. The extent 
to which it will carry out the objective, or the degree to ehich it 
will endeavour to increase equality, will be influenced largely by 
political considerations. A left-wing government will probably be 
more enthusiastic and carry the policy farther than a conservative 
government.. However, it appears that the welfare state has been 
firmly established and irrespective of the party in power, financial 
policy is being directed to a geeater rather than a lesser degree 
towards reducing inequality of incomes. It can be safely said that 
this i3 now an aceepted functien of governlent in hiehly dm/ol eo:TAW", 
with non-socialist oreanisation of productiett. 
the analysis which has been made of the processes 
involved in adopting a redistributive policy have been expressed in 
very general. terms. - here has been no distinctien made between the 
procelure in say s a country with a unitary form of government and 
one with the federal form. However, it would be true to say that 
the description applies fairly generally to a eountry with the 
unitary for of government. While the description is itself a 
simplification of the vast amount of co-ordination that is necetesary, 
there are no apparent modifications necessary when the policy is 
applied exclusively to a unitary government. Taxation is raised 
by a sinele central auellority, cash social service benefits are paid 
uniformly throughout the country, and general social servicati con be 
supplied uniformly to all sections of the community. 
In a federation difficulties in the implementat-
ion of this simple plan arise because of the division of fields of 
activity in both the reverue raising and spending spheres between. 
the Federal e.overnment on the one hand and the several State 
Governments on the other. It is tee purpose of the remainder of 
this Section to show how the redistributive function of government 
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can be successfully applied in a ;!ederation. 
As pointed out in the previous Chapter, 6 the 
distribl.tion of powers between the Federal and the several State 
Governments will differ between Federations. For the purposes of 
illustration, and because this analysis will subsequently be confined 
to the Australian Federation, conditions which exist in Australia 
will be assumed to be typical or federations generally. 
In Australia, the Federal Government hai been 
given absolute power to impost. customs and excise duties, 7  and 
concurrent powers with the Statea to impose other forms of taxation. 
However, the Constitution provides 
discriminatory between persons and 
expenditure on social services, it 
and provide maternity allowances, 
that taxation shall be non-
States.8 In the field of 
9 may pay invalid and old-age pension 
widows / pensions, child endowment, 
Unemployment, pharmaceutical, sickness and medical benefits, medical 
and dental services, benefits to students and family allowances. /° 
The totato Governments have, by implication, the power to provide the 
major types of physical types of social servIces such as education 
and health service*. 
Whatev'er may have been the intention of t'lose who 
were responsible for the framing of the Constitution, the provisions 
relating to concurrent powers in the field of taxation have been 
interpreted by the courts to mean that the eederl Government has a 
prior right to tax, and this decision, in conjunction with the power 
to make conditional grants to the States, has in fact excluded the 
States from the field of income taxation. The position in Australia 
is thus that the Federal Government has almost absolute control over 
the collection of income and sales tax and customs and excise 
duties. 11 At the same time, the States are responsible for a large 
part of social services expenditure. 12 This is the framework upon 
which the welfare State is built in Australia. 
pith a unitary form of government such as that 
which exists in the United 4ingdom, it is a relatively simple matter 
to enforce a policy aimed at the redistribution of incomes. Taxes are 
levied uniformly throughout the country. Similarly social services 
are supplied on a uniform basis whether they are in the form of 
money transfers such as invalid or old-age pensions or in an indirect 
form such as education services or sUbsidisee hospital treatment* 
■,...emomo.rowimemovisememmemeimmeamIlmommow 
6. See page 10 above. 7. Constitution Act of the Cowmonwealth of Australia, Section 86 8, Constitution Act Section 51(ii). 9. Constitution Act :;ection 51(xxiii). 10. Constitution Act Section 514xxiiiA). 11. In 4952-53, taxation collections by all stout Governments were 1.71m. and by the Commonwealth Government, £895m. 12. In 1 952-53, expenditure by the States on the provision-of social services was £11m. and by the Commonwealth Government, x166a. 
• 
• 
.28. 
In a :ederation such es that which exists in 
Australia, such a redistributive policy cannot be implemented in the 
simple manner oAtlined for a unitary state. Tv.e ?ederal Government, 
which has the greater authority for the imposition and collection of 
taxes, can calculate and impose its rates of taxation In the accepted 
progressive form. 	So far as its oxpendit 're on social and other 
services is concerned, here again the redistributive process can be 
effected by the adoption of a policy for the provision of services 
which are uniform iv all sections of the comnunity. The great 
majority of Eederal social services expenditure in Australia is an 
the payment of cash pensions and allowances which are paid uniformly 
throughout the Commonwealth Irrespective of the State of residence 
of the recipient. 
But a small part of the total taxation collections 
and a large part of the total social services expenditure is the 
responsibility of the State Governments. As shown earlier, while the 
present constitutional arrangements exist in Australia, there must 
inevitably be some transfer of revenue from the Federal Government 
to the State Governments if the utates are to be permitted to perform 
adequately their allotted functions. It must be admitted that t here 
may be no compulsion on the part of the Commonwealth in making these 
grants to the States." 	The problem thus becomes one of determining 
how a policy of equalisation, of incomes can be effectively implemented 
under such conditions. 
The extent to which equalisation can be achieved 
throughout the whole federation, to the degree required by the 
political decisions of the governments concerned, will depend in the 
main upon the principles which are used to determine the amounts of 
the grants to each State. These principles will be examined in 
detail in a later Chapter. 14 At this stage the object is merely 
to determine the way in which the redistributive policy of 
governments can be implemented in a Federation. The means indicated 
may point to the principle to be adopted. 
It is generally accepted that the welfare of a 
community will be increased if inequalities of incomes are reduced 
and, as mer,tioned earlier, this is the fundamental reason for 
adopting a policy which involves redistribution of incomes. This 
concept can be applied to any comaunity no matter how large or small. 
It could be applied, if necessary, to a small community.within a 
unitary state. However, in a country with the unitary form of 
government such as the United 4ingdom, it would be futile to attempt 
13. The Constituti-n provides in Secti n 96 that the Commonwealth may make conditional grants to the States, but under the States Grants (Tax Reimbursement) Act, 1946, there are no conditions other than that which requires the States to refrain from imposing income taxi 
14, See Chapter III 
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to bring about greeter equality -within say, each County separately, 
For if this were attempted there woul; undoubtedly be inequalities 
between people on the smee level of actual income in different 
counties depending upon the absolute average level of income and the 
degree of inequality of incomes before taxation in each comLunity. 
Such an attempt would be difficult to justify on either ethical or 
political grounds and there would be little dodbt, that the welfare of 
the nation 61 a whole would be increased in County boundaries were 
ignored and the OsMe . rates of taxatiowlevied and atandares or 
services supplied in all - counties. 
The position is similar in a Pederation. It would 
be possible for Federal policy to aim at equalising incomes in each 
State individually. 	The federal Government, as the chief revenue 
raising authority, could record funds raised from the m:sidents in 
each. Utate by way of taxation and also the amounts paid to or on 
behalf of the residents of each 3tate. The remainder, if any, could 
then be paid to the .respective governments of the several States and 
they would be responsible for its expenditure in such a way as to 
reduce the degree of inequality in each state indivi&tally. 
Alternatively, the Commonwealth Government could' 
adopt a different redistributive policy for each State based on the 
taxable capacity of each State. A State with a wider range of in-
comes would enjoy greater redistribution and higher absillute levels 
of services compared with a State with a narrow range of incomes. 
SuCh a scheme has little to recomiend it from the practical vieepoint, 
Either of thse approaches, however, regards each 
Stete of the kederation as an integral unit. The alternative is to 
regard individuals, not as meathers of a particular state, but as 
members of the.Federation, as acwhole, Under such circumstances, the 
objective of iederal governmental financial policy should be to 
reduce the degree of inequality of incomes throughout the I'ederation 
ignoring State boundaries. If this were the objective-, Federal 
• grants to the States would be designed to permit State uovernmk:nts 
to adopt an expenditure policy which would decrease the degree or 
inequality to the extent where the same degree of inequality exists 
In all Ztates of the Federation. 
Under Australian conditions, thie would involve an 
assessment of the relative severity of Strite taxation and the stand-
ards and impact of services supplied by the rce.7ective Z=tate 
Governments from their own sources of revenue. It could well be 
that one State in a Federation is particularly poorly endowed with 
natural resources and therefore it - can be expected that incomes are, 
on average, lower than those enjoyed in other States. 	If Federal 
taxation is levied according to a progressive scale, collections 
from that State will be relatively smaller than fmm other Otates. 
IT, under these circumstances, the aim of financial policy is to re-
duce the degree of inequality of incomes in each :.tate separately, 
the degree of redistribution of incomes by means of progreasive 
taxation and discriminatory social services will be limited by the 
range of incomes. 
In the case of a comparatively poor :.;tate where the 
range of incomes is narrow, the redistribution which can be effected 
will be small. In a State which is more prosperous and has a wide 
range of incomes and higher absolute levels, the scope for 
redistribution of incomes is com.spondingly higher. Although there 
is no way of measuring the relative levels of satisfaction enjoyed 
by the residents of each State, it could be said that on average, the 
residents of the latter t74.ate would be better-off than the average 
resident of the former State. Although it is not possikle to 
measure the extent to which they are better-off, it is possible to 
say that they are in a position to satisfy wants to a greater extent. 
However, in such a process of rediatribution between States as well 
as within .tates, there will always be a range of uncertainty in 
which it will be impossible to determine whether greater redistribut-
ion will increase or decrease the average level of satisfaction. 
The conclusion which can be reached from the 
foregoing analysis is that if a government decides to adopt a policy 
designed to redistribute this incomes of the members of its community, 
then the policy should be applied uniformly In all sections of the 
country. A unitary government would have no hesitation in 
redistributing incomes across local government boundaries becKuse it 
would recognise that the boundaries themselves are purely artificial. 
In a X'ederation, the 2ederal Government should endeavour to reduce 
inequality uniformly throughout the Federation because State 
boundaries are similarly artificial and were probably designed 
purely for administrative purposes. To the extent that this 
uniformity cannot be achieved by the direct means at the disposal 
of the Federal Government, federal grants to the State Governments 
should be so designed that when spent by the respective State 
Governments, they will produce a uniform degree of inequality 
between States 
C. The PSIS121/MSDIMA_Pliective. 
As in the case of the redistributive Objective, 
the developmental objective of governments is of comparatively 
recent origin. It is only in recent decades that governments have 
undertaken the responsibility for supervising and encouraging first, 
a balanced use of available resources * and secondly a co-ordinated 
plan of capital luvestment. Together, these make up the 
dionifolkwireirr dmveire., 
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It is the accepted duty of a government in a modern 
developed economy to use its influence to ensure that the allocation 
• of available resources is such that present and future flows of goods 
• and services are maximised. This calls for the planned use of 
resources in the production of goods for current consumption on the 
one hand, and in the production of capital goods for future production 
of consumer goods on the other. 
Com.sponding to each combination of available Peso roes 
there as a certain output of goods and services. One particular 
combination gives the maximum possible output, and this maybe called 
the optimum allocation of resources giving maximum production. It 
is a function of governments to influence tha allocation of resources 
to produce this optioum. 
It has been suggested in economic writings" that a 
completely free market will produce an allocation of resources which 
is below the opttuue. The elparint reason for this Is that the free 
market is individualistic with each individual, either producer or 
consumer, activated solely by the profit motive. The aim of each 
individual is to maximise profits, and iLdividual prolate maybe 
Maximised when total production Is less than a maximum with perhaps 
some unused resources available. 
The effects of private enterprise left to itself can be 
seen, in a simple illustration, by the need for development in many 
• countries of town planning authorities, With lack of positive 
direction, the development of suburban areas of cities has proceeded 
almost irresponsibly. Town planning autheritics have been developed 
• to ensure that proper facilities for shopping centres, playing areas 
and even street formation are provided for. 
The same type of effect can be expected on a larger scale 
• with derisions concerning production. Private industry maybe 
unwilling to accept the reeponsibility for long-range planning or bear 
- the cost of building up capital resources for future production when 
the profit marein is less certain. 	it the case of the use of 
available resources for immediate production, private industry will 
not usually have the necessary knowledge or even cppital to make the - 
best possible use of those resources. 
Crider these circumstances, if governments can intervene 
to influence reallocation in the direction of the optimum, ther the 
• total output of goods and services, and hence the nationml income 
and the average level of income in the calmunity will be increased. 
That is, the financial policy of governments should be directed 
• ..... 
15. See, for example, W.J.Baumol, 	;conomics and the Theory of the ntatee , Chapters 1 and 2. 
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towards bringing about the optitur. allocation of resources in order 
that the power of the community to eatiefy ite wants will be maximised, 
In attempting to determine the optimum allocation of 
available reaources,'s government !should give consideration to the 
long-term as well as the -immediate maximieotion of output of goods and 
services. It could happen that at a given moment the allocation of 
available resources iz such that the proJuction of consumer goods and 
services is maximised. . Rowever, if certain resources were to be 
transferred to the production of capital goods, the output of 
consume goods at present would be reduced but would permit the future 
stream of consumer goods to be increased. Therefore, deciaions will 
need to be made as to the allocation of retources which will give the 
required balance between the production of consumer and capital goods. 
Reallocation of resources can be both influenced by and 
effected by Fovernmental financial policy and other more direct 
controls. In the extreme case such as that which exists in time of 
war', the government should undertake the responsibility for 
allocating all factors of production by means of direct controls. 
An example of this was seen in Australia and other countries during 
the 1939-145 war, with olcial conscription of labour both for the 
defence forces and civilian production. 	her this emeiTelicy is 
absent, the complete regimentation associated with a comprehensive 
range of direct controls is impossible. 
Under such circumstances, in a modern democracy a . 
government must use more indirect methods. 	By use of its financial 
Power it can influence the allocation of' available resources, but 
. again it will be easier to achieve this aim in a unitary state rather 
than in a federation. The ways in which a Fovernment can influence 
this allocation through financial policy are varied, but the more 
important will be briefly mentioned. 
As in the case of financial policy aimed at producing 
greater equality of Incomes in the coinmunity, discriminatory taxation 
and judicious expenditure policies are the main weapons at its 
disposal. The tate, as the largest single enterprise in the 
community, can do a great, deal ii its ownexpenditurc policy to 
counteract any maladjustments which can be sLiD in the private sector 
of the economy. In this reipect, the paymeet of bounties and 
subsidies cm play an important part. ;iut in the reallocation of 
resources, financial policy must inevitably be accompanied by other 
methods such as the imposition of direct controls and discrimination 
in the application of rates of taxation end other charges. Its 
• 
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Influence on Ceatral bank credit policy will also play an iAportnnt 
part. 16. 
"he major pert of the task facing governmente in the 
implementati n of this policy will be to determine the extent to which 
production is below the optimum and thee the netuee of the 
reallocation.Of reaources necessary to improve the position. In some 
cases the ne.el for reallodation will be iemedlotely apparent. 	For 
example, good agriceltural land- may be going out of production because 
farm labour is not available In the immediate vicinity. A decision 
could then be made as to whether production as a whole would be 
increased if labour were transferred from urban areas to the partic-
ular rural areas to the advantage or total production and hence 
national income and the average level of incomes. 
1r this decieloe were =de it would be possible, for 
example, for the government to allow taxation concessions to workers 
In the area, to improve amenities to encourage labour .to move to the 
farms or, negatively, to discourage the expansion of leduetries 
responsible for the transfer of labour by credit and capital control. 
Alternatively, it (eight encourage thc . greater use of labour-saving 
machinery by the farmers to offset the loss of labour by concessions 
in the form of cheaper electric power ol lowee exciee and custom 
duty or sales tax on the machinery involved. Again, it may help to 
reduce the costs of production to the farmer ey concessional transport 
charges. Similar examples could be suggested to illustrate the way 
In which governments can influence the allocation of resources in 
other fields of economic activity. 
In a federation the problem of Zetate boundaries and the 
distribution of powers between the Yederal and fteete uevernments 
again proves to be a barrier to the simple implementation of such a 
policy. 	If, for exteeple, the rederal Oovernment has decided to 
adopt this epproach to output maximisation, the full range of policy 
decisions necessary for making it *era effectively are not available 
to the Federal Government. ehile it controls Central e'anking policy 
and a large part f taxation raising policy, part of the power to 
impoce taxation and a large part of expereliture power, particularly 
In the field of expenditure on capital works, is in the hands of the 
several ,ate Governments. 	They also control such purely domestic 
matters as the levels of charges for Z;tate services including railway 
and electricity services. Consequently neither authority is in a 
16. This is in general agreement with the statement by ".J.Baumol in "Welfare F.conomice and the Theory of the tate" p.63, that "the general problem of maldictribution of resoarces seems to be one that is amenable to amelioration Py a syste31 of bounties and tomes so long as we have some idea of its direction and magritude." 
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position to implement effectively a policy of redintibution of 
resources independently of the other. 
Since it is impossible for tither the Yederel or tate 
Governments to achieve the d_sired end independently, the solution 
must lie in some form ef agreement or cooperation betwee: them. If 
a uniform approach ie desired, the federnl Jovernment must be the 
coordinating authority. Constitutionelly the State Governments 
remain free to act as they think fit and difficulty might be 
exporienced in persuading governments with opposing views to adopt a 
uniform policy in this rLspect. Danger thus exists that different 
policies may be adopted in different tates and this might prejudice 
the success of the policy of the Federal government. 
ene safeguard exists in that the .!sederal Government ia 
bound by the Constitution to adopt a uniform taxation policy 
throughout the Pederation. 	1Wen if It so desires it would find it 
difficult to disc lminate beteeen States except so far as the payment 
of grants is concerned. If two tate (:overnments proposed different 
approachee to a particular problem, a certain amount of uniformity 
would be maintained by the actions of the 2ederal Government. The 
Federel qovernment is prevented from imposing different rates of 
taxation in different :;tates and therefore policies involving the 
imposition of discri•linntory taxation must be applied uniformly 
throughout the Federation. In its control over Central ;ank policy 
and in its expenditure policy there is no such limitation however, and 
In these fields it would be possible for the 'ederal Government to 
discriminate between States. 
If it is agreed that the Federnl itevernment should adopt 
a policy aimed at maximising production in the l'ederation, this policy 
should be applied to its revenue, expenditure and banking policies. 
A considerable portion of its expenditure, however, is used for the 
purpose of making grsnts to the States. If thetates are to be 
place in a position where they can cooperate in t'As implementation of 
the policy, the grants should be determined accordingly. That is, the 
amounts which each State shall receive from the ederal Government 
should be determined after taking into considerntion the ability of 
the State to assist in the implementation of the recneired policy 
from its own resources. 
In this respect, Federal financial seeistance will 
probably play a smeller pert than will be needed for the implementatis 
of a policy designed to reduce inequality through redistribution of 
incomes. In a policy of redistribution of resources according to 
some preconceived plan, expenditure from current revenue will probabl; 
play a relatively small part. Cotsiderably more influence cart be 
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wielded throuW, expendirure on capital works. Levertheless, this 
aspect will have to be considered in the determination of naleral 
grants even if only to allow for differences between States in the 
severity of debt management expenses, particularly interest and 
sinking fund contributions resultant upon expenditure from loan funds. 
The principle involved in determining the respectiv( 
parts which the "2ederal and **tate (overnments shm.ad play in a policy 
designed to maximise produc-tion through improved allocation of 
resources can now be stated in general terms. It would seem that the 
implementation of a policy aimed at etcouraging the attainment of the 
optimum allocation of resources, when introduced by the Federal 
Government, can only be properly aimed at producing the optimum in the 
Federation as a whole. Further, since the sphere of action of the 
Pederal Covernment is limited by the provisions of the Constitution, 
the ,t•deral policy must be implemented in part by State action. It 
is reasonable to suppose that the national income of the federation 
as a whole will be greater if the policy is aimed at obtaining the 
optimum allocation of resources in the Federation as a whole rather 
than in each tate individually. Therefore the plan should be one 
designed by the Federal Government and supplemented by such action as 
is necessary on the part of the States in the fields where they have 
complete constitutional power to act. 
However, if the Federal aim is to be fully effective, the 
3tates musi be placed in a position where financially they may play 
their part. For this reason, Federal financial assistance to a 
state must recognise the Gtate's ability to supplement the Federal 
policy. 	In other words, the grants to the 2tates must include 
amounts sufficient to permit thetr novernments to play their part in 
carrying out the policy. In order to ensure that the States will 
cooperate in the implementation of the overall plan, it ms;; be 
necessary for the Federal "overnment to impose some conditions upon 
the payment of such grants. However, it would probably be found that 
the mere fact that the Federal novernment has power to compel coop, r-
ation will prevent the need for such action. 
The payment of .'ederal grants may involve a transfer of 
financial resources from one State to another which act, by itself * 
could be an •2fective factor in the redistribution of resources. An 
underdeveloped State will be placed in a position where, becausL of 
increased financial resources, it will be able to import from the 
wealthier States relatively more material resources than it could tlav4 
afforded from its own income. ,hether or not this is desirable will 
be determined as part of the overall plan. 
Should the Pederal Government not make provision for the 
adoption by a state of the policy of rya location of resources in the 
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determination of the grant to be made, the anomolous position will 
arise where the Federal Government is attempting to maximise product- 
• 	ion throughout the Federation while the State uovernments will be 
capable only of maximising production in each tate individually. 
Since the States hold a large part of the power to implement the 
policy, look of coordinatim could render the poeer of both 
ineffective. The existence of the Federal Government operating in 
this field will cause more to be achievd than if the States were 
functioning alone, but the optimum will probably never be reached 
unless the ederal Government recognises its responeibility. The onus 
rests with the Vederal ,lovernment to determine grants in such a way 
to 'permit the State Governments to perform their parts. 
Hefore dealing with the fourth major objective of 
governmental financial policy, mention should perhaps be made of the 
Investment activities of governments. In determining the optimum 
allocation of resources, a Government will have to pay particular . 
attention to maintaining a 'balance between the production of present 
and future flows of consumer goods. This involves d - cisions concern-
ing the allocation of reuources betwe,n investment projects with 
varying time-legs between commencement and the stage when the 
i.esultant flow of consumer goods begins. That is, it must develop 
• 
	
	a long-range inveetment plan for the economy as a whole and attempt to 
bring about an allocation of resources in accordance with this plan. 
As with other capes where the Government attempts to 
direct the operation of the market, it may approach the problem in 
two ways, one direct and the other indirect. The direct approach 
involves capital expenditure by the government itself, while the 
indirect approach involves creating conditions which influence the 
private sector of the economy in adopting an investment policy of 
the Government's making. 
Government capital expenditure will be financed from 
current revenue or from borrowed funds. To the extent that current 
revenue used for this purpose is raised by taxation or similar imposts 
the Government will have drawn off purchasing power from the pubis 
which may eventually have been used for current exrenditure or which, 
if saved, could have found its way into private investment. 
In this way the Government can influence the comunity's 
saving and the direction of the corresponding investment. The 
Government will decide, according to its overall plan t the manner In 
which the funds shall be expended and the time-lag between the time 
of investment and the time when a flow of consumer goods is to begin. 
• Apart from such direct action on tipe distribution of 
available resources beteen the production of shot and long term 
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investment goods, a Oovernment may indirectly affect the distribution. 
e selective taxation policy combined with direction of Central Bank 
credit, can be instrumental in encouragine. private invistment to 
follow the lead of the Government. 
A eovernment can also play a decisive part through the 
conduct of its •very-day administration. For example, it the modern 
econow, restrictions have been placed on overseas immigration. By 
adopting a policy which limits entry to those of certain skills and 
professions, the distribution of the labour force can be substantially 1 influenced.7  Cimilerly, a large part of overseas boerowing is now 
conducted by governments and the remainder is subject to direct 
supervision. Present-day currency reutrictions make it comparatively 
easy to ensure eovernmental direction of overseas capital. 
It can be appreciated that the development and 
supervision of a balenced investment programme is a task for a 
centralised government. In a federation with revenue raising and 
spending authority divided between several Governments, the successful 
operation of such a plan is far more difficult than in a unitary 
state where a single authority holds all necessary power. 
The problem is not one which impinges to any great 
extent on the financial relationships of -lederal and .3tate Oovernment4 
at least so far as :=ederal grants to the Utates are concerned. It is, 
however, a matter which calls for close cooperation between the two 
types of government and this co-operation will net be forthcoming 
unless both are satisfied with financial relationships in connection 
with the determination of grants from current revenue. 
P. The Anti-cyclical Oblective.  
In this tlection it is proposed that the anti-cyc/ical 
Objective of government financial policy be examined in a manner 
similar to that used for the rtdistributive and developmental 
objectives. The main problem will be to show how accepted practice 
in a Unitary state must be modified to comply with the peculiar 
position which arises in a Federation. 
It would be true to say that until twenty years ago, ther 
were no commonly held vie wa on the part which government financial 
policy should play in counteracting the effects of the Trede Cycle. 
The laisser faire view that an alternation of periods of prosperity 
and depreseion war an inevistable concomitant of industrial society 
had not been completely abandoned. The welfare state had grown 
17. Post-war immigration policy in Australia has included direct allocation of alien immigrents to specific industries and firms for a period of iwo years after arrival. 
• 
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rapidly in the years after the first :arid i.ar and the greet 
depreoaion of the 1930's wnr the first major epportenity for definite 
government policy to be adopted for this purpose. In tie depreesion 
of the 1890's, for example, the role of government wes still restrict-
ed. until its size and ecopei was enlarged, the abilit.y of government 
to play a positive pert in anti-cyclical meseuree through finite142 
policy was limited. 
Thu occurrence of mass unemployment after 1929 found 
governmente unprepared to adop a definite financial p-licy to meet 
the crisis and its aftermath. The profcesional economist, and this 
profession wse still in the embryonic stage, was similrrly caught 
unawares. Most governments accepted some responsibility but the 
approaches adopted were pallWivee only. For example, in Australia, 
the Premiers' Plan of 1930 	called for a general reduction in 
wages, salaries and interest rates, was a otep taken to effect a 
recovery from 'he depths of a depression. It was not designed as a 
corrective which could be applied to prevent a depression occurring. 
There were, in fact, no clear statements of financial policy designed 
to prevent a recurrence of the circumstances which had developed. 
In 1936, when most countrice had recovered from the 
-orst effect- of the depression, 	Ke:eles produced his "General 
Theory of :mployment, Interest and , oney". In this work, Aeynes 
endeavoured to explain the interaction of factors which determfee the 
level of employment it a point of time. Although not expressly 
stated in that work, later develoements of the theory have produced 
from it principlee of public financial policy ich should be adopted 
by governments which are conscious of the trade cycle and which wish 
to counteract the effects of general economic fluctuations. 
It is not an easy matter to state the Keynesian Theory 
in a few words. Almost every writer on Keynes has a different view 18 
Nevertheless, it is possible to say that one of the main elements of 
the theory is that it can be shown that if, is possible for an economy 
to be in equilibrium with a situation of less than full employment. 
A given level of national income and employment is compatible with a 
certain level of spending on consumption and investment. In the 
Simplified case or a closed economy, the amoulit of spending on 
consumption and investment will be divided between the public and 
peivate sectors of the econom. 
If unemployment threatens, it will be because the level 
of spending has declined below the full employment level, producing 
what has become known as a "deflationar$ gap". If, with full 
........------------ 
. 18. For e summary of the General -iheory, see Dudley Dillard - "The Iconomics of J. M. Keynes", p.48 ff. 
18a. See Shann and Copland, "The Crisis in Australian Finance, 
1929-31", pp.183- 5. 
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employment, inflation threatene, the level of spending is above that 
necessary to give full emnloylent and the differeece is the 
%nflstionary gap'. 
?rem t:et line of economic thought developed by goynes 
and eubsequent writers, a . theory of the approach which should be 
adopted by governments to produce or mnintain full employment of 
resources he been evolved. 19  This theory aureate that aim the 
level of employment is datermIned by the level of spending, reel 
employment is compatible with one particular level of spending once 
the other relationships in the economy have been determined. The 
total volume of spending in a (closed) economy is divided between the 
public and private sectors. Thus, if a situation of less than full 
employment develops, it will be because the rate of expenditure by 
either or both of these sectors has fallen below the full employment 
level. This can be remedied by the public sector, under the control 
of the government, increasing its rate of spending to restore the 
former total level. 
Conversely, if inaction threatens, it will be because 
the rate of total spending is greater than the rate corresponding to 
a situation of full employment. This can be corrected by a reduction 
in the rate of spending by the public sector. 
The action required of a government if a position of 
stable full emploement is to be mainteined is thus to regulete its 
spending to counteract fluctuation:, in spending in t4e private sc,ctor 
of the economy. 	At the same time it cm influence the level of 
private spending. The problem to be considered is how this stability 
can be best achieved with particular reference to conditions which are 
found in a federation. 
There are three major approaches which a government can 
use through its finaecial policy to coueteract the effects of the 
Trade Cycle. 	2he first relates to the revenue side of the 
Consolidated evenue Account, the second to the expenditure side of 
that Account and the third to variations in the rate of expenditure 
on public capital development. In adopting this tripartite division, 
it has been assumed that the government concerned draws a clear line 
of Jewareation 'between exeenditure . from current revenue - that is, 
revenue which is generally recurrent each year - and expenditure from 
loan funds. 	In most countries, the distinction is not always made 
as clearly as this, but as a general rule in Australia the two 
sources of revenue are kept apart. 20  Current revenue in used to 
19. See, for example, L.R.Klein, "The 4feynesian Revolution" p.168 and budley Dillard "The economics of J..Keynes" p.156 ff. 
20. Even in Australia there are some exceptions. The 0olioneealth eovernment and to a lesser extent, the financially larger State Governments finance some capital works from current revenue. 
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meet the cost of everyday administration and the nrovieion of services, 
and loan funds for public inveetmert purposes. 21 The distinction 
between capital and revenue is uceful for public aceounting procedures, 
but hes little nignificance for . ageregetive annlysis. in this 
irate:nee it ie neceseery to retain the dietinetion in order to 
understand the Auetralian poeition. 
Mt: first poseitle aeproach le frt;m the reverue side. 
That is, the government can manipulete the amount of revenue it will 
receive by alteration to the rates of taxation it imposes. The 
mnjor courceeof revenue will vary between countries, but in most they 
will be found to be taxation in ite varioilt forms. MosI importent 
are ueealle incone tax and cuntoms and exeire duties supplemented by 
sales or purchases tax, stamp and death eutiee and a mrltiplicity of 
minor taxes, duties and licences. 
Earlier in this Chapter, a brief examination was made 
of the way in which taxation rates are generally imposed progressively 
and thus collected mainly from those in the higher income brackets. 22 
This is a simplification of the procesmeinVolved, but is *efficient 
for the purposes - of illustration.. An increace in ratea of taxation 
with no alteration in price levels will result in a ,iecrease in 
money wages and company incomes. This in turn will cause a decrease 
In purchases - of consumer goods or a decrease in savings or a 
combination of both. In the higher income brackets, geiater taxation 
rates will probably be at the expense of taving, whilst in the lower 
income brackets where a comparatively small proportion of net income 
is saved, it will be mainly at the exeense of the purchase of 
consumer goods. 
Conversely, a reduction in taxation will probably result 
In an increase la expenditure on consumer goods by the lower income 
- groups and an 'increase In saving in the higher income groups. The 
reaction of the individual, will, of course, vary from this general 
'pattern, but for the community as aeihole, this type of reaction may 
be . expected With confidence. 
In this respect, Aeynes has stated23 that "the 
fundamental psychologioal law upon which we are entitled to depend 
with great confidence, both a priori and from our knowledge of human 
nature and from the detailed facts of experience, is that men are 
disposed as a rule and on the average, to increase their consteeption 
as their income increases, but not by as much as their increase in 
flnrfla efl 
21. In other countries, the practice varies widely. In the United Kingdom, for example, there is no distinction between expenditure on current goods and services and cepitel investment. The 
budget result is the difference between current revenue and 
expenditure of ell types. However, cef ,ital expenditure by semi-
governmental bodies is financed by public borrowing and is excluded from the budget. 
22. See above p.24. 23. General Theory, p.96. 
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incomes". 	This means, in effect,.thet since a reductien•in taxation 
increases the money income of the people, part of the increase *ill 
be spent on the purchase of consumer goods and the re.A.ainder saved. 
Hy a judicious adjustment of the impact of the tax reduction or 
increase on the various income groups, a government should be able. to 
determine approximately the shape of the consumption function. 
• The _Object of increased rates of taxation is to reduce 
the purchasing powerAn'the hands of individuals in the community and 
hence reduce demand and production in orjer to reduce inflationary 
pressures which rre present at times of ever full employment. 
Conversely, the object of reducing rates of taxation is to increase 
purchasing power, demand and production and thereby inerease employ-
ment. The effectiveness of either policy:will be negated unless 
there Is corrk.sponding-action on the part of governments to control 
or expand their.ownexpenditure. 
An incrense in ratea of taxation reduces purchating 
power of individu/e in the comaunity and increases the purchasing 
power of the government b7 a corrt ,snonding amount. If no saving is 
involved and the 'government increases; its expenditure by the full 
amount of the additional inceme„ the effect of the inereased taxation 
in curbing inflation will be made ineffective. •milarly,. in times 
of less than full employment, it taxation is reduced and government 
expenditure reduced accordingly, there will be no sltimulus for 
employment to increase.... The fact that portion of individual incomes 
Is saved means that If a government carries out this procedure. , the 
reverse of the anticipated effects can be expected. 
. Consequently it is desirable that the Increased taxation 
revenue elould not be ppent.or that expenditure should be maintnined 
at its previous level when a reduction in taxation rates Is applied 
to bring 'about an increase in businese activity. 	That is, if over 
full employment is threatening, governments should budget for a 
surplus in the Concolidated , ievenue Account. In times when 
unemployfent is threatening, they should budget for a substantial 
deficit. 
The approach to sustainiw: or reducini! total demand by 
altering the ratea and impact of taxation and rates of government 
expmditure on current goods and services (tan be -egarded as short-
term public financial policy for anti-cyclical purposes. It is 
possible for a government to modify its income raising and spending 
programme at comparatively short notice. In the case of threatening 
unemployment, for example, the decision to reduce taxation can be put 
Into operation as quickly as. the Parliament can pass the necessary 
legislation. 	Under pvesent methods of income-tax collection, 
commonly referred to as "pay-as-you-earn' thu effect of reduced 
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rates of taxation are immediately felt in the pocket of taxpayers. 
koney incomes will be increased and consequzntly the rate of 
expenditure ii increased. some of the iurae“ate efVects mny be lost 
as part of the increase in money incomes is absorbed in savings. 
eve iheless, dematel will be stimulated to aome extent, depending on 
the peopensity of the comeunity to consume its curient income, he 
demand is stimulated, employment will be increased. 	?he effects of 
alteration in the rates of taxation other than income taxation may be 
slower, although the effeete of alterations in rates of stales or 
purchmse texes will be felt imeudiately. 
If, at the same time, the rate of government expenditure 
is increased, there will be a further impetus to demand which again 
will take place almost immediately. For example, the increase in 
expenditure may take the rem of increased pensions and other forms 
of transfer peyments. The marginal propensity to consume amonst 
teosc in receipt of pensions would be compaeatively high and therefore 
almost all the inereaee in incomes would be spent, '..:emand will thus 
be further stimulated. 
The increased amount available for the nurchase of goods, 
mainly consumer goods, will probably check any tendency for unemploy-
ment to develop or increase. This, hewever, is only a temporary 
meesure which in recommended because its results are felt almost 
immediately. It would be true to say that more severe corrective 
measures are necessary to deal with a situation where unemployment 
has developed than are necessary to deal with threatening unemployment 
Oonsequently it is es.ential that imarediate remedial action be Wean 
to prevent a major depression occurring. The use of budget deficits 
should be regarded as the method ehich can be used to hold up the 
process until more persuazive instruments of financial correction can 
be brought into play. 
It should be mentioned that part of this corrective 
process of overcoming an inflationary or deflationary gap my be 
carried out automatically. This is sometimes referred to as "built-
in flexibility" and suggests that the effect of progreaspee taxation 
rotes, combined with relatively stable transfer payments tend to 
produce surplusee in times of proaperiey and deficits in times of 
depression. 
In all probability, the main cause of increasing 
unemployment would be a decrease in private inveatment activity 'below 
the point where, in conjunction with private and peblic consumption 
and public investment activity, it can maintain a full emplcenent 
level of income. This is not to say that slumps ere inevitebly 
caesed by &cit.:ions of the business world to reduce investment 
expenditure, but historicalle it appears that whetever the original 
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cause, businecs investment always plays an important part. The 
reduction, when seen, cam be corrected by - a corresponding increase in 
public investment. At the same time, private investment cat: be 
encouraged through such media as Central ,Dank credit policy. It 
is not here necessary to discuss the methods and processes of 
financing government budget deficits and increaaes in the rate of 
public capital expenditure. These matters are adequately dealt 24 with in any work on public finance. 
The action of increasing the rate of public investment 
will take some time. Even if emergency public works programmes have 
been prepared in advance, there will be some delay involved, and to 
some extent the degree of immediate budgetary action will be dictated 
by the speed with which it is possible to alter the rate of public 
Investment. Once commenced there is still delay before the full 
effects are felt. There will be some direct increase in employment 
as men are hired to undertake the labour side of public works project 
The indirect increase with time lag will occur through a stimulus 
to production resulting from the purchase of materials and equipment 
necessary to the emergency programme. The newly-employed will 
increase the demand for consumer goods. 	)rom there the process 
follows the now-familiar pattern of the Keynesian Multiplier. 25 
Another significant difference between the two approaches, 
one using budgetary surpluses and deficits and the other the rate of 
public investment, is that the effects of the former are felt In all sections of the community while the effects of the investment 
programme may be more selective. If unemployment is threatening 
in a particular industry or group of industries, works programmes 
which will stimulate demand in those pa_!-ticular industries can be 
introduced. It would be very difficult to produce the same effects 
through adjustment to taxation rates. 
In dealing with imminent over-full employment, the 
process is very similar but operates in reverse. The first action 
by a government will be to budget for a surplus by increasing rates 
of taxation and reducing its rate of spending on current goods and 
services. The existence of an inflationary gap means that the total 
expenditure which people desire to undertake exceeds the total value 
of maximum output. Hence money prices rise or shortages occur, or 
both. 	Government action is designed to reduce the desire for 
expenditure in both the public and private sectors, to the full 
employment level. Again, thil is capable of achievement by increasing 
taxation in order to reduce individual expenditure on the purchase of 
goods and se4vicea, thus producing a surplus in the Consolidated 
Revenue Fund, and by reducing the rate of public investment. The 
Multiplier again comes into action, but this time the process is 
reversed. 
24. 	see, for example, "Pdblic Finance", by Ursula It. Hicks. 
25 	Gee "The General Theory of Employment Interest and Money" p113 
44. 
It should be emphasised that this explanation of the 
processes involved is greatly simplified. However, it docs show in 
breed outline the part which a government should ply in its financial 
policy to prevent the occarr•nce or to mitigate the effects of the 
Trade Cycle. 	In fact, the situation calls for constant vigilance 
and preparedness on the part of governments in order that they maybe 
in a position to take immediate action should the economy show signs 
of deviating from a position of full employment. In the immediate 
post-war years some governments recognised that this was one of their 
functions and in three, the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia, 
the respective governments Vemally adopted a policy designed to main-
tain run employment ming as their basis the Keynesian approach. 26 
In order to undertake a deliberate financial anti-
cyclical policy, a government must therefore be in a position to alter 
rates of taxation, revise expenditure programmes and altar public 
investment programmes at short notice. 	In addition, it would be 
advantageous for it to have control of central banking facilities. 
It must be assumed that only a minimum of direct control can be exer-
cised as would be the ease in a modern democracy in times of peace. 
Alteration of financial policy such as that envisaged as 
necessary for the implementation of an anti-cyclical policy would 
normally require action by the legislature. Only rarely could a 
complete scheme be introduced by thi' executive arm of government. 
Therefore it would be necessary either ° for the whole plan to be 
approved by Parliament or the executive given power to act as found 
to be necessary. Such constitutional arrangements may cause 
temporary delays but not, it is thought, delays of sufficient 
magnitude to preludice the success of a full employment policy. 
Once the approval of Parliament iz obtained, there is no 
impediment in the way of the government taking the necessary action 
In a unitary state. The problem can be treated as a whole. Taxation 
rates apply to all retAdents, expenditure is distributed over all 
parts of the country, and public works activity can be introduced in 
any region. 
In a *c ederation, the approach will be far mere complicat-
ed. Constitutionally there is a Federal Government and several State 
Governments each responsible for financial administration over a 
particular sphere. As mentioned in a previous section of this 
27 Chapter, in Australia the Yederal aovernment has control of certain 
financial matters In Australia as a whole. The remainder rests with 
26. United kingdom, "Employment Policy" Cmd. 7399, 1944. Canada "Zmployment end Income 1944. The policy set out in 
this document was further stated in a document entitled 
'Proposals of the Government of Lanada" (q.v. p.7) prepared for the Doelnion-2rowincial Conference on Reconstruclion 1945. Austral*, "Full Employment in Australia", Parlt. Paper 2736, i945, 
27. Page 27 ff. 
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the State Governments. The Federal tovernment ,ontrole a large part 
of taxation revenue while the States have wide powers ofexpenditure 
from both revenue and loan funds. 
It can be appreciated that neithez- the Federal Government 
nor the tate Governments could effectively introduce a complete anti 
cyclical policy 'based on financial measures. If action is needed to 
close a deflationary gap, the vederal Government can adopt an 
appropriate taxation policy in order to increase the purchasing power 
of individuals and companies. To a certain degree it could increase 
its expenditure but here its range is limited because constitutinally 
the field in which it may function is restricted. It may, of course, 
pay increased amounts by way of grants to the State Governments, but 
there can be no compulsion on the State Governments to spend any 
increased revenue they may receive. 
blevertheless, so far as short-term remedial action is 
concerned, it is mainly the Federal Government which must take the 
appropriate steps. A State Government in virtually powerless to 
initiate an anti-cyclical programme. Its taxation powers are 
comparatively small and the part it can play in increasing expenditurt 
is limited by the extent of any grant received from the Federal 
Government. It is true that a State may undertake deficit financing 
in order to assist in an inflationary policy. In fact it seems only 
reasonable that If the i'tederal Government is adopting this procedure 
so too should the State Governments. However, in Australia at least, 
the State Governments &re dependent Upon the Pederia Government fOr 
StUmftoiterM loan funds to finance a temporary deficit. 
Difficulty will no doubt be experienced in obtaining 
agreement between the several State Governments and the Federal 
Government as to the measures or the extent of the measure* necessary 
to effect the improvement in the -.commie tituation. However, 
uniformity is by no means essential so long as action is taken in the 
right direction and the total effect la sufficient. In this respect 
it would undoubtedly be appropriate for the State . Governments to be 
guided by the Federal Government. 
As mentioned earlier, budget financing is only a short-
term approach to the problem. The permanent effects will be made 
through pUblic investment policy. In t%is respect, most of the 
initiative must be taken by the State Governments. As will be seen 
in a sUbsequent Chapter, 28 in Australia, State Governments have 
retained almost all responsibility for the expenditure of loan money. 
If quick expansion of public works programmes is needed, the Federal 
Government, except in a restricted field, can only idvise the State 
4' 
	 Governments. 
4W■41104M.11.04.4WW.M.I4,04.0104VO410.41104114, 
28. Chapter 7. The Financial Agreement. 
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Even though shown to be desirable, a State ‘overnment 
may be unwilling to incur the debt charges which accompany heavy 
borrowing. Further, if selective investment expenditure is required, 
the State Governments may not have the necesuary knowledge to apply 
the corrective treatment. Finally, the procedure of authorising the 
raising of loan monies. in Australia. is rather a lengthy proeess, 
involving a meeting of the . Tressurers of all ftates and the 
Commonwealth. The process could probably be quickened, however, in 
an emergency such as a sharp roceesion. 
In a case where it becomes necessary to close an 
inflationary gap, it would seem that the Federal Government has more 
opportanity to adopt an anti-cyclical policy edbracing the whole 
Federation. 	Again, it has almost complete control of rates of 
taxation. 	In the field of controlling expenditure it is also in a 
powerful position. in that the States are dependent on the Federal 
Government for a substantial portion of their revenue, ' If Federal 
grants to the States are suddenly reduced, a State Government has 
almost no alternative but to reduce expenditure. It may incur a 
deficit, but a deficit of substantial size in times of inflation would 
be dangerous politically. The Federal Government also has control 
of Central Bank credit which may prevent a State financing a deficit 
for any period of time. 
According to a strict interpretation of the Constitution, 
the Federal Government in Australia has no power to limit the size of 
a States capital expenditure in any year. In Australia thie is a 
function of the Loan Council, However, as will be seen later in 
Chapter 7, Federal control of the Central Sank gives the :7'ederal 
Government effective control of the annual amount which can be raised 
on behalf of all States and the Commonwealth. 	In short, the 
Pederal Government cannot force a State Government to spend in order 
to close a deflationary gap, but it can restrict their expenditure 
when it becomes necessary to close an inflationary gap. 
It is evident that in a Federation, rLaponsibility for 
inaugurating an anti-cyclical oolicY must lie with the Yederal 
Government. For it bobs fully effective, however, the cooperation 
of the several ftate Governments As required. It is suggested that 
complete cooperation will only be forthcoming in times of crisis. 
Normally the State governments would be suspicious of any attempt by 
the Federal Government to influence them in their domestic affairs. 
Therefore it becomes necessary for the Federal Government to persuade 
the State Governments to fall in line with the policy it has designed. 
Nermelly the *States will require little inducement to 
'persuade them to spend money. In determining the amounts of Federal 
aid to the States, the ?ederal Government should therefore allow for 
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the effects of that expenditure on the level of business activity. To 
a certain extent it maybe selective. If a ..Aate is relatively dcp-
reseed, or even an industry in one State, the grant maybe increased 
to permit the assistence by the State Government in effecting an 
improvement in conditions. The grant may oven be conditional upon 
its being used in the manner prescribed by the Federal Government to 
implement its overall policy. 	Again, if expansion of capital works 
is required by one State rather than another for the same reasons, the 
Federal Government can encourage the State concerned to undertake the 
work and assist by meeting . portion of the annual interest and sinking 
fund bill. Under these conditions * state would not be reluctant 
to increase Its public debt. 
The determination of grants on this basis will involve 
considerable organisation on the part of the Federal Government. It 
must be constantly aware of the state of business activity not only 
in the Federation az a whole but also in each individual industry and 
State. It must be prepared to apply remedial action both directly 
through its own constitutional powers and indieectly by persuading the 
several State Governments to adopt the correct revenue policy. There 
will inevitably be a tendency for the Federal Government to think 
that it eould achieve its purpose far more effectively if its power 
were absolute in the necessary fields of activity. This, however, is 
not by itself an argument for unification. In the short period the 
constitutional arrangements can not be altered quickly and therefore 
the appropriate policy must be worked out within the existing 
framework. 
The task of the Pederal Goverzment in determining the 
amounts of the grants to the States to permit an effective anti-
cyclical policy will be extremely difficult. It will be much more 
so when it is remembered that at the same time grants must also be 
designed in the light of its redistributive and developmental 
policies. It is not a matter that can be dtcided by guesswork but 
must involve careful examination of all relevant considerations. 
4.44•44•404.4.44.4.46.4m4.4.mare4111.1•410 
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PRINCIPIXS•OF DBRAL GRAIITS 
In order to test the adequacy or the financial provisions 
of the Australian Constitution, it will be necessary to develop 
alternative principles upon which Federal grants to State Governments 
can be made. These alternatives must then be examined to determine 
the moat datisfaotory for the required puma.. If the Australian Practice le in accordance with the chosen principle, then it must be
*rimed that the financial provisions of the Australian Constitution 
give the most satisfactory *newer possible to the financial problem 
which arises in this type of Federation and which has been outlined 
*Wye. On the other hand, if the practice does not agree with the 
principle which emerges as the most effective, suggestions Should be 
made as to how conditions can be improved. 
The assumption upon which this analysis will be made is 
that in a Yederation the -tederal Government has potential sources of 
revenue in excess of expenditure requirements, and that it is possible 
for the federal Government to produce surplus revenue which would be 
available for distribution between the several States of the Federat-
ion. It is apparent that this situation must not necessarily arise 
in * ?ederation, The organisstion could be such, for example, that 
the State Governments are the only revenue raising authorities and the 
in turn allocate portion of their funds to the l ederal t;overnment to 
permit it to fulfil its allotted functions. Again, the situation may 
be such that all authorities in the Federation have independent 
sources of revenue :ust sufficient for their needs and therefore no 
adjustment between the Federal and State Governments would be 
necessary. 
It is thought, however, that the situation which at 
present exists in Austral* is the one most likely to arise. 
Fundamentally it is also the situation which has arisen in the other 
main Federations such as the United States of America and the 
Dominion of Canada. Since it is the intention to develop principles 
against which the financial provisions of the Australian Constitution 
can be tested, it will be necessary to consider only the 4pe of 
Federation which exists in Australia. 
It appears that there are two possible alternative 
principles which could be adopted. The first which can be called the 
" compensation" principle, can be stated as the distribution of the 
surplus revenue of the Federal Government between the States upon the 
basis of compensating each State as far as possible for the loss of 
revenue resulting from the transfer of revenue raising powers to the 
Federal Government; The second, which can be called the "principle 
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of payment according to relative financial need" calls for the 
disbursement of the surplus revenue of the Federal Government to the 
State Governments according to the relative financial needs of each. 
These two basic principles are each capable of subdivision, but 
generally it can be stated that they are the two principles which can 
be considered in the case of a rederation similar to that which was 
adopted in Australia, The implications of the adoption or each on 
now be considered, 
(a) DALSSIMUSItaLftjattple 
The compensation principle of disbursement of surplus 
revenue of the Federal Government is a simple concept. The people 
of each State contribute in various ways to the revenue of the Federal 
Government. 	Men, for example, the Federal Government levies a 
customs duty, the duty is paid by the importers of the goods. They 
in tura recover the duty through increased prices and eventually the 
duty Is paid by the consumer. There may be several intermediate 
steps, but inevitably the consumer contributes to the income of the 
collecting agent, in this case the 7ederal Government. The duty is 
imposed on all goods coming into the Federation and the people who pay 
the duty are distributed between the States of the Federation, 
Therefore each State, through the consumers of the population, contrib-
utes to the revenue of the Federal Government. Put in another way, 
the contribution of the State is the amount which would have been col-
lected and paid into its own Treasury if it had sole power to raise 
such revenue and did so at the rate now adopted by the Federal 
Government. 
If the amount of the contribution by each State is 
recorded, it is possible to divide the total revenue of the Federal 
Ooverrment aecordinE to the State in which it originated. Obviously 
not all this amount so collected can be returned tc the States. Zech 
must be reepansible for portion of the cost of the Federal Government 
and this should be regarded in some measure as the price which must 
be paid for Pederation. In effect, at the outset a new governmental 
authority is being established with some new powers or functions to 
perform which were not formerly carried out by any government. It is 
therefore inevitable that the total cost of government of the 
Federation as a thole will be increased and this must be borne by the 
people of the i..ederation. Whether it is borne from the revenue 
formerly accruing to the governments of the States or by greater 
taxation is a matter of policy, but in any case, the =Aber States 
regarded collectively as groups of people must bear the extra burden. 
In addition to the cost of the new functions given to it, 
the Federal Government will be involved in expenditure rcsulting from 
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the taking over of powers formerly held by the State Governments. 
Thus, its expenditure sill be made up of two parts, the cost of newly 
created powers and the cost of powers taken over from the States. 
The total amount available for distribution in any period la the 
amount collected from all sources less the two types of cost mentioned 
above. The amount payable to each State Government under this 
principle of Federal disbursements is the amount of revenue collected 
in each less a share of the cost of Federal Government, =niers the 
deduction is made for the cost of functions transferred to the Federal 
Government at the inauguration of the Federation, there will be no 
apparent loss to the State Governments. Any loss that arises will 
result from the cost of the newly created powers of the 2 ederal 
Government. 
The basis upon which the proportion of these costs which 
each State Government will be called upon to bear is calculated will 
probably present the most difficult problem to overcome. It would 
usually be impossible to calculate exactly the amount of expenditure 
incurred by the 7ederal Government on behalf of the people of each 
State, and therefore some arbitrary method must be devised. The 
simplest basis which can be adopted is to assume that exponilture is 
incurred on behalf of each State in the name proportion as that which 
each State's contribution bears to the total revenue of the Federal 
Government. Thia may not be a very realistic assumption, but It would 
give a distribution which should not diffev very greatly from the 
actual distribution. An alternative assumption is that expenditure 
has been divided equally between all persons in the Federation. If 
this assumption is accepted, then costs of the Pederal uovernment 
should be charged to each 'tate on a ?or capita basis. 
In considering this principle of disbursement, 
distinction should be made between the "community" loss and the 
"Treasury" loss of the °tate. The two terms are not synonymous and it 
is necessary to distinguish between them in order to determine the lose 
that must be made good by the Federal Ctovernment as part of this 
principle of disbursement. 
It is possible that a loss of revenue by a Treasury of a 
State is compensated for in part by a gain by the community as a whole. 
That is, a gain by the people who comprise the population of the state. 
For oxample, it may be that when the Federation is first inaugurated 
the level of taxation which is imposed is lower than that which existed 
in s6me States before Federation and greater than in others. Where it 
is lower than the former level, the community loss will be less than 
the Treasury loss. This situation will arise because the reduction 
in revenue received by the Treasury of the State concerned will be toque 
to the amount which would have been collected if the rates of taxation 
which applied before Federation were still being collected. 
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On the other hand, the community as a whole will be paYin4 
less in taxation than it would be required to pay had the former rates 
been levied, The community loss will be equal to the amount of taxatr 
ion now paid to the Federal Government under the new rates of taxation, 
Since the new rates are lower than the pates formerly imposed by the 
State t:overnment, the community loss will be leas than the Treaaary 
loss. Conversely, where the amount collected by the Federal 
Government is greater than the amount which mould have been collected 
by the Srate Government if the former rates of taxation had continued 
to be imposed, the 7ressury loss will be lLss than the community loss. 
Under the principle of payment as compensation for lose, 
it is the community loss which must be considered in all oases. For 
if the community loss is less than the Treasury loss, and the Treasury 
of the State is compensated for the community loss, then the differelms 
can be made up by the Treasury taking from the community an amount 
equal to the amount by which the taxation payments which it is 
required to make are reduced. Conversely, when the rates of taxation 
are higher under Federation compared with the rates which operated 
before Federation, the Treasury will receive the amount which the 
community pays to the Federal Government under the new rates of 
taxation. This will be greater than the amounts it would have recoil, 
ed had the previous situation still Obtained. The difference can 
then be remitted to taxpayers by lowering other forms of taxation if 
they exist, or by direct payments to the meMbers of the community. 
In this analysis it has been assumed that there are no 
complications to the collection of revenue by the Federal Government 
and payment of this amount to the several State Governments. As 
mentioned previously, the amount to be paid 	the Federal Government 
will be the amount collected from all sources less cost of government, 
made up of the cost of administering functions transferred from the 
States and the cost of newly created functions. In determining the 
loss of each State, its contribution to these expenditures of the 
Federal Government must be deducted from the community loss. The 
amount so determined is the payment to be made to the State Government 
as compensation for financial loss incurred through Federation. 
As a first approximation it can be assumed that the cost 
of the functions transferred to the 'ederal Government will be similar 
in amount to the cost to the State Governments in the years 
immediately preceding Federation. In fact, such cost maybe lowered 
or increased by those now responsible for their administratirn. If 
this type of expenditure is reduced, the '.:tates as a group can restme 
the former position by additional ex imditure on their own initiative. 
If it Is increased, however, the State Governments will be forced to 
consider whether they will reduce expenditure on the performance of 
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other funotions and services, or increase taxation in order to 
continue operation of the retained functions at the existing level. 
It may be that one of the transferred functions is the 
control of defence expenditure, and that before Vederation, one State 
Government found that if it was to give .a reasonable level of other 
services, expenditure on defence must be kept at a very low level. 
After Federatior. and the transfer of powers of defence, it may happen 
that the l'ederal Government has deemed it advisable to expend a great.- 
er proportional amount on this service. If the allocation of this 
cost between the States is to be on a per capita or similar basis, 
then the cost of defence to the State which formerly felt that the new 
level could not be afforded will find that the cost of defence has 
increased considerably. This additional cost will be reflected in 
lower grants from the Federal Government than would oth•r ,ise have 
been the ease. The decision must then be made by the Government of 
the State concerned as to whether it will now reduce expenditure on 
the provision of services which it considered more essential, or 
Whether it will raise additional revenue through increased taxation in 
the fields remaining open to it in order merely to maintain the 
existing level of services which it provides to the population. 
It can be seen that under this principle of disbursements 
by the Federal Government, that of payment as compentation for financ-
ial loss accruing to the State Governments as a direct result of 
Federation, the calculation of the amounts to be paid may become 
complicated. Further, the amounts which will be available for 
distribution may not in fact be sufficient to enable the States to 
operate at the level which formerly operated without recourse to higher 
taxation. If, during the process of drawing up a Constitution, it 
is decided that this principle should be adopted, then adequate 
provision should be made in the first Instance to ensure that the 
States retain a considerable portion of the fields of taxation in 
order that they may remedy any financial difficulties that may arise 
because of the adoptio.1 of this principle, and secondly to ensure that 
expenditure by the Federal Government will not reach the level where 
individual States are forced to reduce expenditure in other fields. If 
the power to raise revenue by taxation is limited to the Federal 
Government, then the States will be dependent on payments from the 
Federal Government for almost all their income and the position could 
easily arise where such payments, if based on the principle of payment 
as compensation for loss, would be totally inadequate for the proper 
performownce of the Statee allotted functions. Some taxation fields 
must be retained by the States to prevent this situation arising. 
lip to this stage, the only loss which has been considered 
has been the direct financial loss suffered by the States. Attention 
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must also be giver to indirect financial loss which a tate might 
suffer. Such indirect loss might arise in any one of a number of 
ways. The most lively to arise, however, is the ease where the 
Federal Government adopts certain policies or courses of action which 
result in a loss of revenue to one or more of the States. The loss 
may be incurred by the Treasury of the State, as when the Federal law 
bans a certain activity which is subject to State tax, but it is more 
likely to effect an industry or group within a state. one possible 
example arises where the Federal overnment has absolute control or 
migiation policy and decided that it is in the beef. interests of the 
nation as a whole to prohibit migration from a certain couniry or 
countries. 	If an industry in one state is dependent on that labour 
in order that it ms y function efficiently, then direct prohibition 
will directly affect only that State. That is, a particular industry 
in one State will suffer a loss as an indirect consequence of 
Federation. 1 	In such cases as these, where the Impact of Federation 
is distributed unevenly between t' , tates, it may be conceded that it La 
only reasonable for the loes to be shared by all Ctates since it was 
In the interests of all that the step was taken, 
where thistype of indirect loss occurs, compensation may 
be made from the funds held by the Federal Government. It may be by 
grants-in-aid made directly to the industry concerned, or to the 
Treasury of the State or States involved, which in turn will be 
responsible for the distribution of the funds. It may take the form 
of a subsidy or bounty or special taxation or duty remissions directly 
in favour of the industry concerned. 2 In any of these cases it will 
represent a payment made as compensation for an indirect loss to which 
all Staters contribute. It is possible that the vederal Government 
will be called upon to make payments of this type. The main difficul 
ty associated with them will undoubtedly be the determination of the 
amount of the loss in each case. Where the loss is direct, that is, 
through the transfer of taxation rights, it is a relatively simple 
matter to determine, within fairly close limits, the amounts involved, 
kihero the loss is indirect, however, there is no simple measuring rod. 
The amount of the grant, subsidy or bounty will need to be determined 
by arbitrary methods. 
A variation of this principle of payment according to low 
arising from Federation is that the surplus revenue of the Federal 
Government can be distributed among the member States on a per capita 
basis. For this variation to be a true basis for compemeation it 
1. The cxample given is from actual Australian experience. Before 
• Federation, the '4ueensland sugar producing industry recruited Pacific Islands labour on a contract basis. Commonwealth legis-lation in 1902 prohibited this recruitment forcing Queensland cane growers to use dearer white labour. 2. In the Australian case mentioned above (Note 1), the uommonwealth Government paid a bounty on sugar produced by white labour. See 
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would be necessary that all States have contributed to the Common-
wealth revenue on a per capita basis. Otherwise, there will be some 
redistribution in favour of those Stattea which have contributed 
relatively least, In short, it assumes that contributions are on a 
per capita basis, 	bile such an assumption is unrealistic, it does 
have the advantage of being simple to administer. 
(b)Theer ecriePti.d,A2nalNell_sLuS 
This principle can be stated in the following way. Where 
the distribution of functional and financial powers between the 
Federal and state qoPernmenta is such that the revenue of the Federal 
Government is more than sufficient for its immediate requirements, the 
surplus may be distributed bet een the States according to their 
financial needs irrespective of the amount which each has contributed 
to the revenue of the Federal Government. The hypothesis upon which 
this principle is based in that before Federation all States were of 
different sixes with different standards of natural resources and 
generally different levels of prosperity and economic development. It 
follows that levels of taxation and standards of services supplied 
were also different. Unless these differences exist between the 
States, the adoption of the principle of parnent according to financial 
needs will produce similar results to those obtained when the prin-
ciple of payment as compensation for loss is adopted 	For if all the 
States are of the same size with similar natural resources, and are at 
the same stage of development, both contributions and financial needs 
should be proportional to size. It is only when these differences 
are •present that the two principles referred to produce different 
results and make necessary a choice betwecn one or the other of the 
two alternatives, 
In discussing this principle, it will first be necessary 
to distinguish between absolute financial needs and relative financial 
needs3 and determine which of the two must be considered. "Need" is 
a vague term and probably no two persons would 'tree as to the needs 
of an individual. - , hen the needs of a community are being considered 
it is much more difficult to determine its precise meaning. Absolut#0 
needs must be related to a welfare basis. In order to determine the 
absolute needs of a nation or any other community or individuals, it 
would be necessary to make certain value judgments as to the ultimate 
aim of economic policy. It could be assumed, for example v . that the 
sole reason for the existence of a government is to ensure that the 
real income of the community is raised to a level where every mewber 
of the mummity is in rcceipt of a minimum real income. If this 
3. The concept of financial needs as a principle for determining 
Federal Grants was developed in Australia by the Commonwealth 
Grants %emission. See First Report (1934) PP.83/84 and Third Report (1936) pp. 75-80. 
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were so, then the abrolute financial needs of that conknunity would be 
sufficient to permit everyone to receive this minimum. The national 
minimum real income would be determined one purely scientific basis 
related to the requirements for nutrition, clothing, shelter, etc. 
If this problem were successfully solved, a further difficulty would 
arise relating to the existence of any inequality of income within the 
community. If the real national income of a community is just suffic-
ient to permit each member to receive a personal minimum real income 
*hen the total is divided equally between all, then the existence of 
any inequality between members of the community will ensure that some 
receive more and some less than the determined minimum. One 
definitioncould thus be that the absolute financial needs of a 
community are equal to an amount sufficient to ensure that, when div-
ided equally between all, each person receives at least a minimum 
living wage. However, because inequalities do exist, it would not 
be divided equally between all. 
• 	 Apart from the difficulties of a technical nature ivhich 
would arise if this beats of absolute need were adopted, there is an 
"mediate financial problem which would prevent its adoption. It is 
the object of these chapters to develop a principle upon which the 
surplus revenue of the federal Government in a Federation can be 
distributed between the States. It is immediately apparent that the 
financial resources of the Federal Oovernment available for distrib-
ution would almost certainly be insufficient for the purpose of 
equalising the absolute financial needs of each member State. Rather 
it could be considered that the whole purpose of Federation would be 
to aim at producing the state of affairs where, in the long run, each 
individual within the Federation wee receiving at least a minimum real 
income. In the initial stages of Federation it could reasonably be 
expected that only a principle of distribution 'would be adopted which 
could be followed in its entirety. All that could be expected would 
be that a principle of distribution of the surplus revenue between the 
States be adopted which would go as far as possible towards producing 
this ultimate result. This would possibly be achieved by adopting 
the principle of payment according to relative financial needs. 
The principle Of payment to the States according to 
relative financial needs can be stated as a principle of equalisation. 
That is, the distribution of the surplus revenue is made according to 
some predetermined principle whereby it is aimed to equalise some fora 
or forma of economic activity by equalising payments from the Federal 
to the State Governments. The principle of payment according to 
absolute financial needs discussed in the preceding paragraphs could 
be regarded as a principle of complete equalisation. The adoption 
of the principle of relative financial needs is to adopt • principle 
of partial equalisation. It has teen shown that complete 
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equalisation will be impossible without substantial transfers of 
revenue 'between States. However, it would be possible to go as far 
as the . finaneial resources of the nation will permit tower** the 
Ultimate goal by applying the avails As aurplus revenue in a manner 
designed to equalise certain burdens or standards of services between 
States. There are many possible fields inwhich equality can be 
engineered through the agency of the grants which the laderal 
Government maes to the State Governments. A few of the more import-
ant will be considered. 
(i)Bqualisation of taxation burden*. 
If the initiation of the Federation tarries with it the 
transfer of certain taxing pavers from the State Governments to the 
Federal Government, there will be an automatic tendency towards greater 
equality between States so fares the impact of taxation is concerned. 
In all probability the tax levied by the Paderal Government 'ail' be 
uniform throughout the Federation. In Australia, for example, a tax 
Imposed by the Yederal Government must be uniform in all Etates 4 . 
Before federation when the State Governments 
possessed their own taxation rights in these particular fields, 
different rates of taxation would inevitably have been. levied in each 
State. The act ofYederation and the entry of the Yederal Gevernment 
into the field of taxation would therefore reduce the degree Of 
disparity ef taxation rates between members of the separate Slates. It 
can be expected, however, that not all powers of taxation will be 
transferred to the :::,'ederal government, and in the fields which re sin 
within their individual jurisdiction, rates of taxation will still 
differ between States. - The reasons for these differences are not of 
immediate relevance but if they do exist their effects can be correctel 
by the judicious apportionment of the funds made available by the 
Federal Government for distribution to the Stets Governments. 
tqualisation of taxation burdens on the residents of the 
States cannot, however, be regarded in isolation. It must be looked 
at in conjunction with the possibility of equalising standards of 
services. 
(ii)Equalisation of standards of service*. 
he raising of revenue by taxation and the provision of 
pUblic services are complementary functions of government. Although 
a government will have other sources of revenue, it would be true to 
say that the extent to which a government can provide social and other 
services depends on the extent to which it can raise revenue by 
imposing taxation. In tat, main it is a political decision which is 
4. Section 51(11) of the Constitution gives the Yeders1 Government powers to impose taxation "buts() as not to discriminate between States or ports of states". 
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influenced by the attitude of the people themselves towards bearing 
high rates of taxation in order that high standards of servicea maybe 
supplied. A chosen level of services implies a specific level of 
rates of taxation depending on such factors as the economic prosperity-
of the community and the distribution of incomes within the community. 
At this stag* it maybe of advantage to explain briefly 
what is meant by the .provision of services. The phrase is used her* 
in its broadest sense. State services car be said to include any 
activity of a government whatsoever. The provision of a police force, 
of a ludiciary and so on represents the provision of a type of service. 
Services generally should no be confused with social services which 
is only one branch of -a field which has a much wider coverage. It can 
be said that for the purpose of exposition every item of expenditure, 
of governments re#resents the provision of some service or other. 
However, there are certain services which are generally 
accepted as the function of government. These are the basic funct-
ions of government which have been described earlier. 5 The 
performance of these duties or the provision of these services implies 
a certain cost and normally this cost will be borne by the revenue of 
the government raised by taxation. In most cases, except where the 
government has a source of income other than revenue raised by 
taxation, the burden of taxation on the people will be determined by 
the standards of services which the government intends to provide. It 
maybe decided, for example, to provide free education for all child-
ren in the community. The service will be free in the sense that 
there will be no direct cost to the people who receive the service. 
It will inevitably be paid for by higher rates of taxation. 
It can be seen that there is a close inter-relationship 
between the burden of taxation and the standards of service* supplied 
in a community. Within the community it will be of real importance 
as to the extent of the services given because, if taxation la at all 
progressive and incomes are unequally distributed, the benefitr will 
be received mainly by those who contributed leart by way of taxation. 
In other words, within the community there will be some redistribut-
ion of incomes. When each 'Aete is regarded as an entity and compar-
ed with other States in the Federation, considerable differences will 
be apparent. It 1 probeble that it the same rates of taxation are 
levied by each State Government, the standards of services supplied 
will be different. Conversely, if the standards of services supplied 
in each Ctate is the same, the level of taxation will probably be 
different. This will probably arise because of differeLces in 
natural resources, stages of development reached, distribution of 
incomes etc. between the oommanities. 
111101M4111.0. 0001.111041. ....... 
5. See page 19 above. 
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One of the principle upon which the totcl amount of 
revenue which the Federal f;overnment is prepared to make available can 
be distributed is the principle of 'equalisation of etandards of svrv-
ices, but it automatically follows that equalisation of tax burdens 
must also be considered. For at the beginning of -,:ederation all 
State Governments may be providing services of similar standards, but 
only at the expense of different severities of taxation. If the 
principle to be adopted were aimed at equalising standards of services 
then the amount available would be distributed on a per capita basis. 
It is only reasonable that if standards of services are already 
equalised, then attention should be given to the relative severity of 
taxation in each of the several communities, 
(iii) i:qualisation of Development 
Inevitably the natural resources of each Ctate in the 
rederation will have ensured that each has reached a different stage 
of development. In one community the natural resources available may 
have besot' capable of exploitation at comparatively little cost and 
being a profitable field for investment, were developed by private 
enterprise. 	In another, the resources may have been difficult to 
exploit without heavy capital expenditure. This has been the general 
experience in all the main Federations of the world today. In the 
latter community, if the same stage of development is to be reached as 
In the former, the rate or public investment will need to be 
relatively greater. If it is agreed that one of the financial . 
Objectives of a , ederatien is to permit all States to attain the same 
stage of development in the interests of maximising output in the 
Federation as a whole, then it will have to be agreed that public 
capital expenditure, and therefore public bo rowing, must be 
relatively greater in those Otates which have not been able to develop 
their resources to the same extent as the more prosperous atates. 
It must be recognised that a policy directed towards these 
ends is not directly concerned with the financial problem of the 
distribution of the total amount made _available by the 4 ederal 
Government each year for payment to the State Governments. However, 
every set of public capital investment involves the borrowing 
authority in annual committmenta in the form of interest and sinking 
fund payments. This will influence the severity of taxation in a 
community where the borrowing authority 1;1 the tate Government. 
Before Federation, the amount which could be borrowed was probably 
limited because of the burden which would be plaeed on the taxpayers 
or the other types of services which would have to be foregone. If, 
however, one of the aims of rederation is to p.rmit equalisation ot 
development, the total amount available can be distributed between the 
State 44overnments to such a way as to permit the interest bill of one 
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State to increase disproportionately without throwing any relatively 
greater burden on the taxpayers of that tate or without reducing the 
standards of other types of service* below the general level operating 
In other States. 
In other words, the people of the States which are more 
developed will be required to contrib,te some of the cost of the 
interest on, and the amortisation of the loans raised to finance 
development in the relatively under-developed States. Such a policy 
is justifiable in the interests of the maximisation of welfare in the 
rederation as a whole. In effect, this type of equalisation could 
reasonably be included under the heading of equalisation of standards 
of services, Powever„ because of the different nature of this type 
et "service", it has been considered advisable to treat it independ-
ently of the other types of services. It involves a completely 
different decision - that of deciding the level of •ptiblic borrowing 
in each State. 
(iv) Equalisetion of incomes. 
In an earlier Chapter, attention was given to the part 
which inequality of incomes will play in retarding the attainment of 
the maximum average level of welfare in a commumity. It was shown thal 
if inequality exists to any extent, the production of greater equality 
will be achieved by the imposition of progressive rates of taxation 
and with the revenue thus obtained, by providing public services to 
those *hose need is greatest. The reduction of inequality is synonym-
ous with increasing the average level of welfare. 
This reavoning, which was related to the members of a 
single community, can be extended to apply to communities as well as 
Individuals. If the average level of income differs between the Stets 
in a Federation, it maybe ;Add that the average level of welfare 
enjoyed by the people of the Federation as a whole can be increased 
by increasing incomes of those in the lower income brackets at the 
expense of thoa in the higher brackets. 
there is ample scoee for such redistribution in a 
, ederation if the 2edera1 Government imposes income taxation. If the 
rates of income taxation are progressive, the Oederal Government will 
collect relatively more from the States whore average incomes are high, 
It can then, by means of grants to the State Governments, bring about 
greater equality of incomes in the Ti'ederation as * whole by making the 
distribution in favour of the States with lower average incomes. 
The four mein poesibilities for equalisation in adopting 
the principle of relative financial needs are thus, equallantion of th4 
severity of taxation, standards of servces, development and incomes. 
They ere not mutually exclusive, In fact, if this principle Is to be 
dMAIMAIII, IMMO.W.IPOOMMWOMMOMAIDOMMOMINOWIS 
6. Chapter 2, pp 20 - 30. 
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• 
placed on a basis whidlis at all sstisfectory, it is doa able that 
the etas of producing equality, or reducing irequelity in all these 
fields shoald be adopted simultaneously. 
The extent to which the 1.'aderation can be successful in 
bringing about equality between Ctates will Oepend primarily upon the 
amount of revenue which beccves available for distribution, This in 
tura will be dependent upon the constitutional provisions of the 
Federation which allocate functional and financial powers between the 
Federal and state Governments. At the one extreme the Federal 
Government will be riven absolute control of taxation in which case tho 
total a.uount available for distribution should be considerable and 
adequate for the purpose of bringing about equality between the States 
in the selected fields. On the other hand the taxation powers 
allotted to the .eederal Government may be such tsat they provide 
revenue only slightly in excess of the amount necessary for tne proper 
conduct of its on administration. in this latter case, the 
poesrbility or successfully applying a principle of payment of grantee 
according to financial needs will be remote. The :ituation can be 
envisaged where the iCule of the amount available is distributed to 
one or a few of the Ctate *4overnmenjts, and these amounts are still 
insufficient to bring about the required degree of equality in the 
chosen fields. The Ltates to which no payment is made may still be 
in a position of superiority eompsred with those which actually 
received gra ts from the Federal nover , ment. 
A further possibility whicil must be considered is that th4 
source of finance available to the 2ederta Covernment ;any be sdbject 
to some fluctuation, so that in years of prooperity the alount of 
revenue available for distribution to the State 4overnments is 
s..ifficient for the purpose of meeting the relative financial needs of 
all the State uovernments, while in periods of reduced econcllic 
activity, the amount available falls short of requirements. Of course 
the possibility always exists to: the Federal iovernment to produce a 
deficit budget result under such circumstances. This will mean in 
effect, that the Zederal Government will be financing the attainment 
of equality between States in certain fields by deficit financing. 
There seems to be no justification for the Federal Government to be 
called upon to undertake deficit financing for tills purpose. It may 
be justified, however, an part of a general policy designed to 
maintain full employment. Therefore constitAtional provision should 
• 
	be made to ensure that sources of revenue available to the l'ederal 
Government are sufficient to ensure that total income, and hence the 
amount available for distribution to the States, is sufficient to 
satisfy the principle of payment according to relative financial 
needs. 
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It might be argued that the simplest way for this to be 
carried out would be for the Federal Government to assume responsib-
ility for administration in the fields in which it is desirable that 
equality be brought *bout. The possibility does not arise, however, 
because it has been presupposed that certain communities have agreed 
to codbine to form a ?ederation end that each wishes to retain its 
.independence to as great a degree as possible. To hand the necessary 
functions to the 4'ederal Government would be tantamount to the 
establishment of a unitary form of government in place of the federal 
fora which exists. If, for example, it was decided that the aim of 
P adoration was to produce equality ot standards of scrvices and of the 
burden of taxation, such a procedure would imply handing over to the 
Federal Government power to collect all taxes and also the power to 
administer the function of providing the necessary services. Earlier in this eseag the provision of services has been defined to incltde 
all fields in which governments incur expenditure. Thus the handing 
over of these powers to the Federal Government would imply the compl-
ete surrender of independence on the part of State Governments. 
In support of the contention that the Federal Government 
should attempt to bring about equality in spK:cified fields by assuming 
control of administration in those fields is the sometimes stated 
principle of public finance that those people who are responsible for 
the spending of public money should also be responsible for the 
raising of the necessary revenue, Such a contention can not logically 
be applied in a Federation. Carried to its ultimate conclusion, it 
would imply the continuous perfect distribution of functions and 
finances between the 'ederal and State Governments. There could be no 
payments from one to the other and the anomoloue position would arise 
where, by accident or design, one authority had more than sufficient 
revenue for its requirements and the other had less than sufficient. 
Rigid adherence to this tenet would mean that unless this perfect 
co-ordination between functions and financial resources of the 
various governments was maintained, the governments of some States 
would experience easy financial positions while the others would be 
Continually below standard. It is apparent therefore, that this 
cannot be followed with any rigidity in a Federation. While it is 
undoubtedly desirable that revenue raising and spending should be 
controlled by one authoritr, this is not practicable in a Federation. 
A further aspect which should be taken into consideration 
in deciding whether or not it is practicable for the functions to be 
worried out by the State Governments while at the same time receiving 
financial assistance where necessary from the Federal Government, is 
that while it is possible to Obtain equality in certain fields by this 
method, it does not assume that there must be equality between regions 
7 See page 57 above 
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within a State. While this le undoubtedly desirable as a long-term 
policy, it is not reasonable to expect that it can be achieved over a 
short period by transfers of powers of administration to the Federal 
Government. It would seem to be preferable for these functions to be 
carried out by the State Governments. Those authorities will be in 
close touch will local thought and feeling, and more readily able to 
assess relative needs as betweer; regions within the community. 
If the k'ederal Government were to assume responsibility 
for Vie provision of, say, health and educaUon services on the 
understanding that the services would be given without differentiation 
between meMbers of the Pederation, it would be ineultbient upon it to 
provide the same standards of s , rvIces in all districts of the States 
of the Federation. Such a policy would be difficult for a single 
central government to administer and a cerain amount of devOution 
would be necessary. In a Federation, however, the maohinary exists 
for effective administration of such services by State Governments. 
This would be wasted if control of the functions were handed to the 
Federal uovernment. 
However, while arguments eta be developed for and against 
the desirability of the unitary or federal to in of government, in the 
present instance it is not strictly relevant. The question is merely 
to determine the best way to obtain financial stability in a 
Federation. It is not concerned with whether federation is Liore 
desirable than the unitary form of government. 
This discussion of the efficacy of the whole eyetem of 
grants from one authority to another in a Federation has beta a slight 
digression from the main topic of the principles upon which grants are 
paid. Nevertheless it is not entirely irrelevant in that the question 
will always arise as to whether there is some alternative method of 
solving the major financial problem in a Foleration. ' ,rale this may 
be so, so long as the financial problem does exist, it is proper to 
put forward a financial solution while recognising that other 
solutions of a non-fiscal nature may also exist. 
• 	 The principle of payment according to financial needs 
can thee be used as a means of correcting differences in standards 
which existed between the Ctates before they federated. The principle 
of payment as compensation for financial loss is a means of maintainkei 
the financial organisation and relationships which existed before 
Federation as far as possible. It is proposed to examine the relative 
merits of each in order to determine which of the alternatives is the 
more appropriate for the type of Federation which was established in 
Australia. 
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CffAPT1R 14  
piTs or A 	-P'I PRINCIXM 
' The two major alternative, principles which me$ be adopted 
as a basis for the disbursement of the surplus revenue of the Federal 
Government have now been propounded. Briefly, it wau found that the 
main possible alternatives were the principles of payment as compen-
sation for financial loss incurred by a Ltate as the result of 
entering the Federation, and payment according to relative.financial 
needs. It remains now to determine which of the alterftutives if ad-
opted, would give the more beneficial results. To some extent, such 
a determination involves value judgments, but unfortunately the 
nature of the problem is such that this is unavoidable. However, it 
is anticipated that the conclusions reached with regard to each will 
be sufficiently distinct to make the chioce relatively simple. 
he background against which the merits of the 
alternative principles will be examined will be the possibility of 
attainment of the several anemia]. Objectives of government out-
lined in Chapter 2. 1 	In that Chapter it was suggested that the 
main Objectives of financial policy of governments are to redistribute 
Incomes towards greater equality, to encourage development and to . 
maintain full employment. It was further shown that in a Federation, 
either the Federal Government or the Stat* Uovernments alone could not 
effectively pursue such Objectives, Gone 'cooperation is needed 
between States. This cooperation can be achleved.through the system 
of grants made by the ,eederal to the State,uovernments. The test of 
the adequacy or otherwise of a principle for determining the amount 
of these grants will therefore be whether or not it permits the 
attainment of the Objectives. 
*hen several communities join together to forma 
Federation, it is more than probable. that economic conditions will be 
different in each. There is a multitude of factors which will have 
given rise to this situation. - Such things as accidents of history, 
geographical location and nearness to established trade channels, size, 
geological formation, policies of past governm eats, richness or 
poverty of natural resources, capital development, and many other 
factors will have influenced the determination of existing relation-
ships. It fllows that it is equally probable that the financial 
positions of the States . will be different. If a community is - richly 
endowed with natural resources such esminerals„ forests, capacity to 
develop cheap power and so on, it is probable that the . community is 
highly developed. Private capital will be encouraged to move to the 
centres of greatest potential productivity, and opportunity will exist 
1. See above p. 19. 
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for the national income of the people to increase as industrial 
development takes place. 
The .,overnment of such a commurity will be Ins fortunat 
position. The fact that average incomes are relatively- high will meal 
that the obligation to provide community services and amenities will I 
relatively small. The basic function of government, the organisation 
of defence, police and judicial services will be proportionate to the 
size or the population, but services for which the demand varies with 
the levels of incomes, such as medical services, free education, 
library services, etc, will be compnratively low. On the other hand, 
the taxable capacity of the people resident in the community will be 
high. The industrial prosperity of the country presupposes considerdi 
overseas trade. If a protective tariff has been adopted, the revenue 
of the government from customs duttes will be high. Similarly, since 
incomes are high, a fairly low rate of taxation should yield 
' sufficient revenue to provide the necessary services. 
. 	Furthermore, since the abundance of natural: resources 
make for profitable investment, it is possible that capital investment 
will be undertaken =July by private enterprise and therefore the 
public debt of the community may not be very great. This means that 
the burden of debt charges on the finances of the government will no$ 
be very great. 
It is possible, then that at one en -; of the scale of the 
group of communities which propose to combine in Federation is this 
type of community which has s government with relatively few 
commitments and high potential sou ces of revenue. At the other end 
of the scale is the community which is net well endowed with rich 
natural resources, and those which are available are not potentially 
profitable. In all probability, the population of such a community 
will be mainly engaged in rural activity, and any major developmental 
work which has taken place has been by public investment. The average 
level of incomes will not be high, and therefore the need for services 
financed by the State will be .reletively great and at the same time, 
the taxable capacity of the people will be low. Overseas trade will.
corrspondingly smell and income from customs duties will also be low. 
The government of such a community will not be in an 
enviable position. It will be forced to impose high rates of taxation 
in order to receive sufficient revenue to provide even the bare 
minimum of services to Meet the neAs of the community. Its public 
debt may be high, but this depends on whether in the past governments 
have been suffieiently courageous to incur the . annual burden of debt 
charges in view of the low taxable capacity and other needs of the 
community. Undoubtedly as a long-term plan, such a procedure would 
6 5 
be commendable, but politically it may have been difficult for a 
government to incut debt deliberately in the knowledge that other 
services would have to be curtailed until such time as the benefieial 
results of the investment became apparent. 
he two cases which have been considered have been the 
two extreme possibilities. In actual practice it would probably be 
found that the communities entering the proposed Federation will all 
be somewhere between the two extremes. Nevertheless it would be safe 
to assume that conditions In each community wal be different. It 
would be expected that the severity of taxation, the standards of 
services supplied, the degree of development of primary and secondary 
industry and the ratio between public and private capital development 
In all °immunities will be different. To a large extent, some of 
these are complementary. For example, equal standards of services may 
have been achieved by disparate severities of taxation. Conversely, 
equal standards of taxation could be achieved by adopting different 
standards of services. 
To sum up, it maybe said that before Federation, 
differences in natural conditions between -7;tates iill have resulted in 
differences in the average incomes of the residents of the several 
States. nifferences in average levels of incomes will have made it 
difficult for the governments of the States to pursue a policy design-
ed to maximise welfare and which will give the same average level of 
welfare in each State. The scope for the effective pursuit of a 
policy designed to maximise welfare differed between tltates. 
In an earlier Chapter it was shown that where inequal-
ities of income exist in a community, the welfa.e of the community as 
a whole will be increased id the degree of inequ'a-Lity is reduced. 
Similarly, if there are inequalities in the average level of incomes 
between States in a Federation, the welfare of the people of the 
Federation as a whole will be increased if the degree of inequality 
between States is reduced. 
The establishment of a Federation with a Federal 
• Government to coordinate, where necessary, the activities of the 
several States means that a new authority is set up *tics° objective 
as with all governments, to maximise the welfare of the people it 
represents. State ‘tovernments existed before Federation and their 
Objeetive, both before and after the establishment of the Federation, 
Is to maximise welfare within their State boundaries with the 
resources at their disposal. A new Uovernment, with jurisdiction 
over the whole field of Federation would be superfluous if it were 
designed merely to carry out a few functions in which there should be 
some cooperation between States. Such responsibility could be carried 
2. Chapter 2, p.20 ff. 
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out by a council of repveaentatives of the various rtate governments 
without any direct legislative power. 
A Federal Government means something more than this. It 
function should be to maximise the welfare of the people in the 
Federetion as opposed to maximisation of welfare in each State 3 Separately. As shown in chapter 21• this Inaba achieved by the 
adoption or appropriate financial policies. They are first, by 
decreasing the degree of income inequality in the community, secondly 
by influencing the distribution of resources and encouraging 
development in order to maximise production and hence incomes, and 
thirdly by ensuring that at all times the nation enjoys a situation o, 
full employment. The alternatine principles of payment of grants to 
the State Governments by the Federal Government should be examined in 
the light of the ways in which their adoption would help or hinder thl 
Federal Government in attaining these Objectives. 
(i) 
	 h 	at on P 	1 
The adoption Of the compensation principle implies that 
in distributing its surplus revenue, the Federal Government follows a 
principle designed to give each State Government, as far as possible, 
that portion of the surplus revenue which was actually collected from 
people resident In that state. At first sight, the accounting 
difficulties associated with such a method are prohibitive. It may 
be possible_ to determine with some degree of accuracy, the amounts 
actually collected from th• people of each State. The extent of the 
difficuMy which might arise in this connection will be in accordance 
with the nature of the source of revenue of the Federal Government, 
Where the Federal Government has been given sole 
responsibility for the collection of customs duties, and customs 
duties are levied only on goods imported from foreign countries, the 
difficulty of apportioning these revenue collections between States 
will arise where goods are imported into one State and the duty paid 
at the port of entry and then the goods are subsequently distributed 
to the other Stators for retail sale. The difficulty Is increased 
where raw materials are imported into one State, there converted into 
finished products, and then sold to residents of other States. 
It is evident that complete accuracy in this regard could 
only be Cbtaibed by an intricate method of registration of imports, 
quantities of imported materiels contained in locally manufactured 
goods, distribution of sales of goods and transfers across State 
borders by road, rail, sea and air of all goods involving an element 
of foreign material which has been subject to customs duty at the 
pont of entry. 
The reason wly it is necessary for thesedetails to be 
3. p.20 ff. 
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known is to permit the Federal Government to determine how much of its 
customs revenue was actually derived from the residents of each State. 
It may 'be, for expmple, that one seaport serves the whole of. the 
Federation, in which case all customs revenue collections will be 
shown as received from the State in whiCh the seaport is situated. If 
most of the goods Are sUbsequently:transferred . to wholesale agents in 
Other States for disposal, the price paid by the ultimate consumer 
will include customs duty reporded.to the credit of the importing 
State. In the interests of equity, it is essential that the persons 
. who actually pay the duty are credited with the payments. 
Altpost precisely similar.difficulties will be encountered 
if the Federal 0o-remnant aeaumea control of the imposition end 
collection of excise duties. If the duty la paid and recorded in the 
State where the :goods concerned were manufactured, the consumption of, 
and eventual payment of excise on those goods consumed in another 
kate will be ignored. The records of collection of duty will not 
reveal the distribution of the origin of the duty. It this case, 
however, the determination of the correct distribution should not be 
difficult. It the .rates of. duty are the same throughout the 
Federation., all that must be known is 'the quantity of each .type of 
article upon which excise duty is payable, transferred across State 
borders. The rest follows from simple arithmetical calculation. 
Another important source of revenue which could conceiv-
ably be handed to the Federal Government at the inaugurat Ion of the 
Federation is the power to collect income taxes on individuals and 
compentes. Difficulties of apportionment of income tax collections 
between -itates will arise where individuals and companies derive 
revenue from more than one State. In the case of a large industrial 
concern, for example, which has branches throughout the Federation, a 
tax on income, or profits in this case, could be imposed by the 
Federal Government on the total profits of the concern. If, however, 
it is necessary for the total tax payable to be divided according to 
the amounts payable arising from the activities of the concern in 
each State of the Federation, then a great deal more information will 
'be required by the tax collecting authority, and a great deal more 
clerical and administrativo.work will be inraved. 	• 
Similarly, if the incomes of individuals are taxed by the 
Federal ()overuse:lit. where incomes are earned in more than dhe State. 
additional information will be required to permit the 14deral 
Government to correctly determine the origin of individual incomes. 
If this information is not available, it must be assumed that all 
Incomes of individuals are earned in the State of residence. While 
it may be expected that the error which is likely to arise from 
making this assumption will be reduced by compensating turoPe in the 
case of each State, there angst be some error, however small. 
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The determination of the *mount of revenue collected according to 
source would be simpler in the caie of other types of taxation. For 
example, the distribution of collectione of Land 1. 51, Saies . or PUrchmm 
Tax and Entertainmente or Amusement tax would be straightforward. 
Almost invariably the collections would be. made in the Ctate.in which 
the person paying the tax resided. There would possibly be some 
interstate ownership pf land, but it should not be very difficult to 
apportion revenue from these sources correetly. :Matron Gifts and 
Death Luties might similarly present some difficulties, but again, it 
should not be impossible for these tO be overcome. , • These, however, 
are comparatively minor sourcei of 'revenue. The more important source 
of taxation revenue are Income taxation and Customs and 14eise Duties 
and as explained Above, they would be.diffiCult to apportion Securat* 
The allocation of revenue derived from services supplied 
by the Federal Government must also be -considered. The most important 
services from the revenue viewpoint, and the ones Moat likel*. to be 
taken over by the newly formed Federal Government are post and ' 
telegraph services and transport services by road, rail, sea and +Kir i! 
In the first case no serious difficulty Should be encountered in 
determining how much of the total revenue received In the Federation 
from the provision of serviette was derived from the residents of each 
State. Post and tclegraph.services are usually received and paid for 
In one place. Where the service extends beyond  the boundaries of one 
State, such as in the case of carriage bymail, there is usually a 
compensating movement in the Opposite direction. This is also true, 
- to a lesser extent, in the case of transport services. v:here goods 
are shipped from one place to another, it is usual for theshipper to 
pay the freight in the first place and recover the transport costs by 
charging correspondingly higher prices to the consignee.. Ultimately 
the coat of the transport it paid by the consumer. Unless there is 
a correspondence between the imports Into and exports from any 
particular State of the l'edcration, the collections in transport 
charges by the Federal Government or its agency will be shown to be 
greater per head in the areas which import least. In fact the g Nat-
eat cost per head will be in the State which imports most, but the 
cost will be borne in portion of the prices paid for the goods import-  
d. This factor must also be token into consideration when assessing 
the relative . amounts paid by the members of each State for services 
supplied whin thnse services are supplied.. by the Federal Government. 
It can readily be appreciated that there will be a series 
difficulty encountered in ascertaining how much of the revenue of the 
Federal rlovernment was contributed by members of the several States 
of the Federation. Prebebly even greater difficulty will be 
4.It may be that the provision of these services is undertaken by 
• private enterprise. If so, the problemwill not arise. 
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encountered in determining the portion of total Federal lovvrnment 
expenditure incurred on behalf of each State. Excepting specific 
grants to State Governments, almoet everey item of expenditure will 
need to be scrutinised carefully and if possible, properly apportionedA 
In many eases this will be practically impossible. 
In the case of expenditure on defence, which may under 
etlitain circumstances represent a - substantial portion of total expen-
diture, there can be no completely satisfactory basis of distribution 
between States. The fact that certain items of expenditure are in-
curred in a specific State of the 4dtration does not necessarily mean 
that such expenditure is made on behalf Of that area alone. It may 
be in the interests of the Federation as a whole that defence expen-
diture be concentrated in certain strategic areas. If those areas 
chance to be in one or a few of the territories of the tates s it is 
not reasonable that the expenditure be regarded as being incurred on 
behalf of thoae States alone. All meMbers of the Vederatim should 
be regarded as having contributed to the total cost. 4:lwrefore, some 
means must be devised to apportion the coat beteeen the slates which 
comprise the Federation. This will necessarily be an arbitrary 
device. It maybe decided that reletive population sizes should be 
the basis, but this suffers from the dreviback that defence requir,ement 
:aay bear only remote relation to the poptletion. 'atever method is 
chosen, there will inevitably be some deficiencies. 
Another type of expenditure which will be difficult to 
apportion between States will be the annual commitments for interest 
and einking fund charges incurred by the Federal Government. These 
. commitments will arise from the.expenditure made from loan funds on 
capital goods and construction works front which the members of the 
Federation will benefit. The correct apportionment of subsequent loan 
charges will entail'the recording of all capital expenditure. and 
amortisation according to ntates the mentors of which benefitted from 
the expenditure. This will not always be ear:y to calculate, but such 
expenditure should be subject to reasonably accurate distribution. 
Most items of expenditure will permit simple apportionment. Others, 
but probably fee, will call for an sebitrary decision. 
.Theve two examples illustrate the difficulties which 
will be encountered by the Federal Government should it require to 
distribute the total expenditure on central government activities 
between the States. It can readily be appreciated that if even a 
reasonably accurate assessment is to be made, a considerable amount 
of work will be involved. This, in itself, will canoe greater 
expenditure by the Federal Government. 
In many cases * in order to arrive at a reasonable 
approximation to a colliect distribution. between States of expenditure 
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made on their behalf, and revenue received by the Faderal Government, 
some arbitrary basis will have tck. be adopted. Under ordinary 
circumstances, it will probably be found that the only est1:7factory 
basis will be a per capita distribution. tAille in acme cases this 
may be sufficiently accurate in others it may be completely 
inadequate. It could never be used, for example, as a means for 
distributing revenue received from the imposition of customs and exam 
duties and from income taxation. It is apparent that in these cases 
a more exact method is required. Generally it can be assumed that a 
considerable amount Of time and money will be expended in the process 
of reaching the desired degree of accuracy. It may, however, be 
poesible to reduce the work involved by use of accepted statistical 
techniques.. 
Undoubtedly it will be possible to arrive at some 
reasonable figure showing the revenue rind expenditure of the Federal 
Government according to the State of origin or destination. tinder 
the assumpvion made previously - that the revenue of the Federal 
Government will exceed its expenditure - the net result will be a 
surplus divided according to the State of origin. Under the principle 
of payment as compeneation for financial loss incurred by the several 
States, these are the amounts to be oaid by the Federal Government to 
the reepective State Governments. 
The effect of the adoption of this principle of 
determining the amounts to be paid to the State Oovernments from the 
surplus revenue of the Federal Government can now be considered. The 
ve-y method of determining the size of the grant in each case ensures 
that the State will receive the not amount of the contribution of its 
meMbers to the surplus revenue of the Federal Government. Under this 
principle, no attempt is made to use the surplus revenue as a means ol 
redis , ributing the total financial resources of the oederation. -Jiach 
State will receive the amount its residents contributed in various 
ways to the revenue of the Federal Government less a proportion of 
the cost of VIE, Federal Government. 
It combo safely assumed that all States will be of 
different economic strength and as a result, some actual inequity 
might be caused by the methods used in the adoption of this prbaciple 
of distribution. 	When the States form themeelves into a Federation 
they surrende certain functional powers to the newly formed Federal 
Oovernment.' Henceforward they will have no authority as to the 
amount of revenue income which will be expended In thee° fields, and 
yet they will be required, by the nature of the distribution of the 
financial powers of the Federation between the 7ederal and Ctate 
Governments to contribute to the financial support of the exercising 
5. See pp. 63-64. 
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of those powers to the extent that the Pederal Covernment considers 
necessary. The case or the handing over of the defence . poTera of 
the '/ ederation affords an excellent example of the atinner in which 
this can operate.6 The Game effect might be felt in any field which 
posses to the control of the Federal Government. The tcope of activ-
ity covered by any of the transferred functions might be interpreted 
quite differently by the authority now responsible for its 
administration. They meet be interpreted in a eider sense and this 
could conceivably result in greater overall expenditure than before 
Federntion. On the other hand, the taking over of a function 
formerly administered by several authorities by a single administrat-
ive agent should result in some reduction of total expenditure. 
Nevertheless, If total expenditure does increase, the members of the 
several States will be receiving some service which was previously 
provided by their own Ctate governments. But nit a result cf 
Federation, there may be changed emphasis on the relative important:re 
of the different types of servicee supplied. 
In addition, there will, be some expenditure incurred by 
the Federal Government which was not necessary before Federation. 
The establishment of a new legislature and associated administrative 
machinery implies expenditure not previously necessary. If this type 
of cost of government in distributed between the Otatea on a 
population basis, it in possible that the extra burden, although 
negligible in the case of the moee peosperous States, would be of 
considerable significance in the cases of the poorer communities. 
The first of the objective° of governmental financial 
policy is the redistributive Objective. As explained earlierT the 
purpose of this Objective is to reduce inequalities of incomes in the 
community. Prom the point of view of the Federal Government, the 
coweaunity it represents is the Federation as a whole, and therefore it 
should aim at achieving this objective throughout the Federation. 
However, it can be shown that if the surplus revenue of the ‘ederal 
Government is substantial and the principle of redistribution of this 
surplus revenue is to be the compensetien principle, it will be 
impossible for the Federal Goverment to achieve this objective. 
Under the compensation plinciple, the people of a 
particular state cannot receive proportienately moTe of the surplus 
revenue distribution than their contribution to the revenue of the 
Federal Government. If average incomes are relatively low in one' 
State, the total welfare of the Federation viii be increased if this 
Inequality between •'tates is reduced by giving to that State a 
relatively greater portion of the surplus revenue of the Federal 
Government than the contribution to revenue. Under the compensation 
principle this cannot be done. 
• 6, See above p. 52 7. Chapter 2 p.20 ff. 
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Generally it may be saikl that the adoption of the 
compensation principle will maintain, within certsin limits, the 
situation which existed before the inauguration of the kederation. 
The political eituation will have changed consideratiy, but from the 
point of view of the material position of the mesibers of the several 
rtates of the Pederatien, their relative positions would remain 
virtually unchanged. There will probably be some change in the 
structure bf the services received, but overall the relative positions 
should remain unaltered. If taxation was relatively high in one 
State before Federation, it will probably remain so after kederation. 
If standards of services received were below average, they will still 
be at the -ame relative level after Federation. There may be some 
eight reduction in standards of services, or increases in taxation 
as a result of the additional cost of the new government, and this 
will be felt most in the jtates where taxation was already high or 
where standards of strviees were low. 
Since the rela'ive position of the States remain the same 
after Federation, it follows that differences in welfare levels bet-
ween the States will remain unaltered. The adoption of the 
coApewation principle cakes it practically impossible for the 
Pederal G:vvernment to undertake effectively a policy designed to 
reduce inequalities of incomes in the Federation as a whole. If it 
has power to impose taxes on incomes and there are inequalities of 
income between people it the Federation, it may impose progressive 
rates of taxation for the purpose of bringing about greater equality. 
However, since it is bound to return revenue according to the State 
of origin, there can be no redistribution of incomes between States. 
The second objective is that of maximising production 
through redis:-Iiibuting resources end influencing orogress and capital 
development. Here, the Federal Oovernment will stnilarly be limited 
in its scope. It has been suggestod8  that a government can use 
direct and indireet means to achieve these objectives. Atie direct 
means include discriminatory taxation, the payment of bounties and 
subsidies, and manipulation of its own expenditure policies. 
In a rederetion„ if the rederal eovertnent =PP; adopt 
the principle of payment for compensation as the basis for grants-in-
aid, it will noi be able to use these direct means of reallocating 
reseurces and influencing development. If, for example, the Federal 
Government provoses eneouraging the development of a particular 
irdustry in en endevelope3 f:tate by payment of bounties and subsidies, 
such paymente would be classified as payments for that State. The 
grant to tile State Government would be reduced accordingly. 
8. See above, pp. 3S-33. 
73. 
Similarly, if it wished to encourage a State Government to embark on 
new capital works, it could make available the necessary finance by, 
for example, central bank credit. However, the State Government 
would be required to meet debt charges as they , would be regarded as 
payments for the state and accordingly charge* against the State. In 
these circumstances, it is doubtful if the State Government concerned 
would respond to the encouragement or the Federal Government. 
So far as indirect methods are concerned, the obstacles 
imposed by the adoption of the compensation principle will not be so 
great. Such approaches as the discriminatory use of central bank 
credit and direct controls will not be affected by the principle 
adopted to determine grants-in-aid. 
The third major financial Objective of government policy 
is the attainment and maintenance of fall employment. As in the 
previous case, the success:121 application of this policy involves 
discriminatory taxation, encouragement of private and public capital 
investment in certain sectionsof the Federation, and manipulation of 
Oederal Government direct expenditure to produce the best results. 
Again, the complete application of the policy will be prevented if 
the Federal Government is restricted to the use of tht. compensation 
principle in determining the payment of grants to the State 
Governments. 
This is particularly so to the extent that it may prevent 
rapid expansion and contraction of public investment programmes. In 
the Australian ioderation, the State Governments are mainly responsible 
for such expenditure. Consequently, if this is to expand, it is the 
State Governments which must accept the responsibility. The Federal 
Government can encourage expansion in a Particular 2tate by 
contributing from its revenue to the resultant annual debt charges. 
If the compensation principle is to be used, the Federal Government 
is prevented from giving this type of assistance. 
It may be said, therefore, that the use of the compen-
sation principle will prevent a Federal Government from effectively 
attaining all three Objectives of governmental financial policy if the 
field of its operation is regarded as the Federation as a whole and 
not the several states individually. When this principle of determ-
ining grants is adopted, the Federal Government will be forced to 
treat each State as a separate unit and reduce inequality, maximise 
production, and maintain full employment within the limits set by 
the natural resources and economic development of each separate State. 
Each Objective could be more adequately pursued if the Federal 
Government were permitted to ignore State boundaries and influence 
the transfer of resources, physical and financial, to those parts of 
the Federation where they will produce the most beneficial results 
for the Federation as a whole. 
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(ii) Eff t o lel Ti C We 
     
The principle of disbursement of the surplus revenue of 
the Federal Government to the State Governments of he Federation 
according to the relative financial needs of each has been stated as 
a principle aimed at producing equality between States in certain 
fields of economic activity. 9 	The implications of the adoption of 
this principle are that before Federation there was a fairly wide 
range of differences in the economic conditions which existed in the 
several States. In particular, rates of taxation, standards of servi( 
-es and levels of public endebtedness would be different. The 
possibility of implementing the principle arises when the Federal 
Government receives atibsitantially more revenue than it requires to 
finance its own operations. The annual surplus would then be divid-
ed between the States with the object of equalising conditions, and ii 
particular the three aspects of governmental activity mentioned. 
In essence, the process of equalisation in these fields 
on a Federal basis is similar to the process which would be adopted 
if a government were attempting to equalise the incomes of its 
individual meMbers. In that case,. the authority concerned would levy 
taxes on a progressive scale, thus drawing the major portion of its 
revenue from the wealthier of its community, and with the proceeds 
provide services, pensions, etc. to people in the lower income groups, 
Then it is thouivit desirable to produce equality in 
certain spheres of econmaic activity in States, the Federal Oovernmeni 
•will impose rates of taxation which will be progressive as far as 
possible. An income tax will almost invariably be of a progressive 
nature, but a customs duty will usually be regressive. Nevertheless, 
the rates of duty, or taxatlon inaposed will probably be progressive 
throughout the Federation. Under certain circumstances it would 
•render the process of bringing about equalisation impossible If this 
were not so. If, for example, both the Federal and State Oovernmenta 
were permitted to levy income tax concurrently, and the revenue 
derived from income tax formed a reasonably high portion of the total 
revenue of the several authorities, it would be possible for the 
Federal Government to levy differential rates of taxation between 
States and so Obviate the necessity to make payments to the 4;tates. 
That la, the Federal Uovernment could dispense with a revenue surplus 
and hence dispense with the -necessity to make a distribution. If the 
revenue of the Federal uovernment from other sources was still 
sufficiently great to produce a surplus, thus retaining the necessity 
to make a distribution, the rates of certain types of taxation could 
be so adjusted between States to permit the distribution of the 
surplus by the simplest possible method. or example, it may be 
9,‘ See PP. 54 ff. 
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possible, by manipulation of certain rates of taxes between States, 
to permit the disbursement of the surplus revenue on a per capita 
basis and still achieve the desired purpose. 
• Despite the attractiveness of such a actleme, main 
consideration must be given to the case where it is incuMbent upon 
the Federal Government to impose uniform rates of taxation and dutio 
in each State of the Federation. This is the situation which exista 
in Australia. In effect, under such a systemof payments to the 
melber States as here envisaged, this uniformity of taxation rates 
will be technically invalidated. For while rates of taxation will 
be uniform, paymnts to the several States will bear no relationship 
to the amounts contributed by each and hence the ultimate effect ell 
be that the net burden on the taxpayer of some States will be less 
than the burden on taxpayers in other States. Nevertheless, super-
ficial uniformity will exist and presumably all that is required is 
that rates of taxation alone shall be uniform throughout tite Federati 
Since the general level of prosperity will be higher in 
some States than in others, it can be assumed that the average level 
of incomes will be correspondingly greater. It follows that Federa 
Government collections of income tax per head will also be greater. 
Progressive income tax rates will ens re that residents of the more 
prosperous States will contribute lelatively more than the average t4 
Federal revenue. .:,ven in the case of customs duties collections, th 
same effect will bliained, although by a different process. It can 
be safely assumed that in a Federation, the more prosperous a 
community, the greater the volume of imports per head from outside ti 
Federation. At first sight this may appear to be a contradidtion. 
It would appear that a prosperous community would be producing 
relatively more than its poorer neighbours, but generally this 
prosperity will be in a few fields of production. Few co unities 
are capable of producing all their requirements in both primary and 
Secondary industrial fields, and most find it economically advent
ageous to specialise in producing commodities . for which cost 
eonditions are most favourable, In such oases, the more of the 
commodities in which they specialise are produced, the greater their 
•capacity to exchange the surplus over current requirements with 
countries which have specialised in the production of other types of 
•goods. Hence, as prosperity grows, so will exports and imports 
and thus the revenue from import duties. 
Thus, if the rates of Federal Government taxation are 
uniform between the States of the ioederation, and rates of some types 
of taxation are progressive, collections per head will be relatively 
higher in the more prosperous States. Expenditure from the revenue 
of the Federal Government thus derived will be first upon the proper 
performance of its allotted functions. The type of expenditure which 
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it will be necessary to incur will be determined by the provisions of 
the Constitution of the Federation which distribute functional powers 
between the Federal and State Governments. The expenditure will be 
in the interests of all members of the Federation but it is inevititble 
that there will be some differences in the relative amounts spent for 
or an behalf of each State. To take a simple case which could 
conceivably arise, if the Federal Government is given power to pay 
pensions to aged persons in the Federation, and one State has a 
disproportionately, high percentage of its population in the higher 
age-groups, then the people in that State collectively will receive 
relatively more in pension payments than the other States. Such 
differences will operate throughout all fields or expenditure in which 
the Federal Government operates. 
Consequently there will be many factors which contribute 
to the determination of the relative distribution between States of 
the expenditure of the Pederal Government. In all probability there 
will be some cancellation of positive and negative differences, and 
the final balance in favour of or against each state maybe only 
small. There pill be no force operating to ensure that this 
distribution will be in favour of the States in which the financial 
need is relatively greatest. In the case quoted above as a simple 
example, the utate with lowest taxation rates and highest average 
incomes might also have the highest percentage of older people in 
its population. As a result of a demographic accident, this state 
will receive more per head on this account than any other State. 
The balance of revenue remaining to the Federal Govern-
ment after making the necessaarpayments, is the amount available for 
distribution to the member States. Under the principle that thease 
payments should be made according to the relative financial needs of 
each, the amount will be distributed in such a way as to ensure that 
the economic conditions in the various States are equalised in certain 
fields. The manner in which the amounts can be determined will be 
considered in the next Chapter. For, the present it will be assumed 
that the distribution has been made successfully. 
When this principle in adopted, the poorer States will be 
raised to somewhere nearer the level of the more prosperous States. 
Rates or taxation should be reduced, standards of services raised and 
standards of development brought more into line with development ta 
other States. In the more prosperous States where standards are 
generally relatively high, standards of services should be lowered 
and rates of taxation increased slightly. 
It may be assumed for the moment that the principle of 
payment according to financial needs has beenidoptod in a newly-formed 
'Federation, and it has been decided that the principle will be put 
into operation 'by endeavouring to equalise the standards of services 
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supplied and the level of taxation in the fields remaining to the 
State Governments. This presupposes inequality before Federation 
but, as pointed out above, this is a reasonable supposition. The 
State Governments win be required to surrender certain taxation 
rights and certain functions which forme4ly entailed some expenditure 
However, it maybe assumed that the revenue foregone will, in all 
cases, exceed the expenditure taken over by the federal Government. 
If no recompense is forthcoming in the form of a gratt from the 
Federal Government, each State Government will be faced with three 
alternatives ln.the determination or future policy. It may reduce 
its expenditure on its allotted functions to the extent of the net 
reduction in its revenue; it may increase rates of taxation in the 
fields remaining to it in order to offset the loss of revenue as a 
result of Federation; or it may coMbine both, reducing expenditure 
and increasing rates of taxation but in 'both cases by less than if 
the operation were made through only one avenue. 
If the Federal Government makes a grant to a State 
Government, and the amount of the grant is less than the amount of 
revenue foregone as a result of Federation, then that State will still 
be required to reduce its expenditure below the former level, increae 
rates of taxation to maintain expenditure, or combine both to a mod-
ified degree. If the grant to the State Government is greater than 
the net amount foregone, that State will be in a position to increase 
expenditure on the provision of services, reduce taxation in the 
fields remaining to it, or coMbine both approaches. 
It is apparent, therefore, that by manipulation of the 
amount which the Federal Government pays to each State from its 
surplus revenue, it is possible to bring about equalisation in these 
fields. This does not mean to imply that conditions will then be 
identical 'between States. The Government of each State will retain 
independence in the expenditure of ell money received, and it will 
entail a policy decision on the part of each Government es to the 
field in which the adjustment is to be made. The federal Government 
should only be concerned with the net burden on the individual within 
the Federation. The way in which the burden is distributed must 
remain a function of the State Governments. 
The way in which equalisation can be brought about in 
these two fields, which can in fact be regarded as complementary, can 
also be extended to operate in othtr fields. In the field of 
development generally, the process will be a little more complicated. 
Iti this case, decisions are required with regard to expenditure from 
loan fund* as well as from general revenue. Economic development 
of a community will be by a coMbination of public and private 
investment. Manipulation of investment programmes must be through 
public investment. It may be clearly stated at the outset of 
Federation, and even incorporated in the Constitution in order that 
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the state Governments maybe fully aware of it, that a. policy is to 
be followed to permit relatively under—developed States to borrow 
greater than proportional amounts for public investment. The States 
concerned would then realise that they may increase their public debt 
and the amount of the grant by the Federal Government will be 
Correspondingly greater to offset the higher interest and sinking fund 
payments which it will be required to make. 
It is not suggested that grants should be made from the 
surplus revenue of the Federal Government for the purpose of 
subsidising capital investment in the weaker States. All development-
al programmes should be financed from loan raisings„ Wand if necessary 
the higher debt charges of the weaker States met from surplus revenue 
Again, it could be suggested that the Federal Government might assume 
responsibility for the public debt incurred before Federation by each 
State and be responsible for all future borrowing programmes and the 
annual charges payablL. Such a scheme would be feasible only if it 
could be ensured that the income of the Federal Government would 
always be sufficient to meet the 'combined annual charges an the 
public, debt of all States. 
This maybe possible if the distribution of the taxation 
fields between the Federal and State Gobernments is sufficiently 
flexible to permit a reduction in taxation rates by the State 
Governments and a corresponding increase in rates by the Federal 
Government If the possibility arises where the funds available to the 
Federal Government appear to be insufficient for the purpose. If this 
method' of applying the principle of relative financial needs is 
adopted, there will be implied a complete lose of independence on the 
part of State Governments in determining the extent of public 
investment which will take place. Since there is a close relationship 
between expenditure from loans and from revenue * it is desirable that 
State Governments retain control of the direction at least, of 
expenditure from loan funds. Furthermore, the adoption of this method 
could lead to complications if there was a Owego in the relative 
status of the several States. 
At the State developed, it might become less independent 
on financial assistance from the Federal Government. If the Federal 
Government were committed to meet all debt charges of that State, the 
position might arise where the needs of the state were less than the 
committnents on its behalf by the Federal Government. However, apart trail this consideeation, it is thought that the possibility can be 
rejected solely on the ground of the loss of independence by the 
State Governments. 
It can now be seen that if the principle of payment 
eirmilmwmilmweamommweimmow■Ammirommeimm 
10. This condition relates to Australian circumstances. See p.39 above and nets 20 on that page. 
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according to relative financial needs is adopted, the Federal 
Government will be in a position where it can effectively adopt a 
policy designed to maximise the welfare of the people of the Federatim 
as a whole. It has been stated tha the principle of peyment 
according to relative financial needs lira principle of equalisation. 
If correctly applied, it tends to equalise the burden of taxation 
throughout the Federation and at the awe time equalise the standards 
ef services supplied in each State. In effect it takes revenue from 
the relatively wealthy States and gives to the relatively poorer. In 
other words it tends to equalise thelevels of real income between
• Staten. 
At the same time, the ledural tiovernment can use its 
power •V differentiate between States In distributing surplus revenue 
•In order to influence the allocation of resources. In this respect, 
an Increase lathe gradts to a State will increese the relative 
purchasing power of that State compared with the other States. With 
the increased revenue, factors of production formerly held in other 
States may be transferred to the State receiving the additional grant. 
• So far as the implementation of a full employment policy 
is concerned, the influenoe which the Federal Government can exert an 
a State Oovernment to increase expenditure when unemployment 
threatens, and reduce expenditure when inflation threatens, can be 
brought to bear through grants designed to meet rive financial 
needs. So far as public investment programmes are concerned, the 
Federal Government can again influence the level of spending by the 
State Governments through financial aid to assist the States in 
meeting the necessary .debt management charges. 
On the other hand, the adoption of the principle of 
payment** compensation fat , financial loss would prevent the Federal 
Government from pursuing any at these policies. It would ensure that 
the position which existed before ?ederation would be maintained as 
far as possible. Inequalities between States would be perpetuated and 
therefore the 'federal Oovernmant would be barred from pursuing a pol-
icy- designed to maximise the welfare of the people within the 
Federation. 
There can't)* little doubt that if the Federation is to 
be an effective union, the Federal Government should adopt the 
principle of relative dinancial needs as the only basis for distrib ■ 
mating its surplus revenue between the State Governments. By using 
this principle it is in a position to adopt the only policy which is 
acceptable for Governments in modern communities - that is, 
maximisation of welfare and with it the naintenance ef full employmnt 
Tpe formal adoption et the princlje of payment 
according to relative financial needs will place the Federal 
Government in a position where, other conditions being favourable, it 
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eay effectively dopt a policy designed i.o maximise welfare. For this 
to exist, it will be necessary for several other conditions to be 
satisfied. 	or example, the surplus revenue of the Federal Governmew 
will need to be large enough to permit iJ to make substantial grants 
to the Creates. These grants will have to represent a large proportiol 
of the toted revenue of the -;tatee. Precisely how large this 
proportion should be will depend on the degree of inelatality between 
the 2tates and the state of business activity at the particular time. 
Furthermore, the correct application of the policy will 
depend on the ability of the i. ederal Government or itt agents to 
interpret the relative financial pasitiens of the tretes. Levertheless 
If these conditions were satisfied, and the principle of paement as 
compensation for lose were adopted, the Federal `Jovernment would etil: 
beprevented from effec$ively putting its policy into operation. The 
adoption of the principle of distribution according to relative 
financial needs is the wajor prerequisite. 
Attention rhould aleo be given in peasing to the 
poesibility or adequacy of the per Capita baste for distribution. At 
an earlier stage it wer mentioned 11 that this was merely a variation 
of the principle of compen. - etion for loss. In fact it does not in-
volve any principle at all, but may be regarded as e method which has 
no logical justification other than simplicity. The results which 
would be Obtained from the adoption of this metheo would probably be 
better then the resultn which would be obteined if the principle of 
compensation for loss were adopted. 	A per capita distribution would 
favour slightly those :Antes which contributed least per head of pop-
ulation to Federal revenue fro which the distribution is suede. In 
this respect, advantages would accrue to the weaker etates at the 
expense of the more prouperous L,tatec. To this extent the. adoption o: 
a per capita distribution would have more to commend it, so fax as 
equalisation is concerned, than distribution as compensetion for loes, 
eeverthelees it has the disadvantage ot bringing about 
some measure off equelisation according to no logical principle. 
eurthermore, there can be no guarcutee that or capita payments wilt 
achieve the desired result. Therefore it is considered that while 
this method has some advantages over the cora-patient/on principle, it 
cannot compere with the principle of payment according to finaneile74 
neede which, it is contended, is the correct principle to edope, 
The principle of payment according to finaneiel nee 
must be reparflen an a principle which is aimed at alesseteg the 
exietine eet of financial telations. Theprinciple ofiJapalent no 
compensation for loss on the other hand, is a principle -designed to 
perpetuate existing reletionships. ?her, can et. ae4ong-range 
11, 	nee above pp. 53-54. 
1 
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objective with the latter principle. From the outset it is aimed at 
continuing the existing distribution of the tntal resources of the 
Federation. On the other hand, it must be assumed that there is sow 
ultimate Objective, some long-range purpose in the adoption of the 
principle of payment according to financial seeds, and eventually thal 
Objective will be reached. In this case the ultimate Objective is 
equality of general economic prosperity between 2tetes. As the Statei 
which are relatively week at the outset become stronger and sppreaeh 
equality with the former economically stronger States, it will be 
found that the payments necessary to produce equality will approach 
more closely to some other standard, such as amounts per head of 
population or amounts roughly in proportion to the amounts contributt 
to the revenue of the Federal Government. ?then this stage is reached 
it can be claimed that the purpose of the adoption of the principle 
of payment according to financial needs has been achieved. The lengt/ 
of time which will elapse before this state of affairs comes about will 
depend partly on the way in which the principle is applied but 
mainly on the degree of difference in economic conditions which exist 
between State at the inauguration of the Federation. It may be that 
in a reasonably short period of time, all but a few of the States will 
reach equality in the desired fields. At that stage, partial 
conversion to a new principle may be desirable in the interests of 
simplicity. Leverthelese, there will alwaya be need for differentiat-
ion between 1 tatoa for purposes of maximising welfare by means other 
than equalising incomes. 
The great danger of the adoption of this principle Am 
that there is every opportunity for it to lead to a transfer of 
functional powers from the State to the Federal Government. The 
Pederal Government may feel that its policy could be more effective 
if its spending powers were increased at the expense of the States. 
If involuntary unification is to be prevented, the individual States 
should retain independence of action in as wide a field of activity 
as possible. The surest way to ensure this is for the respective 
fields of operation of the State and Pederal Governments to be 
clearly defined in the Constitution. Then the transfer of powers can 
. maybe in accoidance with the constitutional provisions for 
amendment of the Constitution. 12. 
welasimoimamANA■milimmmatamims.........mremmi. 
12. In Auctralit, Section 128 of the Constitution requires approval by both a majority of States and electors for alter-ation of the Constitution. 
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CHAPTER  
DETErdINATION VA GRANTS  
It has been shown that the distribution of powers and 
resources between the several States which comprise the Federation 
will usually be such that a mdistribution of revenue between the 
Federal and State Governments, from the former, to the latter, will be 
necessary. Where this situation dean arise, a decision must be made 
as to the principle which should be adopted as a basis for the 
redistribution. Where any inequality of resources exists between 
States, it is suggested that the principle of payment according to 
relatiWo financial needs be adopted in order that these inequalities 
should not be perpetuated and so that the Pederal Government is placed 
in a position where it can effectively implement a policy designed to 
maximise welfare in the Pederation as a whiale. In short, the Federal 
Government will, in each accounting period, allot a certain amount of 
its revenue to be distributed between the State Governments, For the 
reasons which have been examined previously, it is suggested that 
this distributi-n should be made according to the financial needs of 
each. When this situation arises, a problem develops as to the manner 
in which the amount payable to each State should be determined. 
Consideration must first be given to the body or 
institution which is to accept responsibility for the determination 
of the relative financial needs of each State 'Government. There 
appear to be teveral possibilities, but these can be reduced to two 
major alternatives. The first of these is that the Federal 
Government itself should accept responsibility while the second is 
that an independent committee, board or tribunal be appointed for the 
purpose. In the final analysis, the responsibility for appropriation 
of Federal Revenue for the payment of grants to the State Governments 
will rest with the Vederal Parliament. it a completely independent 
body is appointed for the purpose, its function can therefore be 
advisory only. This maybe subject to some qualificajlons, as will 
be seen later. 
he choice between the two alternatives is not an easy 
one to make. Each has important advantages and disadvantages. The 
eventual choice may depend on the particular circumstances of the 
Federation in question. lievertheless an-attempt should be made to 
reach a definite conclusion, at least so far an the authority most 
appropriate for the Australian Federation is concerned. 
If the Federal Government regards its ability to make 
grants to the State Governments as an instrument for the implementat-
ion of a policy designed to maximise welfare, it will be vitally 
concerned with the determination of the amounts which each State will 
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receive periodically. In fact it will be part of Federal Government 
policy. For example, in the process of enforcing a full employment 
policy, the Federal Government will have to decide the total amount 
which is to be available for ecpenditure by all governments in the 
Federation. This in turn will necessitate a policy decision concern-
ing the rates of taxation and other charges to be made. Obviously 
such decisions must be made by the Federal Government itself, They 
cannot be delegated to an independent authority which is not poligc-
ally answerable to the people. 
he first conclusion to be reached is therefore that the 
total amount available for distribution to the States in any petiod 
must be determined by the Federal Government as part of its anti.' 
cyclical policy. In fact, such decisions will probably be made by th4 
economic experts advising the Federal Government, although these 
recommendations maybe modified for political reasons. It is not 
necessary to debate here the advisability or otherwise of expert 
recommendations on economic matters being modified at the ministerial 
level for political reasons. It must be assumed that the Federal 
Government proposes to adopt a policy designed to maximise welfare, 
including the maintenance of full employment. 
Once the total amount available has been determined, the 
problem remains to distribute this amount between the States in such 
a way that the policy of welfare maximisation is still followed. In 
the main, this will require a distribution which rill reduce inequal-
ities between States and, to a lesser degree, influence the allocatiol 
of resources between States to maximise produetion as far as possible 
It is quits apparent that the ,'ederal Government as such, would be 
technically incapable of making such a determination. If the task 
remained with the Federal Government, it would devolve upon public 
servants who would be responsible for the necessary calculations. The 
results would be conveyed to the Federal Government which would 
inevitably accept them almost without question because the processes 
by which the results were obtained would be largely unintelligtble to 
the individuals concerned. Any modification made would probably be 
made for political rather than economic reasons. It must be recognim 
that usually politicians have not been trained to comprehend the 
intricacies involved. 
choice of the body to whom shall be given the 
responsibility for distributing the total amount available thus be-
comes .a choice between medbers of the public service employed by the 
Federal uovernment and a body of disinterested experts. So far as 
ability to Perform the task is concerned, there is no choice to be 
made. It is a choice between experts within or outside the Public 
Service. 
84. 
The difference between them is that where the experts in the employ-
ment of the Federal Government are used, there is danger that they 
may be considered to be interested parties. Such an accusation would, 
of course, be quite unfair. To the oetside Observer, however, the 
distribution would be made by the Federal government itself, and this 
is composed of representatives of the States. Although unlikely, 
there is danger that it would be accused of partiality. 
The alternative, an independent commisiion whose sole 
function would be to distribute between the tate Governments a total 
amount indicated by the Federal Government, would avoid any such 
accusations. The members of the commission could be appointed by the 
Federal and State Governments after consultation, and the distributior 
would thus be withdrawn from the political field. 
In the Australian Federation, this idea hes much to 
commend it. Whereat the State Governments would be suspicious of 
a distribution made within the walls of the Federal Treasury, a body 
which has no political affiliation, and made up, of recognised experts 
in the field of pUblie finance, would probably avoid such feeling. 
The reasoning of such a body would be independent of the aecidents 
of Federal politics. 
If it were decided to establish such a body, it could 
have advisory powers only, or it could be responsible for the actual 
distribution of the grants. That is, it could be advised by the 
Pederal aovernment of the total amount which it, the 4deral Oovern-
Relit decided to make available to the State Governments, and in turn 
It would advise the Federal Government of the best way to distribute 
this amount in order to achieve the desired Objectives. Alternatively, 
this committee could receive the total amount from the Federal Govern-
ment and distribute this between the States as it thinks best. 
The latter alternative has the advantage of removing any 
possibility of the rederal +;overnment altering any recommendations of 
the committee. A, block amount could be voted by the Federal Parlia-
ment for payment to the committee 'for distribution to the several 
ntate Governments according to the principle of relative financial 
needs. Such a procedure would, however, prevent the Federal Govern-
ment from attaching any conditions to the grants. An independent 
committee such as that envisaged would not have the necessary powers 
to impose conditions on grants made to the States. 
A compromise solution might be the establishment of a 
separate department under the Yederal Government with the necessary 
power. It could, in fact, be the comission envisaged above but 
operating within the framework of the .Vederal Public Service. Even 
in this form it could be independent of the Federal Government in thal 
each year an amount could be appropriated to that department for 
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distribution to the :7tates, Criticism could still be made of the fee 
that it would be an agent of the Federal Government, but it would 
avoid the necessity of voting a certain amount for each state in the 
Fedtral Parliament. 
One of the main factors which must be counted against an 
proposal for the distribution of the total amount available being 
removed from the hands of the Federal Government or those responsible 
to it, is the size of the amount involved. For example, in Australia 
in 1952-53, direct payments from the Federal to the State Governments 
amounted to Li 83m., or 19% of the total expenditure Of the Federal 
Government. The establishaent of an independent bodywith responsib-
ility for spending this proportion of the revenue of thu Federal 
Government without respdhsibility to the people would surely be 
without precedent in the practice of British government. 
Neverdtplese l the proposal is practically Bound. 4bile 
the Federal karliament would retain the right to determinethe total 
amount to be paid to the Statee a a a whole, the distribatlon between 
the States would be taken oat or Parliament's hands. '4bile there maz 
be strong objections to such a proposal on political grounds, it 
would prevent the distribution of the total amount being subjected to 
the vagaries of party polities and the influence of individual States 
on tile decisions of the Federal legislature. 
Any opposition to such a proposal on the - grounds of the 
large amounts involved could be overcome by the direct payment by the 
Federal to the State Governments of.a fixed amount each year, or a 
certain amount per head of population. For example, the Federal 
Government could pay to each State Government an amount of £10 for 
• each resident in that State. In Australia in 1952-53, this would 
have absorbed approximately t90m., leaving a further r93m. to be 
distributed according to the principle of relative financial needs. 
In this way the sctual amount which the distributing body would be 
required to handle would be considerably reduced. The claim for 
responsibility of Parliament would be partially satisfied and yet the 
principle of 'equalisation could still be satisfied by the equitalle 
distribution of the remaining amount. 
If the Objection relating to the responsibility of 
Parliament to its electors is satisfactorily overcome in this way, 
there would be no impassable barrier to the setting up of an 
independent committee of experts. If public and political feeling 
were still strongly opposed to it, the compromise solution of placing 
this body within the walls of the Federal Treasury might be adopted. 
The solution will depend on the outloo..c and attitudes of the times. 
Whereas a completely independent body might be inacceptable now, it 
might be regarded with favour in another decade. 
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The other decision to be made is whether the body should 
be advisory only or should accept full responsibility for the 
distribution of the total amount made available in each year by the 
- 'ederal Government. In the light of present feeling on related 
matters, it would appear inadvisable to give &body of persons not 
responsible to Parliament and hence to the *lectors, supreme power to 
control the finances of the States. Uuch a procedure could be adopted 
however, if this body were actUally part of the machineryof the 
Federal Government. 
The alternatives thus appear to be, if the Federal 
Government and Parliament is excluded, to establish a body within the 
framework of government but with the maximum of independence compatia 
with this position, to be 'solely responsible for the. distribution Of a 
sum determined by the Federal earliament, or an independent body - 
acting in an advisory copecity only. in view of the importance of the 
need that the distribution should be in accordance with the principle 
of relative financial needs, it is desirable that the actual 
distribution should be removed from the possibility of alteration by 
Parliament. Therefore, at the present time, so far as the Australiar 
Federation is concerned, the choice appears to be the fo. ,mer alternat-
ive, a body within the framework of the eederal Government structure. 
There is in Australia, no institution such as that which 
has been envisaged above. However, its introduction should not be 
impossible. While it would seem that the adoption of this course 
is advisable in the tattoos** of the implementation of the principle 
of equality in the determination of Federal grants, it is not 
completely eszential. It is quite possible that the same ends can 
be achieved if the Federal C/ove,nment itself, thi.ough its expert 
advisers, makes the d cisions. However, the final responsibility for 
the payment of grants rests with the Federal 'Parliament, and therefort 
there is always the possibility that recommendations by experts may 
be disregarded. While this potsibility exists, there is continual 
danger that the accepted principle will be modified to satisfy 
political expediency. 
The actual methods used by such a body to determine the 
relative financial needs, and hence the amount of the grant which 
should be paid to each State Government will be a matter to be decided 
by the committee itself, after having taken account of the conditions 
which exist in the particular Federation. Such conditions will vary 
from time to time and from place to place, and hence it will be 
impossible to examine in detail all the factors which must be 
MUMOD.M.IM WIte 	1.11f.101116.000.Y•00•110.• 1. The nearest approach would be the Commonwealth Grants Commission (see Cijapter 8 belo4 and the Commonwealth Court of goneiliatien and Arbitration. Po r a description of the organisation and functions of this Court, see Labour Report No. 41 pp.51 ff. 
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considered. However, it Is possible to reach certain tentative 
cenclusionn concerning some of the wider issues involved which can be 
assumed to apply uniformly over time, and distance. The moSe complete 
detall'is a matter for individual assessment. The first of these 
broader aspects Of tho determination of the size of the grants is 
possibly part of the principle upon which the grants are determined. 
It has been stated earlier that the principle of relative 
'financial needs is a principle of equalisation. There may be no 
statement of principle in the constitutional provisions of the 
A ederation„ and the distributing committee may receive no instrucgon 
o. this important matter. Consequently, it may fall upon the • 
committee itself to first determine the principle it will use. Even 
if guidance is given to this body, it will probably be Inbroad 
• outline only, and although, the committee maybe instructed to adopt 
the principle of relative financial needs, it must still determine the 
fields in which it will aim to bring about equality between States. 
The choice of these fields in the particular circumstan-
ces which exist maybe quite obvious. Por example theremay be Wide 
differences in the relative severity of taxation between States which 
are retarding the development of the weaker States and perpetuating 
or even increasini: the inequalities which exist. - Under such . 
circumstances, or-41 of the primary aims of the committee could be to 
establish methods of deterMining grants which, when paid, give rise 
to equality of severity of taxation throughout the iederntion. 
Similarly with the stsnr,ards of services supplied and the degree of 
development in each State. 
It is suggested that the conimittee. should first aim at 
bringing about equality of standards in these fields. This can be 
achieved with reasonable accuracy by a statistical comparison of 
existing conditions, and by assersing the amount of money required by 
the government of each State to permit the same standards to operate 
In each State, assuming equal efficiency of operation. 'Chore are 
certain difficulties associated with such an assessment, but these 
would not be insurmountable, particUlarly if the committee were 
provided pith adequate investigatory staff and has full access to the 
records of each State. It is cot -ceivable that the development of 
satisfactory techniques of measurement could not be made over a short 
petiod. At the ()fagot it would be faced with the problem of 
obtainitg a quick solution, and it would be found necessary to use 
temporary measures to give an approximation to the desired result. 
With more experience, greater accuracy could be expected. 
It could be expected that over a period of time some 
change would take place in the relative financial positions of the 
meMber States of the Federation. neguler payments of redistribution 
grants aimed at giving greater equality should tend to bring about 
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greater natural equality. Consequently, it would be inappropriate, ' 
for example, for a formula to be developed which would automatically 
determine the proportion of the total amount to be made available to 
each State. While such a formula could possibly be devised, it is 
improbable that it would meet all aspects of inequality adequately, 
and even if it did produce satisfactory results in one or several 
years, there could be no assurance that it would be sufficien* for the 
purpose of operating over a longer period of time. It would be 
necessary for the distributing committee in question to be constantly 
reviewing its methods and measures if satisfactory results are to be 
(*teamed. 
This matter leads to another question which is probably 
incapable of adequate solution without reference to the particular 
conditions of a specific Federation. That is, to decide whether the 
committee in question should confine itself merely to a statistical 
comparison of conditions existing in each State, or whether it should 
be competent to use its intuitive judgment after observation of the 
relevant data. Arguments can be put forward to justify the use of 
either alternative in general, but the deciding factors will probably 
only be revealed in the particular circumstances. The use of 
statistical comparisons alone will present a clear-cut picture of suet 
aspects of the economy as the relative severity of taxation* and will 
permit the authorities in the several States to realise the position 
in which each stands in relation to the other States. On other words, 
it will permit the body making the assessiont to justify its determin-
ation of the relative financial needs of each State should -the 
occasion arise where this becomes necessary. This method, however, is 
partly unsatisfactory it that there are many aspects of the economy 
which cannot be subjected to precise statistical comparison. 
The concept of standards of scrvices is one example of a 
rather nebulous term which cannot really be defined adequately. It 
cantos appreciated that it would be difficult . to measure this concept 
with statistical apparatus and remain confident of being in a position 
to justify the conclusions drawn from such measurement. On the other 
hand, it may be possible for a body of competent individuals to be 
able to assess with reasolasible accurawi the relative financial needs 
of the several States from observation based on such statistical 
data which may be available. 
It would not be possible, urder these circumstances, far 
the committee concerned to be called upon to justify and explain its 
reasoning, for it is conceivable that several different interpretat-
ions could be placed on the available information. Since the 
individuals concerned have been chosen for their ability, it must be 
- assumed that their interpretation will be the beat possible. 
Consequently, if this method of assessment were used, ten the 
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committee would need to be placed beyond the position where it can be 
called upon to justify its actions either to the Federal Parliament 
or to the appropriate authorities in the States. It would, in •fect i 
require to be given almost dictatorial powers. It would be given 
financial powers of a judicial nature. Such a procedure is.contrary 
to the accepted principle of public finance that Parliament should be 
the only body to spend public money, and could only be justified'if 
the legislatures concerned were convinced of the Ability and 
integrity of the individuals concerned. 
It would, of course, be possible for this committee to 
evolve methods which would make the best possible use of both altern-
atives. In other words, in the fields where complete statistical 
comparison is possible, it could be guided by the staastical inform 
ation alone. In other fields where statistical comparison is imposs-
ible, then intuitive judgment could be brought into play in the 
interests of producing the best results. 
Another of the broader types of problem associated with 
the assessment of relative fitancial needs which can be mentioned 
conveniently at this stage is the problem associated with the 
difficulty of assessing needs in advance. In point of fact, for the 
pueposit of convenience, it will be necessary for the committee to 
carry out its investigations on an annual basis. It is almost 
universally accepted that the financial accounting period shall be the 
complete year. The choice of this period is purely arbitrary and by 
some tests, public accounting and financial practice could be 
'improved if the accounting period were lengthened. However, in all 
prdbability the period of the particular Federation will be fixed 
already, and the system of the disbursement of the surplus revenue of 
the Federal Government will need to be woven into the existing patteit 
If the accounting period is say, from 1st July to 30th June, as in 
Australia, then available revenue must necessarily relate to that 
period, and the distribution must also be made in that period. 
It must be assumed that, in bringing down its budget for 
a particular financial year, the Federal Government will estimate the 
amount of revenue which should be available for distribution to the 
several State Governments. This is the amount which the authorised 
body, whether it is composed of politicians, public servants, or 
disinterested individuals, must distribute between the meMber , 3tates 
according to the predetermined principle. In actual practice, this 
body will be required to assess the financial needs of the States at 
least one year in advance, for it will be essential for the proper 
conduct of the financial affairs of the State Governments that they 
know as early as possible in the financial year the amount of revenue 
they will receive from the disbursement of the total amount made 
available by the Federal Government. This will be necessary in order 
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that they may adjust their revenue and expenditure policies according-
ly. Thus the committee responsible for the determination, will be 
estimating constantly not present needs, but future needs. 
This will, of course, make the tank of distributing the 
available supply of revenue on an equitable basis much more difficult. 
In fact it will probably be found that the most satisfactory way of 
circumventing this difficulty will be for the body concerned to make 
use of the information relating to a particular financial year in 
calculating a measure of the relative financial needs in that year. 
Statistically this will be diffieult, an a statistical analysis is 
essentially an historical analysis. However, it is not inconceivable 
that an expert body could develop statistical technbques which would 
enable it to have assesses at the erd of the financial year, the 
measure of the financial needs for that year. Theeatimate could then 
be used as a basis for the distribution in the coming financial year, 
and in that way, the distribution could be made as soon as the amount 
available for distribution became known. 
The deficiencies of a scheme such as this, involving a 
time lag of one year, are immediately apparent. The main, drawback 
will be that the amount of money distributed in any financial year 
will materially affect the relative financial needs of the several 
States in that year. As soon as the grant becomes known, each Stat. 
Government will determine its revenue and expenditure policy, and if 
the estimate of financial needs is in any way related to revenue and 
expenditure policies of governments, then the estimate will be found 
to differ considerably from the actual needs. For example, it maybe 
found that a particular State will find that the amount of the grant 
it will receive will be less than sufficient to permit it to maintain 
existing services and levels of taxation, and so either standards of 
services must be reduced or the severity of taxation increased. If 
the same proportionate change has taken place in all States, then 
'relative financial needs will remain unaltered, but if the change is 
not proportionate, then relative needs ill have changed between the 
period to which the assessment relates, and the year in which the 
grant le actually made. 
One of the major problems to be resolved will be to 
&Mid' the nature or form of the grants which will be made to the 
State Governments. This will be almost a matter of principle as in 
some ways the decision in this field may Influence the way in which 
the amounts of the grants will be determined. The main alternatives 
open are first, the payment of a series of specific purpose grants, 
second, the Use of specific purpose grants on a basis proportionate 
to the amounts expended within the States from their own financial 
resources, and Pirdly, the payment of a single unconditional grant. 
It is possible that codbinations of these alternfttives maybe used. 
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The association of special purpose or "ad hoc" grants with the 
ptinciple of relative financial needs implies that it would be possibl 
for the body responsible for the distribution of the total amount 
available to isolate relative needs in all the spheres of governmental 
activity. If this methot of payment is adopted, it automatically 
assumes that relative financial needs will be assessed by reference tc 
actual government expenditure on the various services rather than by 
reference to the inherent natural tifferences which exist between 
States. The major difference between the two approaches of the 
•assessment of relative financial needs is that the former . will be 
influenced by government policy while the latter is independent of 
government policy, ;Alen the system of special purpose grants is 
adopted, the distributing committee will be required to determine 
relative needs in each of the fields in which it is proposed to bring 
about equality and then to recommend specifie payments which, when 
expended on the provision of the specified services, will bring about 
equality in those fields. 
For example, it maybe found that in the field of the 
provision of education services there would be a very wide difference 
if the States were compelled to rely on their own sources of revenue 
to finance the provision of the service. An amount of expenditure pe: 
head would then be calculated which would be sufficient, after 
allowing for inherent differences between States, to bring all States 
to at least the level of the one enjoying the highest standard of all 
States In the Pederatiou, and this would be compared with the actual 
exPenditure per head of potulation. The difference represents the 
basic grant per head in all but one of the States, if the grant is 
designed to bring all up to the standard of the highest. The State 
with the highest standard would, in the first instance, receive no 
specific grant for the purpose of expenditure on education. 
Subsequently it might be decided that the standard should be raised 
still higher, and if this should happen ell States will receive an 
education grant. 
This example has related to a specific purpose grant for 
•one particular service which might be provided by the several State 
Governments. The same procedure would be carried through for each 
type or service in which it is proposed to bring about equality and 
will be continued until the available financial res -_:urces are 
exhausted. This is only one way in which the required calculation 
can be made, and can relate primarily to the determination of the 
amounts of the specific purpose grants during the first year of the 
operation of the principle of relative financial needs. In subsequent 
years, alterations to the amount* determined in thc first year will 
be necessary depending on the amount of revenue made avaitable by the 
Pedenal Government and the changing pattern of needs between States. 
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The method could only operate effectively if the total 
amount available is sufficient to bring all States up to the standard 
of the 4'tate enjoying the highest standard through the Use of its own 
financial resources. If this were not so it would be impossible to 
obtain equality as it would tndoubtedly be found that, as a result of 
government policy, some States would be enjoying standards superio* 
to those which could be achieved through the distribution of the total 
amount available, Once the government of a DiAtiettlar State determin- 
ed to concentrate its expenditure upon one particular type of service 
it would be difficult for adjustment grants to be calculated to bring 
all States up to this standard. It would be impossible if each 
State concentrated on a different field of expenditure. If, however, 
grants from the Federal Government constituted a major portion of the 
incomes of the governments of the States, the situation envisaged 
above would probably never arise. 
The greatest difficulty attached to this method will, 
however, relate to the timing of the assessment and payment of grants. 
The method presupposes that it will produce equality of standards of 
services over a wide field, and the achievement of that equality will 
depend in part on action taken by the several State Uovernments. 
The grants will be made at the beginning of the financial year and U. 
will be aimed at producing equality in the financial year. The 
procedure involved will be first that the assessing committee will 
require to know the amount available for distribution by the Federal 
Government very early in the financial year. It will also require to 
know proposed expenditure on the various services, In the fields in 
which it is hoped to produce equality, by the State Governments 
similarly early in the financial year. Amounts of grants will then 
have to be calculated to absorb all available revenue and produce the 
desired equality in order to make known to the tastes the amounts they 
will receive for expenditure on the various services. This leaves a 
very short period in which the calculations must be made, but this 
will not be impossible if preliminary investigation has been proceed-
ing in the months before the beginning of the financial year. 
Another difficulty would lie in the possibility of 
errors of estimation on the part of the State Governments in predict-
lug their expenditure on the various services from their own resources. 
Presumably estimates would be made before presentation to and 
consideration by the legislatures, for the budget would necessarily 
include the amounts of the grants from the Federal Government. The 
legislatures in question would then be quite within their rights to 
alter the estimated expenditure and throw out of balanwe the pattern 
arranged by the distributing committee. Furthermore, unforeseen 
circumstances may cense the budget estimate to be altered through no 
fault of the governments concerned. 
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Thera seems to be no adequate means of overcoming this 
digficulty whilst retaining the desired equality in each field of 
provision of services. In actual practice, the overall picture would 
not be greatly altered if the States' budget estimates of revenue and 
expenditure from their own resources were subject to some alight 
subsequent alteration. In any Otate, variations bring below standard 
expenditure on one type of service would probably be counterbalanced 
by variations bringing about above standard expenditure on another 
type of service. This may not be precisely so because a certain 
amount expended on one type of service will not necessarily produce 
the same results, so far as welfare is concerned, as the same amount 
spent on another type of service. For example, one tate might find 
it particularly difficult to provide education services and comparat-
ively easy to provide hospital servicea. A certain amount of money 
transferred from the provision of the former to the latter will 
result in an increase in comparative standards, while a reduction in 
the amount spent on hospital services at tke expense of expenditure 
on education services will result in a decrease in comparative stand-
ards. If the extent of the deviation from the original estimate is 
not very significant, the effect would similarly be email. However, 
it would mean that the purpose of using the specific grants would be 
lost. That is, there would no longer be equality between Ctates In 
the standards of each type of service supplied. If there war much 
likelihood of this deviation occurring, it would be advisable to 
adopt au alternative method which would permit some interchange of 
revenue between different tyzt,:s of services without produceng these 
adverse effects. 
The second possible type of grant which should be 
considered is a variation of the special purpose grant mentioned 
above, yet in some ways it will produce completely different results. 
This is the allocation of the total amount evailable according to the 
amount expended by the various State Governments on certain types of 
services. In American terminology it is the "matching" grant. 2 The 
basis upon which this type of grant is determined is that the Federal 
Government agrees to match expenditure by the several State 
Governments on certain types of services. Essentially under this 
method, the Federal Government set out to determine the standards 
which will be achieved in any particular field. It proceeds to 
ensure that thtl aim is achieved by giving to the State Governments 
sufficient revenue to ensure that they are able to supply services 
equal to a predetermined standard. This can only be achieved, howevel 
if the States themselves are prepared to spend sufficient of their 
2. See, for example * "Federal Grants-in-Aid", a Report of tLe Committee on Federal Grants-in-Aid of the Council of State Governments in the U. S. A. t 1949: no.76-80. These grants are sometimes referred to at open-end grants. 
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available financial resources in the prescribed fields. In other 
words, if the Federal Government decides to subsidise expenditure on 
the provision of certain services on a "4 for 47" basis, then it is 
conceivable that the States concerned would transfer all available 
revenue to that field of expenditure in order to attract the maximum 
amount of subsidisation. If this method is the only one used to 
distribute the total amount of revenue available, it Is difficult to 
see how it cen successfully satisfy the principle of payment according 
to relative financial needs. In the first place it is S very 
indeterminate way of achieving the desired end. The Pederal Govern- 
ment will be celled upon to decide which services shall be sUbsidieed 
on this basin at the commencement of the financial year, before It is 
aware of the amount which each State proposes to spend in these fields, 
tience, the amount which it will be called upon to provide may vary 
considerably treat the actual amount available. This effect will be 
negligibleonly if the amount which the Pederal Government pays out in 
grants to the State Governments represents a small proportion of its 
total expenditure. Furthermore, the amount which the Federal 
Government is called upon to provide may differ materially from the 
total amount necessary to maintain a stable level of employment. 
A more fundamental criticism of this method of 
distribution, from the point of view of Inducing equalisation between 
States, is that it takes no account of their relative abilities to 
provide services from theta, own resources. If, for example, a Federal 
Government decides to subsidise expendltere by each State Government 
on a for i: basis according to the amount spent by each State, it 
assumes that the needs of each are proportionate to their expenditure 
from their own resources. A State which spends a smell amount per 
head of population for the only reason that its income from 
•independent sources la small, will receive a correspondingly small 
grant as assistance from the Federal Government. A State which is 
prosperous and has a relatively high rate of expenditure per head of 
population will need assistance least, but will receive most. Thus 
it can be seen that the use of this method of distribution of the 
total amount available, and the principle of payment according to 
re,ative financial needs are somewhat conflicting. 
The method of using matching payments can only be used 
successfully in conjunction with the principle of payment according 
to relative financial needs it there is some discrimination between 
States according to their needs. Poe example, inane particplar 
Stott* where the need Is relatively high, the subeidy for expenditure 
on a certain service might be £2 for every RI expended by the State 
Government from its own resources. In another state, where need is 
relatively low, the subsidy might be only 10/— for each CI spent. 
In this case it will be necessary - for the Yederal Government or the 
distributing agent, to determine the relative financial needs of 
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emch in order to assess the extent to which expenditure on each 
service in each State will be matched. As :neon as thee situateon' 
arises, the - method becomes almost identical with the one considered•
earlier, that of making specific purpose grants. In order to assess 
relative needs it will be necessary to ascertain expected expenditure 
in each State and the determination of the matching giant along these 
lines will be, in fact, the determination of a specific amount, 
The -third elternative available le that the Federal 
Government or •the distributing committee can make a block unconditione 
al grant to each State besed on the relatilec financial needs .of each. 
7he greet can be uncondition;i1 in the sense that the respective Stitt* 
Governments are free to distribute the amount received between the 
provision of the Various servicea as they choose. In the caae of 
special purpose and - matching grantee payment of each grant was 
conditional upon its being used for a specific purpose. An education 
grant could not, for example, be. transferred to the provision of 
•health services at the discretion of the recipient State Governments. 
In the case of a block grant, however, the ftete Governments can use 
_their discretion as to the uso which lc to be made of the emount 
provided by the "ederel Government. 
• In calculating the portion of the total amoent available 
which shall be paid- to each State uovernment, the distributing body 
should have regard to all aspects of governmental expenditure in whict 
it is proposed to bring about equality. An amount should be calculat-
ed which, when expended wisely, will permit the stendards of Ctate 
'services to be Provided at approxkmately the same level in each State. 
Complete equality will not be . possible by this method but there la a 
degree of approximation in any method which might be used. :!owever, 
in this case it arises because of the discretionary poweru 
remaining with the State Goverements. 
As explained earlier, coemunity welfare, so far as 
Government activity is concerned is amongst other things made up of 
the interaceion of the impact of taxation and other charges on the 
one hand, and the extent of services supplied on the other. The 
greater the equalising effect of taxation, the higher the average 
level of welfare enjoyed by residents in the community. Thus a block 
-grant may be determined by the distributin corateittee and be designed 
to raise the residents of all elates to a common average level of 
welfare, given the existing strucure ()V taxation. The committee 
might assume that existing State taxation rates would be continued 
. and the amount of the grant used solely for the provision of services. 
A perticular State Government might decide that portion 
• of its unconditional grant should be used to reduce the severity of 
- State taxation. That is, State taxation rates would be redueed and 
existing levels of services maintained.- If all other States received 
- 
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similar grants from the Federal Government and used them for the 
provision of services, it would probably happen that the people of the 
State which used the grant to educe the severit: of taxation would 
find that their average welfare standards were below those in other 
States despite the fact that the amounts of the grants were designed 
to equalise average levels of welfare. 
Such a situation could only arise if the tate 
Governments were responsible for the collection of a large portion of 
totel taxation revenue. If the scope for imposing taxation residing 
with the State Governments was small, their ability to use Federal 
grants to reduce the severity of State taxation would be limited. In 
the Australian Federation, for example, the Federal Government is by 
far the most important taxing nuthority and therefore it is probable 
that the possibility of error *rising from this enure would not be 
of very great importence. 
Differences between the anticipated level of welfare in 
a state as a result of the payment of a certain grant and the actual 
level which results may arise from another cause. In calculating the 
amount of the grant •a-h State is to receive, the distributing body 
must assume that it will be used for certain purposes. That is, a 
certain portion will be allocated for the provision of educntion 
services, another portion for health services, and so on. As 
explained earlier in another connection, 3 deviation from this distrib. 
ution of the grant within a State may cause the final result to be 
different from that which was originally anticipated. 
Thus there are several ways in which small variations 
from complete equality may arise other than the natural error which 
will arise from the difficulties of calculation. However, the 
distributing agent would probably assume that money provided by the 
Federal Government by way of grants would be spent in such a way as 
to MAXiMASO welfare given the available resources. If this maximum 
Is not Obtained, the fault lies with the state Government concerned 
and cannot be corrected by action of the Federal Government or its 
agent. 
As with other methods of distributiop, a problem will 
arise concerning the timing of the necessary calculations and the 
payment of the grants. Again, the committee will be forced to 
assets future needs on the basis of pest and present experience and 
on preliminary budget estimates by the several 'State Governments. 
hile tiles necessity introduces an element of approximation, it 
appears to be inevitable in any system by which financial resources 
in a Federation are rtdistrfbuted between the Federal and State 
Governmente. 
3, See above, p.93. 
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1. The three alternative methods by which the grants may be 
paid have now been examined. • The first woo the use of a series of 
special purpose grants to bring about equality in certain selected 
fields, and this can be criticised on several ground. First, it has 
not been shown that the principle of payment according to relative 
financial needs is best served by endeavouring to obtain equality 
separately in certain fields of the provision of serviette. Rather it 
issuggested that the principle would operate more effectively if 
some flexibility were permitted and lower than. average standards in 
one field counterbalanced by above average expenditure in another. 
Secondly, there is no guarantee that the purpose of the 
special purpose grant could be successfully achieved, as subsequent 
alteration through a change of intention on the part of the State 
legislatures, or by errors of estimation or even changing economic 
circumstances, would probably mean that the pattern designed at the 
co:Amencement of the financial year would be subjected to considerable 
change by the end of that year. Thus the designed equality in each 
individual field of expenditure would probably not be achieved. 
. 	Thirdly, the method is opento criticism in the ground 
that it imposes a limit on the independence' of the State Governments 
which is incompatible with the concept of federalism.' It is essential 
for the well-being of a Federation that the State Governments retain. 
the greatest possible degree of independence. Under this method, the 
receipt of the grant* would be conditional upon their being used for 
the specific purpose for which the grant was made. The Government 
concerned . would have no power to transfer amounts received as specific 
purpose grants front one use to another. It is possible that the 
specificity of the grants could be circumvented by transfer, after 
receipt of the grants, of appropriation of revenue from the States' 
own independent sources of revenue. If such a procedure were adopted, 
the whole purpose of the special purpose grant would be lost and the 
distributing body would have no means of correcting the position. 
The second method ofpayment which was considered was the 
"matching" grant. As already explained, unless the pure form of the 
application of this method is modified to permit different rates of 
subsidisation to different States according to need, the method is 
diseetty opposed to the principle of payment according to relative 
financial need. This method suffers from a further drawback in that 
it would. be very difficult for the Federal Government to determine in 
4 
	 advateethe total amount it would make available to the several State 
Governments in any 'financial year. Thus it would be particularly 
difficult for the Federal Government to implement a policy of full 
employment, at least so far as Federal grants are concerned. 
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The third method, the payment of a block grant, seems to 
meet the needs of the principle more than the other -. two alternatives. 
Its main advantage is that it leaves the State Governments of the 
Federation with the maximum . of independence in their operations. This 
is essential At all times or there will be a persistent danger of tho 
federal form of government developing into the unitary form. In the 
Australian Federation, for example, the Constitution has specifically 
excluded the Federal Government from the field of the provision of 
education services. If a large portion of the revenue of the State 
Governments is derived from Federal grants, and they are made subject 
to conditions as to the proportion to be spent. on education, the 
Federal Government is actually using its financial superiority to 
influence the level and direction of State spending in fields. in 
which the States are constitutionally autonomous. 
.when . piument is made in the form of a block grant, the 
State Governments will retain sufficient incentive to ensure affioianl 
operation, and the danger of centralisation is avoided. It is 
suggested, therefore, that this. will be the most - effective -method of 
producing the desired result - that IS, the establishment of equality 
in the average level of welfare in each State whilst leaving the 
state Governments with the maximum of independence. The grants should 
be looked upon as paymento received as a matter of right and not in 
the form of a gratuity from . the,Pederal Government. 
It has been mentioned earlier that the adoption of this 
principle of payment according to relative financial needs, the 
equalisation principle, is merely a step in a process towards * 
desired end. This is the attainment of the position where equalisat-
ion of resources Ma been brought about and the financial needs of 
the States become proportionate to. say, the populations of the States. 
If this is to be so, then some recognition would need to be given to 
it in the calculation of the. distribution of the total Amount . 
available. One method of achieving such an end would be to include la 
the amount of the grant to the ttates which are relatively underdev-
eloped an amount which, if prudently expended on development, would 
induce a greater rate of autonomic developMent than in the already 
prosperous - iitites. . This method is rather cumbersome, however, and 
would mean. that part ofth,. grant to this type of State would be 
conditional upon its being used for a specific purpose. A more 
satisfactory approach would be to include an allowance for greater 
4 
	than average expenditure on debt charges when calculating the teed 
for services supplied by the governments concerned. In order to 
prevent this becoming a conditional grant, some organisation of 
• public borrowing programmes would be required. In other words, it 
would be necessary.to-permit the poorer States to borrow proportion-
ately more than the wealthier States in order that they may "catch,- 
up" on development. This would probably require the organisation4 
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4 
	 a body to 'determine within reasonable limits the extent to which each 
State- pould borrow money for public capital. investment purposes. 
This function could perhaps be entrusted to the body 
1/4 	 responsible for the determination of the needs of each State,' . 
particularly as it relates, so far as interest and sinking fund pay.. 
meats are concerned., to relative financial needs. Care would have to 
be taken, however, to ensure that : the maximuat degree of independence 
was retained by the State Governments. If the borrowingof the 
State Governments were unrestricted, it would need to be understood 
that proportionately greaterborroeingihy . the poorer Stites would be 
Permitted and the charges 'would represent legitimate financial needs. 
The major problems which would have to be considered by 
any authority which undertakes to - distribute the total amount of rev-
enue made available each year by the Federal Government :_between the 
several State Governments have now been mentioned,- It has notbeen 
the purpose of this analysis to attempt to supply an answer to every 
problem with.which 'a Federation will be faced in its financial 
relationships. many of the problems which have net been mentioned 
here will need to be *paved with referenee te the peculiar circum-
stanoes:Which . exist inaich.Federation. However, it Is thought that 
the broader: matters which have been raised and possible suggestions 
for solutions made are the problems which are Common to 'all Federatials 
41k in which the Federal Government is financially.supepior to the 
governments of the several states which comprise the Federation. 
2he brief analyala of the financial problems' which can be 
expected to arise in a Federation, together with the suggested 
principles and ;cathode by which a'solution can be reached has now beez 
completed. It would be impossible to deal adequately with such a 
complex prOblenina brief essay such as this..Some of the matters 
which have been summarily dealt with warrant at least . a full chapter - 
for adequate treatment. The study of principle and methods can well 
be regarded as complete in itself, and lr the main purpose had . been' 
to confine the analyile . to this aspect, a much fuller treatment of . 
the sUbjeet could have been given in.the'prcceding chapters. 
The major Object of this study is, however, to develop 
first an outline of the principle involved and secondly to examine the 
financial organisation of the Australian E'ederation-in - the light of . 
these principles and methods which have emerged. It is proposed that 
the mmeond part of this Objective should be attempted. in the following 
chapters. Again, in the'spaceaveilable it will be -impossible temakA 
a complete critical anelysi$ of the 1 . edera17State financial relations 
in the Australian .sederation. -Attention mist be concentrated on the 
organisations established for this putpose. 'Any omissions will be 
deliberate and must be regarded as being of secondary importance. 
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CHAPTER 6 
7TIE INITLL 1),TrI0D - 4901 to 1 2 
In order to provide a background for a critical analysis 
of financial relationships between the Commonwealth and State 
Governments in Australia, it will be necessary to examine briefly the 
financial provisions of the Australian Constitution. / All aspects of 
Yederal-State financial relations are in some way connected with, or 
influenced by these constitutional provisions and therefore a 
comprehensive knowledge of them is necessary for an understanding of 
the implications of the form of Federal-State financial relations 
which has arisen out of the Constitution, 
The formation of the Constitution, including the financ-
ial prolAions, passed through three main stages - the first draft 
prepared by a National Convention in 1897, a second or amended draft 
resulting from the convention of 1899 and which was submitted to and 
rejected by the people in the first constitutional referendum, and the 
final draft which was the second draft altered in a few significant 
aspects by a meeting of Colonial. Premiers in 1900 and accepted by the 
people in the second referendum held later in that year. Although 
there were some material differences between the financial provisions 
of the first and final drafts, it will not be necessary to atudy the 
earlier formulations. While they undoubtedly had some influence on 
the final decisions, they have had little or no direct effect on 
financial relationships since Federation, which is the subject matter 
of this essay. Furlhermore, no attention will be given to the forces 
and conflicts which led up to the framing of the Constitution. These 
and related aspects have been adequately surveyed in other pdblicat-
ions.2 In  short, this Fart will consist of a critical survey of 
Federal-State financial relations which exist at present, not an 
historical examination, In some ways it will be inevitable that the 
manner in which the analysis is made will be to deal with the 
different forms of payment as they emerged chronologically. However, 
it is not intended to be an historical survey in the true meaning of 
the term. It would be illogical to examine some recent development 
before those which have been in operation since Federation. 
In the distribution of the functional powers, which was 
one of the main matters to be decided in drawing up the Constitution, 
It was agreed from the outset that the Federal Government should be 
•given control of international trade and hence the imposition of a 
tariff and collection of customs and excise duties. Other functional 
1, The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia is printed in 
each edition of the Year Book of the Commonwealth of Australia. 
• See, for example, No. 39 pp. 8 - 26. 
2. See, for example, "The Future of Australian Federalism", by 
G. Greenwood. 
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powers were to be transferred to the Federal Government, but it was 
envisaged that the revenue of the Federal Government would usually be 
greater than necessary expendiSure l and therefore provision would need 
to be made for the transfer of surplus Federal revenue to the States. 
The problem concerning the basis upon which this surplus revenue 
should be divided between the States had then to be considered. 
The Constitution dealt with the transfer of surplus 
revenue from the Commonwealth to the States in two major period 
divisions. The first was to be limited to ten years after the °stab- 
lishment of the Federation which was to be regarded as the period of 
transition. During this time, specific limits; were to be placed on 
the Federal Government as regards its revenue and expenditure policy 
and the amount which was to be available for transfer to the States. 
After the expitation of this period, the Federal Government was to be 
-given Absolute discretion in the field.' The Sections of the constit-
ution which dealt with Federal- State financial relations were 87, 88 
89, 93 : 94, 94, 95 and 96. Other Sections would have some influence 
on these relations, but the Sections mentioned are those which deal 
exclusively with the financial problem. Of these Sections, all but 
two, 94 and 96 relate exclusively to the first tem years of Federatial. 
Section 87 provided that for ten years after the 
establishment of the Federation, and thereafter until the Parliament 
otherwise provided, at least three-quarters of the customs and excise 
revenue of the Commonwealth was to be returned to the States. Section 
88 said that uniform duties of customs and excise were to be imposed 
within two years of the establishment of the Commonwealth and, in 
conjunction with this, Section 89 stated that until such time as 
uniform duties were imposed, the Commonwealth should collect customs 
and excise duties on behalf of the States and that the amounts so 
collected should be paid to the States less the actual amounts 
expended on transferred functions in eseh State and a per capita 
portion of the cost of the original powers of the Commonwealth. 
For the first five years after the imposition of 
uniform duties, the Commonwealth was required to record the amount of 
duty paid on goods imported from outside Australia and entering con-
sumption in each State and pay this amount to the States after deduct-
ins, as in the period bonfire uniform duties, the actual costs incurred 
=behalf of each State in performing the transferred functions and a 
• per capita portion of the cost of original powers. This was laid 
down in Section 93. Section 95 made special provision for Western 
Australia as it was recognised that this State would suffer most from 
the abolition of interstate duties. This Section provided that during 
the first five years after the imposition of uniform duties, the 
Government of Western Australia could impose duties on the goods 
entering the State from other States. It was stipulated that in the 
first year of this period, the rates of such duty were not to exceed 
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those in force in the last year prior to uniform duties, and that they 
should diminish by one-fifth in each subsequent year so that they 
would completely disappear at.the end of the five-year period. 
These, then were the constitutional provisions relating 
to the transfer of surplus revenue from the Commonwealth to the States 
during the first ten years of Federation. It can be seen that within 
this period there were several sub-periods which are not completely 
defined. Section 87, stipulating -that the States should reweive at 
/east three-quarters of Federal income from customs and excise duties 
was to operate throughout the whole period. The provisions relating 
to the repayment of net collections during the period . before. uniform 
duties were imposed was limited to two yearsat the most, while the 
next sub-period was to last for five years, during which the repayment 
of three-quarters of customs and excise revenue was to be determined 
by the "book-keeping" method. For the re9ainder of the ten-year 
period, which might be anywhere between , three and five years aecordins 
to the time which elapsed after the commencement of Federation and 
before uniform duties were imposed, Section 87 was still to operate 
but the distribution of the totab amount was to be in accordance wip 
Section 94, which stated that after five years from the imposition of 
uniform duties, the distribution of the surplus revenue was to be on 
such basis as the Federal earliament thought fair. 
Thus for at least five, and possibly seven years after 
the establishment of Federation, a minimum amount was fixed for distr-
ibution, and the principle and method by which the distribution was 
to be made was unequivocally fixed by the Constitution. It ensured 
that the Commonwealth would need to levy rates of duty which were 
sufficiently high to yield four times the amount required to meet its 
necessary expenditure, and in this way it was provided that the three-
quarters of tuch revenue which was returnable to the States would be 
fairly substantial. It can be said that but for two Sections of the 
Constitution, this represented the 'application of the compensation 
principle of redistribution. The exceptions were first, the special 
provision made in the case of Western Australia and secondly, the 
insertion of Zection 96. This stated that for ten years after the 
establishment of the Commonwealth, and thereafter until the Federal 
provided otherwise, the Parliament could grant financial assistance 
to any State on such terms and conditions as it thought fit. It mean1 
in effect, that during this initial book-keeping period, the Federal 
Government could use any surplus revenue available after the three-
quarters of customs and excise revenue had been appropriated for 
return to the States according to the book-keeping method, for making 
conditional grants to any State which it thought was in need of addit. 
ional revenue. If adequate funds were found to be available, this 
Section could have been used to make it possible for the Federal Golfe] 
nment to modify the principle of payment for loss incurred which was 
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implied in the other Sections relating to financial relationships in 
this period. 
For the remaining three to five years of the first ten 
years of Federation, the "minimum amount" provision of Section 87 still 
applied, but it was possible for the Yederal dovernment, if it so' 
desired, to adopt any principle of payment it chose. After the expir- 
ation of the ten years during which Sedtion 87 °posted, payments trot 
the Commonwealth to the States were to be governed entirely by zect-
ions 94 and 96. In some ways it would appear that the provisions of 
these two clauses cover the same ground. They both gave the Coon-
wealth discretion to make grants to the States, but the impression is 
. gained that it was intended under Section 96 tit make conditional or 
specific purpose grants to any State, and the surplus revenue for. 
distribution under Section 94 would be determined after the payment oi 
those grants had been made. The grants resulting from the distribut-
ion of surplus revenue would be unconditional and all States would 
participate. Provision thus existed for the Federal Government to 
adopt any principle and method it chose for the paynent of surplus 
revenue to the 4 tates after the expiration of, at the most, seven 
years of Federation. 
;thile it is not the intention to examine here the motiveg 
which prompted the framers of the Constitution to adopt this line of 
approach to the problem which confronted them, mention can be made of 
the main conflicts which it can be assumed were operating, It would 
appear that the framers of the Constitution felt concern at the 
possibility of State revenues being drastically reduced following the 
commencement of the Federation. This would not be very serious if it 
was the result of the imposition by the Commonwealth of lower customs 
and excise duties, for in such a case, the 4-reasury loss would be 
greater than the community loss in the State concerned, and the 
difference could be recovered by increasing taxation in the fields of 
•taxation remaining to the States. The danger they probably envisaged 
would arise if Federal expenditure on the administration of original 
powers became materially greater than anticipated, or if different 
interpretation of transferred powers resulted in increased expendit-
ure on those functions. 6hatever the motive, it was apparently thouji 
advisable to place some restriction on Commonwealth revenue and 
expenditure during the transitional period. In the draft of 1899, 
the operation cf Section 87 was not limited to a period of ten years. 
•It was to continue for the duration of the Federation or until the 
Constitution was amended. 
This restriction on the Commonwealth and the implied 
necessity for' a restrictive tariff to finance Commonwealth activity 
from the remaining quarter of customs and excise revenue, was one of 
the arguments used by the opponents of the Constitution, particularly 
in New South Wales, the.free-trade State., against its adoption in the 
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first constitutional referenduM. The Premiers' Conference of 1900 
altered tilts provision to limit it operation to a period of ten years 
after the commencement of the Federation, and they also inserted a 
new Section 96. The amended Sections were acceptable to both the 
electors and the Parliaments of the several States. It can be said 
that the nature of the financial provisions of the Constitution grew 
out of the conflict which existed between certain States - some 
opposed to any provision which would make it necessary.for the Common- 
wealth to Impose high rates of duties, and others opposed to any prov- 
ision which would reduce their revenue. Consequently, the result was 
a compromise. 
No serious consideration was given to the incorporation 
of the principle of payment according to relative financial needs in 
the Constitution, with the possible exception of the inclusion of 
Section 96, virtually as an afterthought. None of the wealthier 
States expressed willingness to surrender portion of their revenue to 
assist the weaker States. It would even appear that the poorer States 
would not have been willing to accept this kind of ascistance. 
Probably it was in opposition to the political philosophy of the time. 
Where consideration was given to support of the financially weaker 
'States, it was in terms of special purpose grants to meet special 
difficulties. The case of the special provision to Western Australia 
illustrates the point. It would have been possible for the same 
provisions relating to uniform duties and free interstate trade to be 
applied to Western Australia as in the case of the other States. The 
deficiencies which Western Australia would suffer could then be made 
good by the Federal Government under Section 96 of the Constitution. 
However, it was felt necessary to insert the special provision in the 
Constitution in order that Western Australia would be satisfied that 
its revenue was protected, at least for some timo after Federation. 
It is abundantly clear that the intention was that the 
distribution of surplus revenue was to be according to the compensat-
ion principle, or some variation of this principle, such as per capita 
grants, although some small recognition was given to the fact that 
some states might need additional assistance to compensate for the 
extra disabilities they might suffer as a result of Federation. It 
was probably envisaged that the administrative - difficulties associate 
with the book-keeping system would grow with the Federation, and that 
after the transitional period had been successfully negotiated, the 
Federal Parliament would adopt a similar system which would be simpl-
er to operate but would give a close approximation to the result 
obtained by the book-keeping method. 
In this brief survey of the financial provisions of the 
Constitution and the principles of payment to the States involved, twc 
provisions have been omitted, one of which has played an important 
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part in Federal-State financial relations in recent years. This was 
Section 51 (ii), which gave the Commonwealth power concurrently with 
the tate' to make laws with respect to taxation bigt "so as not to 
discriminate between States or parts of States." The other, which is 
less important from the immediate viewpoint, is Section 105, which 
gave the Commonwealth power to take over all or part of State debts 
existing at the time of the establishment of the Vederation, and to 
deduct the interest cost of such debts from the proportion of surplus 
revenue due to each State. These provisions are not directly related 
to the payment of grants by the Commonwealth to the states, but as will 
be seen later, the flamer has coma to influence the amount of revenue 
available for distribution. 
Summarising the implications of the financial provisions 
of the Constitution as regards the principle of payment of surplus 
revenue to the States, it can be said that while it was stipulated 
that the Federal Government was compelled to adopt the compensation 
principle in the early years of Federation, thereafter it was free to 
adopt whichever principle it chose. The remainder of this Part will 
be devoted to an analysis of the types of payments which have been 
used, and more particularly, those which are being used at present, to 
determine the extent to which the need for the adoption of the princi; 
-le of payment according to relative financial need has been recognied 
It will not be necessary to dwell at any length on the 
period which finished with the expiration of the five-year "book-
keepfmg" period. During this time the Commonwealth had no alternative 
but to adopt the principles and methods of disbursement which were 
laid down in the Constitution. It was compelled to return in total, 
three-quarters of customs revenue, and the distribution was to be 
according to collections in, or on bekalf of each State, less expenses 
incurred in each State for transferred functions, less a per capita 
distribution of the cost of original functions. If the l ederal Govern-
ment had a surplus available for distribution which exceeded three-
quarters of customs and excise revenue, there were two alternative 
methods of disposing of this additional surplus which could be adopted. 
The first was to treat the whole amount as available for distribution 
according to the book-keeping method. That is, a record would be 
kept of all revenue collections and expenditure in, or on behalf of, 
each State s and the balance remaining in each case would be distribut-
ed accordingly. In other words, the principle of payment as compensat 
ion for loan would be adhered to In its entirety. 	The second 
alternative would have been for the Federal Government to make special 
grants under Section 96 of the Constitution to the extent of the 
amount by which surplus revenue exceeded three-quarters of customs and 
excise revenue. These grants would be treated as expenditure on the 
performance of origihal functions and each State would contribute to 
the cost on a per caffita basis. Thus it would have been possible for 
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the Federal Government to modify the adverse effects of strict 
adherence to the compensation principle as laid down in Cections 
89 and 93 of the Constitution. 
In fact, during the period under review, the 
Commonwealth adopted the former alternative. 	In 1915-06, for 
example, Coareonwealth net cestome anC excise collectione totalled 
R8,749 1000, while the total aacunt . retuencd to thc tetes wao 
£7,385,000, or 84'i of collections. 	This tame.r that e7Jcut 
£830,000 could have been disburaed according to Section 96 while 
still conforming to the provisions of the Gonstitutien. 	The 
determination of the distribution of this additional amount -could 
have been according to the principle of relative financ .lal needs, 
buy the Federal Government chose to adept the . principle of payment 
for loss of revenue incurred. 
It is evident that before Federation, there as 
oonsiderable inequality between Ctatee, and this was maintained, 
if not emphasised, during the per:od of the book-keeping method of 
3 distribution. 	The following table shown the relative pcsitieus 
of the several Otates in 1899-1900 and 1905-06: 
Etfect of Yederation on Letate revenues 1899-1900 to 1905-06 
1399 - 1900  	06 
Not Customs & Excise Rev. it 
r '000 
State Taxn. per head; 
s 	d 
4••• 
Amt. Peturned by C i weelth 
r'000 
State Tam per head; 
F. 1,480 13 	0 2,742 17 7 
Victoria 2,c61 14 	11 2,05 17 • 9 
Queensland 1,394 15 	4 ,858 18 9 
Sth. Mist. 638 1146 562 19 0 
'est Anst. 842 13 	9 872 20 6 
Tasmania 477 12 	10 256 27 9 
Total 6,892 OW 'Ow 7,384 
Colleetions, less cost of functions subsequently transferred 
to the Commonwealth. 
One of the reasons for the wide variation in the chenge in incomes o 
. the several p`tates from these sources was the wide variatione in the 
severity of customs duties which exieted before Federation. 	These 
4 variations are clearly evident from the next table. 
3. Source - Statistics of Tasmania for 1899 - Appendix 3, pages 19, 22 and 24;. Statistics for 1905-06, Appendix B, pages 19 and 22. 
4. 2:mime Statistica of Tasmania for 1900 - Appendix 14 page 19. 
4 
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Severity of• celuatomr 7'uties 	Auetralian Colonies - 1900 
	.111,!1.1.011011110.11NOMMIIII IRBEIIIMMI■e• 
	
1.•■••■■••••••■.••■171. 	
Colony 
.11.1111101111.. 
Imports per 
head 
• Customs Revenue 
per head 
Index of Sev-
erity; 	(All 
colonies= 100 
L. s. d. 
41111411•141010 
LO • SO 
N. 	I. 	V. 17 15 7 1. 3. 48.5 
Victoria 15 17 3 1 12 7 78.4 
Queensland • 14 13 1 2 14 . • 9 138.0 
Sth. Aust, 22 15 11 113 7 54.4 
WesL ;%ust. 33 28 11 5 6 7 116.0 
' Tasmania 12 0. .114. 164.7 
••••••■■••111tIone. 	• ••••••••■•••■■•••••••••••••••mamms. 
The i_plications of these tables ie thet with the 
eetablishment of uniform customs. duties, the amount collected in 
the States which formerly had a high oeverity„ would fall, and 
conversely it would rise in the States with a low severity. 	The 
exact extent of the Variation woeld depentl on the level of duties 
imposed by the Corn ll nwealth. 	The 'effect of the adoption of the 
book-keeping method is very apparent in the case et Tasmania. 
Before .eederatien, revenue for necessary expenditure was raise by 
means of high customs duties. 	After Federation, thi. cource of 
revenue vanished, and as only partially repinced by grants from the 
Commonwealth. 	Thus resort had to be made to higher taxation in 
other fields. 	Probably the actual relative inequality did not 
alter much between ''etates, but it became much more apparent when a 
uniform tariff was irtrodeced, as it concentrated the ineeuelity in a 
narrower field. 	Another ferture of this period which is not 
.brought out by the eove tables ir that Co n• orwealth expenditure 
on functions transferred from the Ctates rcse over the period. 	In 
1899-1900, expenditure on these functiors by the Colonies was 
£790,000: 	Comonweslth expenditure in 1905-06 on the same 
functions was £1,115,000, while at the same tine the cost of original 
functiena was about £500,000. 5 	This increase in expenditure 
represented an a rlitionel blrden on the taxesjer, which in 	cases 
would have to be levied by the State Governments. 
The inequalities between :tates which existed at the 
comencement of the Pederation 
extent at least, by the use of 
grants to the more neces'sitous 
could have beer overcome, to some 
au-plus Commer!Isalth Poverue to make 
5tates. 	The distribution of 
   
Source - Statistics of the State of Tasmania tor the year 
. 1905e06; - pages 25 and 28. 
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the surplus according to the compensation principle ensured that 
ineeualities welch existed before eederaeien were continued in this 
period. 	While the Pederal Government. was in a position to 
correct this to some extent, it eas hampered by the Constitutional 
provisions which allocated by far the larger portion of surplus . 
Commonweelth revenue according to the prihciple of compensation for 
loss. 	Thus, the degree to which theyederal Government could 
modify the efeecte of the principle iu these years was limited, ' 
, Uniform duties ofecustems and excise were imposed by the 
eederal Government as from 9th, "ctoberte 1901. 	Thus the five-year 
period daring which the book-keepeng method was o operate would 
continue until at least 3th. October, 1906. 	Thereafter, the 
Cemmenwealth was free to distribute its surplus revenue at its own 
discretion, but until the end of 1910, this surplus reVeaue had to 
equal at least three-quarters of net collections of customs and 
OXCiSe revenue, 	The i'ederal Government eontinued the booke: 
keeping method for the year 1907-08, and lin. 1908 it passed the 
!:urplus %matte Act, , WhiCh provided for the continuation of thc. 
book,-kcaping system, and els ,J that anyeturplus. revenue available 
after the three-quartere of customs and excise revenue . had been paid, 
was to be elietribeleed between tit rebates in proportion to their 
populations. 	eosever, in the same year an Act was peered 
authorieine the rederal eovernment to pay old-arc pensions, and 
although thin ect wee net to operate until the beginning of the 
1909-1C firanciel year, ae ueeuut of L656,000, equal to the emount of 
starrier, revenue in excess ef thrce-quertere . of net cretoms end excise 
colleetiens in 1907-05 was traneferred.to a Trurt fund to meet the - 
future cost of thee pensiens. 	The Ccnntitutional legnlity of 
this traesfor wet chellcnged, leut the rctior of the Corn .onweelth was 
upheld. 	•Consequently t Jri 1908-C9, the remount e) revenue 
transferred to the b.tates ens exectleeeeval to teree-querters of net 
customs end excise collections. 	The provisions of the 1908 
eurplus evenue ect conceenIng the distributior of this further 
curplus revenue did not come into operatier. 
The eear 1909-10 was to bc the lest in which the Araddon 
Clause was to operate, and comeleted the ten Year period during 
which the Coeueonwealth Government was obliged to tranefer three-
quarters of its castoms revenue te the Setatcs.' 	Since 1906, it 
had voluntarily continued the book-keeping method of determining 
the amounts to be paid teethe Ctates, and by so doing, had 
automatically continued to apply the principle of payment as 
compensation for loss.of revenue resulting from ?ederation. 	No 
attempt was made to reelstributo reveuue received and available for 
distribution to the States, and therefore it must be assumed that 
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of the principle of payment according to financial needs, New South 
bales and Victoria controlled forty-nine of the seventy-five seats. 
It would therefore be fairly difficult for the Pederal Government, 
even if it were so inclined, to introduce legislation to help the 
poorer States at the expense of the richer. Consequently, by 1910,the 
end of the first period, nothing had been attempted to bring about 
equality of taxatioti burdens or services supplied as between the Stain 
by manipulation of the distribution of surplus Commonwealth Revenue. 
It is true that equalisation had taken place in the fields in which 
the Federal Government operated, such as the levying of customs and 
excise duties and the payment of old-age pensions, but this equality 
was only achieved at the expense of greater inequality in fields of 
taxation and services supplied by the State Governments. 
In the years which preceded the expiration of Section 87, 
several conferences of the State 4'remiers and the Federal Prime 
Minister were held to attempt to determine a method of securing 
Yederal support for State finances. In 1909 an agreement was reached 
between the k'rime Minister and the State Premiers by which it was 
agreed to amend the Constitution to introduce a new scheme to replace 
the provisions of Section 87. The reason why it was though necessary 
to incorporate the agreement in the Constitution was because "it was 
imperative that the financial relations of the Federal and state 
Governments - which, under the Constitution were determined only in 
part and for a term of years - should be placed upon a sound and 
permanent basis." In essence, the agreement provided that the Common-
wealth should pay to the States a sum of twenty-five shillings per 
head of population annually. Spacial provision was made in the case 
of Western Australia where, because of its large customs revenue, a 
special annual payment of £250,000 for 1910-11, diminishing by £10,00C 
in each successive year was to be made. Half of this amount was to be 
subscribed by the States, including Western Australia, from their 
subsidy of twenty-five shillings per head. The other half was to be 
subscribed by the Commonwealth. 
Although the referendum which was to incorporate this 
agreement in tile Constitution rejected the proposal, the Federal 
Government passed in 1910, the Surplus Revenue Act which brought the 
provisions of the agreement into force from tat. July, 1910, for a 
period of ten years and thereafter until the Parliament otherwise 
provided. The Act also stipulated that if any surplus revenue remain-
ed to the Federal Government after the payment of the per capita grant 
it should be distributed to the States in proportion to the number of 
their people. The immediate effect of the change from the boos-keep-
ingmethod to the per capita method of distribution can be seen from 
the following table which shows the amounts paid to the States by the 
Commonwealth in 1909-10, the last year in which the book-keeping 
method operated, and in 1910-11 and 1911-12 0 the first two years of 
the operation of tbe per capita method: 
Commonwealth Payments to the States - 1909-10 to 1911-12. (e000) 7 
State 
New South Wales 
Victoria 
Queensland 
south Australia 
Western Australia 
Tasmania 
1909-10 
3,480 
2,109 
1,099 
843 
708 
253 
1910-11 1911-12 
1,955 . 	 2,047 
i,617 1,667 
692 761 
515 512 
. 	591 600 
233 237 
	Aielar11.0.110111 	 
he immediate effect was to reduce the total amount payable to the 
States by £2,889,000, but more important was the effect on the States 
separately. New South Wales and Victoria suffered most. Together 
their reduction was £2,117,000. Tasmania was least affected by the 
change. 
The implication of the reduction in the absolute amount 
payable to the °tatee as a whole or individually is not the immediate 
concern of this analysis. It has been shown earlier 8 that the 
relative financial positions of the Federal and tate UoVernments win 
be determined by the distribution 'of functional and financial powers 
at the time of the formation of the Constitution,. The share of 
revenue and expenditure accruing to the Federal Government will resul1 
from the allocation of powers which are considered to be nation -wide 
in their impact, and if-the financial resources of the Yederal Govern-
ment are greater than its necessary expenditure, the balance should be 
disbursed to the States.. The severity of taxation burdens and the 
extent of expenditureon services supplied by the Federal Government 
and State Governments must be regarded as complementar$, so that 
given a certain amout of revenue, whether raised and expended by eith-
er authority, as a first approximation it can be said that the same 
overall standards of services are supplied. If the Commonwealth takes 
over a certain servive, the btates are relieved of the expenditure 
involved. On the other kand, if the Commonwealth introduced anew 
service, It in effect forces the States to pay for it from therevenue 
formerly accruing to them and their expenditure on . otherservices must 
be reduced. In effect, a new service id given by the Federal Govern-
ment in place of one formerly given by the States, or alternatively, 
the States must raise additional revenue from taxation in order to 
give the same service as before. It can be said that unless one 
authority operates more efficiently than the other, the community as 
a whole is no better or no worse off than before. Within the commumM4 
a different group of people maybe deriving more benefit, but taking 
the •communities as a whole, thero will be very little difference. 
It has, however, been stated previously that it is the 
essence of a lederation that the States should retain a maximum of 
7. Commonwealth Yeas nook No. 6, p.800. 
8. See above, pp.8 ff. 
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• -independence, and therefore the assumption of functions by the COMM= 
• wealth which force the States to reduce their expenditure on the 
provision of services must be regarded as detrimental to the success-
ful operation of the Federation as a whole. In the particular elute of 
the Australian Federation in 1910, one of the important factors which 
influenced the Federal Government in reducing the amounts payable to 
all States was that the federal Oovernment hid decided to institute 
the payment of.old-ege pensions. erovlsion; had been made for it to 
act concurrently with the States in this matter in Section 51 of the 
Constitution. Queensland, .New South Waists and Victoria were already 
• paying such pensions, and therefore the action of the Commonwealth 
relieved them of certtin'expenditure in addition to the reduction of 
revenue. To the extent that other States lost revenue for this reason, 
they were Obliged to reduce services or increase taxation. 
The effect was that the Federal surplus revenue available 
for distribution to the '13tates was to be smaller than previously, but 
more significant, there was to be a, new basis for the distribution of 
the surplus to the States. "'he adoption of the per capita method of 
distribution was in fact the adoption of a variation of the compensat-
ion principle, but it operates under one manor assumption which, if 
incorrect, can produce results very different from the adoption of the 
pure compensation principle. The assumption is that all States cont. 
ribute to the revenue which is to be disbursed in proportion to their 
populations. In Australia, at the end of the book-keeping period this 
was not so. If the amount per head of population returned to the 
States in 1909-10, when the pure compensation principle was operating, 
is taken as an indication of the relative amounts contributed to 
. Federal Revenue, it is seen that New South Wales contributed £2.15 per 
head; Victoria, £4.65; 4ustensland, i;1.90; South Australia, £2.13; 
Western Australia, £2.66; and Tasmania, £1.31. Thus, the differences 
were considerable. It can be assumed with some confidence that the 
greater the contribution of a State, the:less the need for assistance. 
• This does not follow inevitably, as witness the case of Western 
Australia where its isolation and the nature of its resources made it 
necessary for it to import most of its needs and hence contributed 
more than the average to the Federal revenue through customs duties 
while its needs were fairly great. 'Nevertheless, the amount of the 
contribution may be taken as a reasonable indication, of relative noels, 
If, under conditions of varying relative contributions to 
the revenue of the Federal Government, a distribution of the surplts 
is made according to the size of the population in each State, there 
will inevitable be some redistribution of the financial resources of 
the Federation as a whole which favours the States whose needs are 
greatest. The adoption of the method of per capita payments in 
Australia in 1910711 meant that the relative positions of the States 
which received least under the book-keeping method, was considerably 
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improved. This is illustrated by the fel owing comparison of State 
taxation per head in1909-10 and 1911-12:9 ' 	• 
!tat. 	1909.-10. Increase 
g New South Wales 1 5 . 2 	CI :2 6 	- 7 1. 
Victoria 0 /3 2 1 	, 5 1 
	
g i 0 3 	gi 	5 4 5 • Queensland Cl 	6 2 	C - 1 11 South Australia 	14 1 43 
. 	 -4.!- 	- 'Western Australia g 	'4 el 3 ii 1 	5 
Tasmania 	11 *5 . 	ti: 15 2 	- 3 	9 
It can be seen that the Stat, which lost most from the adoption of tha 
new method, New South Wales, increased taxation more than any other 
State. Thus, the use of per.capita grants,'-taken in conjunction with 
greater expenditure by the Federal Government on - a uniform basis 
throughout he Uommonwealth, did go some, way towards reducing the 
inequality which existed. However, it must be recognised that there . 
can be no aceurady with the adoption of this method. Greater than 
average needs are recognised as being present in the States which 
contribute least per head . of iy.:pulation to the coon 'fund, but it 
• makes no attempt to measure and correct exactly the degree of inequ-
ality. It may even.accentuate it in some circumstances. 
The adoption of a per capita method of disbursing the 
surplus revenue of the Commonwealth can be questioned on another 
ground. The- proposal was for a fixed per capita amount to be disburs-
ed for a period of at least ten years, and for the reason that it was 
fixed, it could not be a true disbursement of surplus revenue. It is 
inconceivable that for this period the amount of twenty-five shillings 
per head would represent the exact amount of the surplus in any year. 
Admittedly, provision was made in the Surplus Revenue Act of 1910 for 
the per capita distribution of any surplus which remained after the 
payment of the fixed amount of twenty-five shillings per head to the 
States. However, this surplus never appeared, and the payments did 
not exceed this amount except in, the case of Western Australia which 
received a special subsidy which has already'been maLtioned. It is 
apparent therefore, that 'either the revenue resources or spending 
capacity of the Federal Government was sufficiently flexible to permit 
adjustment to provide that exactly the amount of the required surplus 
. was produced. - From the point of view of the Federation as a whole, 
such a proeedure would have little or no effect on the net burden on 
the community. 'From the point of view of the States, however, it was 
significant. If, for example, the Federal Government had increased 
taxation to produce a surplus equivalent to , say, fifty shillings per 
head, and distributed this amount between the States according to 
population, the States with lowest taxable capacity would gain relat-
ively most. Thus, there would be . a distribution which would produce 
a greater degree of equality than if the surplus was twenty-five 
shilling...2er head, and probably the net burden of the balance-between 
9. Commonwealth Year 'Book, No.6 p.809. 
taxation drawn off and nervices supplied would be more nearly equal 
between the States. There is, however, a limit to the extent of this 
process. There may be a limit to the percentage of income which can 
be taken in taxation without adverse repercussions and if this is so, 
the limit may be reached before the desired state of equality. Furth- 
ermore, it may be both politically and economically unsound to raise . 
taxation to a position approaching this level. 
The alternative is for the Federal Government to reduce 
expenditure on the provision of its services in order to pay a greaten 
per capita amount to the States. It is conceivable that such a pro-
cedure would have adverse effects if the cost of giving any petticulaz 
service is relatively greater in one State than in another. It can be 
seen, therefore, that it may not be practical for theFederal 
Government to produce sufficient revenue to bring about the required 
equality when the distribution is to be made on a per capita basis. 
In fact, it is quite probable that it can never be produced if there 
Is any considerable inequality between States. 
During the first ten years of the operation of the method 
of distribution according to population, a considerable change was 
seen in the scope and extent of Commonwealth revenue and expenditure. 
The war of 1914-18 expanded the functions of the Pederal Government 
tremendously, and in 1914 it entered the field of Estate Duties tax 
and in 1915-16 it levied a tax on incomes for the first time. A Land 
Tax had already been imposed in 1910-11. The imposition of these 
taxes by the Commonwealth on a uniform basis made it difficult for tht 
States to vary their rates of taxation, particularly in the States 
where the rates of tax were already comparatively high. In other 
words, it increased the disparity between the taxable capacities of tt 
States so far as State taxation was concerned. 
. After 1919, the Federal Government continued its method of 
. per capita grants of twenty-five shillings per head although various 
Proposals had been made by both the Federal and State Governments for 
the alteration of the existing method or the adoption of some new 
alternative. As early as 1919, the federal Government had suggested 
reducing the amount of the per capita grant because of its increased 
committmonts, but the main proposal of the i#ederal Government at this 
stage was that it should withdraw from some fields of taxation, and 
discontinue all grants to the States. The effect of this change, had 
it betn adopted, would have been to reintroduce in principle the 
situation which existed before Federation. The per capita method did 
give some benefit to the weaker States, although it was probably not 
very significant. 
It maybe convenient at this stage to consider the effect 
of the operation of Section 96 of the Constitution during this period, 
'western Australia had been receiving a special subvention half of 
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which was Contributed by all States from their per capita grants and 
half from the Consolidated Revenue of the Commonwealth. During thlts 
time, the payment was regarded in the same light as the per capita 
grants, but since that time it has been thought of as equivalent to a 
special grant under Section 96. At least the portion contributed free 
Federal Revenue can be so regarded. This amounted to I:125,000 in 1910 
Ii and diminished progressively until it stood at 165,000 in 1924-25. 
In 1910 the Government of Tasmania claimed special financid 
assistance under Section 96 as a result of the findings of a Royal 
*COmmission which was appointed by the Federal Government to enquire 
into the finances of Tasmania. The Commission reported i ihat ".. the 
looses (arising from Federation) suffered by Tasmania .. are such as 
to render assistance to that State imperative." It recommended the 
payment of £900,000 spread over the ten year period 1911-12 to 1920-21 
commencing with 46120,000 in the first year and diminishing by £5,000 
in each of the first five years and by A110,000 in each of the last 
five years. The Tasmanian Government submitted a claim in accordance 
with these findings. In 1912, the Federal Government passed the 
Tasmania Grants Act which made provision for the payment of £500,000 
over the ten year period, commencing with £95,000 in 1911-12 and 
reducing by 440,000 in each successive year. In 1913, another Tas-
mania Grants Act was passed to pay a further E400,000 over the remain-
ing nine years of the ten-year period commencing with £5,660 and 
increasing by Z10,000 in each successive year. The effect of the 
combination of the two Acts was to carry out the recommendations of 
the Royal Commission and give Tasmania a special grant averaging 
£90,000 per year for ten years. 
The grants to Tasmania were In effect the first made 
directly under Section 96 of the Constitution, and the first serious 
attempt by the Federal Government to depart from the principle of 
payment for loss incurred. however, the reasons given by the Royal 
Commission for the necessity for making a series of grants to 12asmanid 
was as compensation for loss incurred as a result of Federation. An 
examinatien of the documents 11 relating to these grants seems to rev-
eal a lack of understanding of the reason for the relatively disadvan-
tageous position in which Tasmania was found after tan year of Feder-
ation. For example, it was repeatedly quoted that the average level 
of State taxation in Tasmania had more than doubled, but it was not 
recognised that this high level of taxation might only have been im-
posed to recoup Treasury loss which occurred when the right to levy 
customs and excise duty was handed to the Commonwealth, and that the 
net burden on the community was relatively no greater than before 
.10. Report of the Royal Commission on Tasmanian Customs Leakage, 
1911, p. xii. 
11.Report of the Poyal Commission on Tasmanian Customs Leakage, 1911. Debate in the Commonwealth 14arliament on Tasmanian Grants Bills, . 1912 and 1913; Federal Hansard PP.4627 ff. (1912) and 4866 ff. 
(1913). 
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Federation. Consequently, it is contended that the grant was designed 
to offset In part the inequalities which existed, not necessarily as s 
result of Federation, but because they had become more apparent with 
the concentration of the inequalities in a narrower field. 
It will be remesibered that Section 96 gave the federal 
Government power to make conditional grants to the btates. When the 
Federal Parliament was debating the Bill to make the grants to Tasman-
ia, the question of conditions was raised, and the then grime Minis-
ter stated: "There is no doubt as to the power of the Ijarliament to 
impote conditions, but so far from recommending a course of this kind, 
/ strongly deprecate it. •At the same time, however, 1 should not like 
to commit myself or any of my colleagues to a declaration that at no 
time should the Commoawealth impose conditions in regard to a grant. 
:Circumstances may arise under which it would be the duty of the 
Commonwealth Government and l'arliament to make a grant of this kind 
conditional, but in the present case / do not think there is any 
warrant to do so." 12 This contention was apparently held by other 
Federal :ti,inisters for at no stage was a condition attached to this typ 
of grant. Similarly, the grant to Western Auntralia was unconditional 
Special grants have been paid in each exibecquent year to Western Aust-
ralia and Tasmania, and South Australia first recel.ved a grant in 
1929-30. This type of grant, as it operated in subsequent years, will 
be dealt with more fully in a later Chapter. 13 
The method of distributing surplus Commonwealth revenue 
according to the method of per cl'pita grants continued on an annual 
basis until 1926-27. In the last few years before this time the 
Commonwealth Government had made several attempts to reach agreement 
concerning the future of Federal-State financial relations * but 
nothing had been firmly agreed, usually because of opposition on the 
part of the States to the Commonwealth proposals. Finally the 
Federal Government announced in June, 1926, its intention to i:troduce 
legislation which would authorise the cessation of per capita payments 
Shortly afterwards, the Commonwealth put forward certain .alternative 
proposals which, in the light of the action of the Pederal Government 
in making a definite move to abolish the per capita grants, the States 
felt bound to accept. These proposals resulted in the Financial 
Agreement, 1927, the subject of the next Chapter. 
viewed in retrospect, the period up to 1927 can be regarded 
as the trial phase in the development of a system of Federal-State 
financial relations. It is notable that almost without exception, the 
methods of determining the amounts which the Federal Government would 
pay to the States which were In operation during this period are no 
longer in use. The payment of special grants under Section 96 has 
continued, but the method of arriving at the amounts of these grants 
is now very different. :imilarly with certain special purpose grants 
12, Federal Hansard, 24th DeceMber, 1912, p.4627. 13. Chapter 8, "The Commonwealth Grants Commission." 
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for road construction and maintenance, which will be mentioned again 
4 at a later stage.1  Generally it can be said that, from this time 
onwards, the structure of financial relationships began to assume 
greater permanence. The Financial Agreement of 1927 is still it op-
eration -today, and the (;ommonwealth Grants Commission which was formed 
in 1933 to recommend payments of special grants under !:edtion 96, stl 
functions upon the basis which it adopted at its formation. Uniform 
Taxation and /ex ReiMbursement Grants were later developments. 
By 1927, some progress had beenmade.towards devising a 
system which would go some way towards bringing all States to a comma 
level. The idea of making payments to States from Federal Revenue as 
compensation for loases incurred as 'a result of Federation was still 
dominant, but the method of application of the principle had resulted 
in a measure of redistribution of the total resources of the Common-
wealth in-ftvour of the weaker States, he per capita distribution ol 
portion of Commonwealth revenue was operating to a limited extent to- 
verde this end, Ind this is supplemented by the use of section 96 fol 
the pa/ment of grants to the more necessitous States. It must not be 
imagined, however, that the Federal Government was deliberately adopt-
ing a policy designed to bring all States to a common level of devel-
opment. In large measure, the favourable results which were achieved 
were accidental. It is thought that the adoption of the per capita 
method was designed to give simplicity oø administration and while 
those who were responsible for its introduction were probably aware 
of the redistributive effects consequent upon its adoption, and were 
quite satisfied with these effects, these were undoubtedly only secon4 
to the main reason which was timpliity of administration. The 
difficulties which had been associated with the book-keeping system 01 
assessing the amount contributed by and expended on behalf of the 
States had been tremendous, and there was no satisfaction that the 
methods used had achieved the correct result. 15 
So tar as the payment of special grants were concerned, 
their use was definitely a move in the right direction. It was real-
ised that although the per capita distribution favoured the States 
which contributed relatively least to Commonwealth revenue, their 
position - was still unsatisfactory when compared with the larger, more 
industrialised States. Although not specifically stated in so many 
words, the special grants were designed to permit the weaker States 
to operate at a certain minimum standard which was considerably below 
the standard operating in the wealthier States. Purthermore, the 
method of assessment of the amounts of the special grants was rather 
indefinite. On occasions Royal Commissions were appointed to recom-
mend the amounts which should be paid, but it is significant that the 
amounts recommended we've usually in the nature of a fixed . payment ovel 
a period as long as. ten years. In addition, the fixed grants were to 
be for decreasing amounts, which assumed that the financial position 
..... 
15. See, for example, the Report of the Royal Commission on Tasmanian Customs Leakaae. 1911. Parliamentary, Panel. F13759. 
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of thc, States concerned would improve, over a short period, to an 
extent sufficient to make them independent of special financial 
assistance. This was evidenced in statements by some Federal 
politicians that the first special grant to Tasmania was to be 
regarded as a loan to be repaid at some future date. 16 
The sem* assumption operated with respect to the per 
Capita grants. The Federal Government was always looking to the time 
in the future when the States would be independent of financial 
assistance from the Commonwealth. Whether this state of affairs was 
to be achieved by the Commonwealth gradually assuming control of some 
of the functions then performed by the states or by increased prosper-
ity of all States is not clear, but it would appear that the payment 
of annual subventions from Commonwealth revenue for the assistance of 
Utate revenues could act only as a palliative, and not as Et ours for 
the disbalance of functional and financial powers. In other words, 
this procedure, on its own, could do nothing permantnt to correct 
the disbalance. At no stage in this period was attention given to 
regulation of the public borrowing policies of the various Statesl 7 
and on this aspect depended, in large measure, the extent of the 
development of the States, and the fixture capacity to increase taxable 
capacity and reduce the dependence of the population on services supp-
lied from public funds. 
Generelly, in this period, the adjustment of the lack of 
balance between functional and financial powers of the Commonwealth 
and States was confused by the vagueness of the Constitutional 
provisions which divided powers between the authorities. At the 
outset the func$ional powers of the Federal Government were few while 
revenue was substantial, but the extensioi, of the field of operation 
of the Commonwealth gradually reduced the amount of revenue available 
to the States. As pointed out previously, there was probably no 
absolute loss to the co. ,,munity as a whole from the change in emphasis, 
but it meant that the Federal Government was refusing to recognise itm 
function as acting as an agert to collect revenue on a uniform basis 
and distribute it in the beet interests of the Federation as a whole. 
Rather, it had decided to use its surplus revenue to increase its 
range of activities. To this extent it was bringing about equality 
in certain fields of taxation and services, but the effect was to 
concentrate the inequality into a smaller field of State activity, 
which included on the eipenliture side such important functions as 
the provision of health end education services. 
It is not the purpose of this essay to criticise the 
actions of the 4deral Oovernsient in the expansion of its functions, 
but where these actions result in a reduction of its surplus revenue 
to the point where it is not in 8 position to bring about equality 
between the 'Qtotes through the distribution of its revenue, then it 
16. See Federal Hansard, 24th October, 1912, pp.4626 ff. 
17. See note p.120. 
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• 	intrudes on the subject matter of the points under comideration. 
This seems to have bben what was happening in the years before 1927. 
The Commonwealth concentrated on bringing about that measure of 
equality which could be obtained .through expenditure of its own rev-
enue. It wes t however, bound to carry out the provision of services 
impartiOly between States, and therefore there-could only be partial 
redistribution. This involved the introduction of new services 
administered by the Federal Government on a uniform basis, whilst 
leaving existing services Ps provided by the Stites on an unequal 
basis. 	It might be said that in the interests of Federation, if it 
was found necessary to expand Commonwealth expenditure to that extent s 
. the correct action would have been to expand revenue accordingly to 
ensure that a sufficient amount would be available for the payment of 
equalisation grants. Admittedly, this would have been a further 
incursion into the independence of the states, but if this was 
necessary to bring about the desired equality, then it would have beer 
justified. 	The correct action, however, would be for the 
Commonwealth to limit ite functional powers to those which are truly 
nation-wide in their impact until equality was reached in the fields 
of State revenue and expenditure. 
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MILEPANcTAL AMEARTI__=.1912 
.As an alternetive to the method of per capite payments to 
tee Jtates, the rederal jovernment submitted a proposal which was fine 
ally accepted oy each Parliament and which is usually referred to as 
the "Anuncial Agreement". The original agreement was framed in 194 
nud the power of the Loaeorevealth to make such an agreement ratified 
by the eeople in a refeeendum which gave rise to hection 105a of the 
Constitution. 'he original provisions were subsequently altered by 
certein Debt conversion Agreemcnts of 1931, and a farther ; - inancial 
i4greement of 1944. 1  The in points of the Agreement, which governs 
public harrowing at the present time may be eummarieed se, follows: 
(1) A loan Council was established 2 with the Prime Minister or his 
representative as Chairman, and the several State Premiers or 
their repres ntativeS as members to determine the amount, distrit 
ution lane conditions of public borrowing. each State was to him 
one vote and the Uommonwealth two votes and a casting vote. If a 
unanimous decision were not reached, one-fifth of the total loan 
• millings in any year were to be available for the use of the 
Commonwealth Government, and the remaining four-fifths divided 
between the Staten in proportion to their net loan expenditure 
in the precedine five years. 
(ii) All loan raising* vere to be managed by the Commonwealth on be-
half at the k;ommonwealth and State*. This was subject t some 
exceptions, such as borrowing by a State outside the Commonwealth 
subject to the approve' of The Loan Council, or borrowing by a 
State within its boundaries from bodies established under Pederal 
or State law. A State could use public monies for temporary 
purposes. 
(iii)Lach eovernment was to submit annually to the Lorin Council a 
programme showing the amount it desired to raise in that year. 
This was to exclude loans for the conversion, reneral or redemp-
tion of existing loans and temporary borrowing. Lonna for the 
purpose of funding deficits were to be included but /owls for 
defence purposes were excluded. 
(le) The Commonwealth egreed to take over the public debts of the 
States as they existed on 30th June, 1927. The exact amounts 
involved were specified in the Agreement. Arrangements were alsc 
made for the complete taking over br the commonweelth of State 
1. roc "Financial Agreement batveen ...ceLaorivItiell.h and "tatee',19h4, Commonwealth earliamentarv Paper 3029. 2. itecan Council had been in existence for several years previously. However it was a voluntary associetion between the Commonwealth and States and had no legal existence. 
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debts relating to property:transferred to the Coewonwealth under the 
Constitution. The States were to continue to be liable for the int- 
. •rest on the debt (other than that relating to the transferred prop-
erties) taken over by the Ceomonmealthplaut the Federal GoWernment wam 
to contribute to each State an amount equal to the amount of the per 
mpita grant received by each State in 1926-27, the last year of the 
operation of that method, for 'a period of 8 years. A sinking fund el 
7/6 per cent, of which the Commonwealth would contribute 2/6 per cent 
and the Statee 5/- per cent was Ube- established to extinguish the 
debt existing on 30th June, 1927„ over a period of 58 years. With 
respeet to debt incurred after 1927, the State aed the Commonwealth 
would each contribute 5/- per cant to a sinking fund to eliminate the 
debt over 53 years. 
(V1 The supplementary agreement of 1944 provided- that where loans. were 
raised to meet a revenue deficit occurring after 1927, the Comenwealt 
mould make no sinking fast eeetribution and the State concerned would 
eontribute to a . sinking fund at the rote of not less than 4% per ann-
um. Special provision was made for the redemption of Treasury Sills 
raised to finance defieits which occurred before let July, 1935. 
(vi)Sinking rands were to be controlled by a National Debt Commission and 
contributions to these funds were not to be accumulated but were to be 
applied to the redemption end repurchase of loan securities. 
(vii)Certain rules were made by the Loan Council regarding borrowing by 
*set-governmental bodies, and these were incorporated in 1936 to form 
!gentlenen t s agreement! which provides for submissioa to and approv-
al by the Lean Council of all loan programmes of semi-governmental 
bodies proposing to borrow £100,000 or more in anyfinancial year. 
These are the mein points of the Agreement which is still 
in form and has governed publie borrowing in Australia free 1927 down 
to the present tine. It addition there were other points of •stly* 
minor importance, such as those governing the procedure of the Loan 
Council, certain: aspectcrelating to the payment of interest and the 
establishment of sinking funds, repayment from State revenues of sink-
ing rued monies which are applied to the redemption fe loans converted 
at a discount,„ and se on. These and other matters have not been 
oovered in detail becalme they have may an indirect effect on the 
relative position of State finance*, which Is the main concern of this 
analysis .3 
1 
	 The situation immediately prior to the introduction of the 
'Financial Agreement was that the Federal Government passed the States 
Grants Act whieh abolished the obligation of the Federal Government to 
• 	continue the per capita grants to the States. Palling acceptance by 
the States of the Commonwealth proposals, there was every probability 
that the States would receive no financial assistance in 1927-26 or 
3. For full details, see *Financial AgreementiSetesen Commonwealth 
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It may appear from this statement that there will always 
be a limit to the amount of investIble funds available for borrowing 
by Governments. While it is not necessary to undertake a digreesion 
to discuss these aspects of public finance, it should be mentioned the 
in a technical sense there can never be a shortage of funds available 
for use by governments. If the required amount cannot be raised in 
the open market, the amount that is actually raised in this way can 
usually be supplemented by the issue of Treasury Ellis by the Govern-
meat with the assistance of the Central bank. In Australia, it is th 
the Commonwealth rather than the State Governments which can adopt tki 
procedure because of its relationship with the Commonwealth Bank. 
Thus, the Loan Council may decide that the full programs submitted by 
all authorities should be raised, but that the market could not pro-
vide the full amount, and that the balance should be made up by the 
creation of credit. This latter decision is not, however, one which 
the Loan Council is competent to make. It nos within the field of 
activity of the Commonwealth Government, and while the Loan Council 
can request that the Commonwealth assist the loon programme in thts 
way, the final decision will rest with the Commonwealth Gokerhment. 
It is the Commonwealth Government, not the Loan Council, whisk will 
usually decide the total amount which the market will provide, for is 
large measure, the Commonwealth Government is the market. 
Th, powers which ranee with the Commonwealth can be app.- 
reelated from an examination of decisions made by the Loan Council and 
the Commonwealth in 1951-52. In that year, coined programmes of the 
atate* and the Commonwealth submitted to the Loan Council amounted to 
£354m, The Commonwealth representatives suggested that with Common-
wealth support, the market would yield only £180m. and of thee, the 
Commonwealth Government was prepared, either directly or Indirectly, * 
contribute £125m. Mevertheleas, the States combined and outvoted the 
Commonwealth, and by a majority decision the Loan Council approved a 
borrowing programme ofI247.5m. It was apparent that without furtberg 
Commonwealth support, the effective programme for the year would be 
&l eft., the amount which the Commonwealth was prepared to underwrite. 
Obviously the Commonwealth could have underwritten the programme to a 
greater extent, but chose not to do so. In this case /tints stated 
that the issue of further Treasury Bills would create inflationary 
pressure which was undesirable at the time. In short, the Commonwealt 
has taken upon itself power to decide whether a certain amount of 
borrowing would be detrimental to the economy as a 'bolsi; whereas It 
Is suggested that this is a function of the Loan Counell. It is not 
intended to debate whether the action of the Commonwealth was right or 
wrong, but morel* to demonstrate that the States have surrendered 
power to borrow, not to the Loan Council, but to the Commonwealth 
Government. 
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The second aspect of the way in which the Commonwealth 
Government has assumed . control of. ..Societal= of the Loan Comet' relate 
to the distribution of the total *moue, which the Council has decided 
to raise by public borrowing in any Saar. The problem will not arise 
if the fell programme stbnitted by the S$atat Governments is agreed to. 
In this 6404 9 since all States are *notated the amount asked for t, 
there Is es need for a distribution by the Loin Council. 
If the total amount make' for is reduced, however, the 
actual amount decided upon math* divided between the Governments of 
the States and the Commonwealth. If unanimous agreement coneerning 
this distribution is not forthcoming, the distribution it made in 
accordance with Section 10 of the rinancial Agreement. This specifies 
that the Commoneeelth Government shall receive mes-fifth of the total 
and the remainder shall bedistributed between the states in accord-
ant)* with the proportions of the totals which they received in the 
preeeding five years. 
In recent years, all State Governments would have suffer-
ed a reduction in the *menet of loan money they received had this 
formula been called into operation. Customarily the Federal Govern-
meat has required less than one-fifth of the total amount to be raised 
The rest of its requirements for tisanes for capital investment proj- 
v. 	 ects are supplied from its current revenue. Therefore, if complete 
'agreement were net forthcoming and the distribution were to be deter-
mined by the Formula, the Cougeonweelth could deemed one-fifth leaving 
a lower amount for dietribUtion to the States compared with the 
amount which would have been distributed with a unanimous decision. 
The way in which this can work may be illustrated by 
reference to the actual determInation in a particular year. In 1951-52 
the total amount agreed to be raised by the Loan k;ouncil for distrib-
ution to the Commonwealth and State Governments was 4225m. of which 
the Commonwealth required only 423m.. Rad the Loan Council not reache 
unanimous agreement on the distribution of the remaining 4202m., the 
Commonwealth could have demanded one-fifth of the total *mounting to 
445m. leaving only 4180e6 Ube divided between the States. In that 
year the Censeuweelth financed capital works from revenue to the ext-
ent of Z11166 and so it would have been possible for the Commonwealth 
to have required their full one-fifth of the total. 
Yrom the point of view of the States, it was therefore 
highly desirable that agreement should be resorted and automatic distr-
ibution of the total amount prevented. Furthermore, since the agree-
ment of' the Commonwealth is necessary for unanimity of opinion, any 
suggestion by the Commonwealth would have to be agreed to by the 
States. This it is possible for the Commonwealth tu impose its will 
on the states se far as the distribution of the total amount agreed 
to is eoneerned. 
126. 
In fsirnese to the Commonwealth Government it must be 
stated that up to the present tine it has not imposed its will upon th 
States to this extent. But the possibility does exist and undoubtedly 
the States' representatives have this aspect in mind when determining 
the allocation of available fends. It is significant that the formula 
has not yet been used as a means of distribution. Some oonpromise Is 
always method by the States rather then suffer the consequences of , 
the operation of tte formula. It can therefore be seen that even in 
this matter the influeace of the Commonwealth is greater than the two 
votes afforded its representatives would suggest. Thus it must be 
argued that while the wording et' the Finsnelal Agreement in the 
sections dealing with the procedure of the Loan Council ostensibly 
protect State rights in the mild of public borrowing, the Commenwealt1 
can in feet determine the total amount tote raised In any year and 
influence its distribution between States. Whether the States were 
aware of the possibility of this situation arising at the time when 
the Agreement was being framed is doubtful, and even if the States 
did recognise the surrender of autonomy in this field to the Common-
wealth, they had little alternative but to secept the proposals. 
From the States` point of 'view, although some independonm 
had been surrendered, if not to the Commonwealth, at least to tile Loan 
Council, there ere some definite advantages to a scheme for coordinat-
ing borrowing by all governmental authorities In Australia. Pormerly 
each State determined independently its eepital investment require-
ments for each year and then entered the market neder the most 
advantageous conditions available. Thus there *as considerable compet 
ition for investible funds, which, under most circumstances were 
United in volume. There was inevitably some bargaining through 
interest rates anA it would be safe to say that this independent act-
ion by the States did have the effect of maintaining a higher schedule 
of interest rates in Australia than would otherwise have operated. For 
example, at 30th Jens, 1927, the average rate on outstanding debt for 
all States of the Umammuwagaltb was 4/18/2%: at 30th June, 4949, the 
corresponding rate was WV-Ss While this is net conclusive 
*vides., at greater efficiency in borrowing, a$ no consideration is 
given to the nature or the tern of the debt and other factors, it does 
seem to indicate that coordinated borrowing hey had some effect on the 
terms upon whisk money is lent to governments in Australia. This is 
probably dee partly to the leek of eonsidersble competition in the 
market and also to the greater security enjoyed because or the estab-
lishment of adequate sinking funds for the ultimate redemption of debt 
in all States and the Commonwealth. It can be said that but for the 
Financial Agreement, the States' developmental pregremmes may have 
been less advanced, as they would probably have been able to raise 
less than they actually did through the Loan Council, or their annual 
charges for servicing their debt 'meld have been greater following 
127.. 
the higher rates of interest, although this might conceivably have 
been offset by lower sinking fund provisions. 
5 As mentioned earlier, under the principle of payment of 
grants to the Stet** by the Commonwealth according to financial need, 
one of the fields in which it is desirable that equality between State 
be obtained is that of development of natural resources. The way in 
which this may to achieved is by coordination of public borrowing . and 
provision that the States which are relatively under-developed should 
be given the opportunity to borrow a relatively greater amount than 
the more advanced States. there are two sides to the achievement of 
this equality, the first relating to the granting of power to the 
underdeveloped States to raise mere public loan funds per head of pop 
ulation than the other States in a loan iparket which is usually limit-
ed, and the seeond to the provision of the additional amounts necess-
ary to meet animal debt charges which will result from the greater 
than average borrowing. The first of these will be considered here, 
and the seeend later in the Chapter when dealing with the impact of the 
Finaneial Agreement OR the relative finacial positions of the States. 
A State which is poorly endowed with natural resources 
will probably find that its rate of developaent will be retarded 
compared with one which has an abundance of resources. private 
espital will be attracted to the States which offer a greeter yield 
for investment, and the average ineomes of the powely endowed State, 
and hence the income of its government will be lower than in the 
wealthier Stotts. Therefore the States which have greatest need for 
public capital development will be the States which have least readily 
exploitable natural resources, to which private capital is not attrac-
ted in any considerable quaatity. leverthermere, those States will 
find greatest difficulty in raising public capital, not only because 
of limited income with which to meet annual debt charges, but also 
because investors will be reluctant to lend to the government of a 
poorly endowed State when more at 	investments, so far as 
security is coneerned, are offering in other States. it will probably 
be found that higher rates of interest will have to be offered to 
attract even the amount of barrowinK that eon be afforded. If one of 
the objects of the establishment of the federal form of government is 
to bring all States to * comma level as regards development, standard 
of living, etc., then the payment of grants to the weaker btates 
indirectly from the revenues of the stronger States will be only a 
palliative unless some attempt is made to smooth out the fundamental 
inequalities which exist in the extent to which each State is in 
possession or easily exploiteble natural resources. 
Tee establishmeat of the Loan Council to coordinate 
public borrowing in Australia offered the possibility of the develop- 
5. See above, pp.30 ff. 
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before 1927, but the total amount had been slightly redistributed in 
favour of the three numerically smaller and financially weaker States. 
Payments to States under Pinaneial Agreement - 	1951-52 
41101A.INNIMINFO ,01.1111. 
S tate Payments under Financial Agreement 	(et000) 1. Nquivalent of 25/- per Head 	('o00) 
•New 3outh Wales •3,898 14,195 
Victoria 2,656 2,877 
Queensland 4,430 1,526 
South Anstmlie 1,020 912 
Western Australia 746 739 
Tasmania 393 373 
Total 10,, 142 10,633 
One other aspect of this matter is that under the Finan-
dial Agreement, the States were compelled to contribute to a sinking 
fund at the rate of 5/4. Prior to 1927, some States at least were 
not providing for amortleation of debt at that rate. 7 While it is 
undoubtedly desirable that regular contributions should be made for 
sinking fund provision, the introduction of the Financial Agreement 
probably meant teat some States were suddenly called upon to pay more 
than previously from revenue for this purpose. In New South Wales, 0 
for example, in 1926-27 payments in interest and sinking fund contrib-
utions on a debt of L24.456 were £8.7m; i 1929-30, the comparable 
figures were S13.7m. on a debt or £2700. This arose partly because 
provision for amortisation had been relatively low before 1927. 
Conversely, Western Australia formerly made high sinking fund provis-
ions, but these were continued after 1927. 
it can be said that so far as the relative financial pos-
ition,* of the ntates were concerned, the basis of payment under the 
Finanoial Agreement produced very similar results to those which would 
have been seen had the per capita method continued. It has been shown 
that there was some slight alteration and that this appears to have 
favoured slightly the *mailer States. To that extent they improved 
their financial positions compared with the larger States. The reason 
for this was beeause the smaller States had chosen., and been permitted 
to increase their relative debt position compared with the larger 
States, as seen from the following Table: 
Indebtedness per Head - 1927 and 1952 - by Stater 9 
State 30th June 1927 	30th June 	1952 Increase 
Mew South Wales 101 155 54 
Victoria 82 429 48 
Queensland 116 151 35 
South Australia 155 236 79 
Western Australia 164 230 67 
Tasmania 111 237 126 
6. Commonwealth Budget avers, 1952-53, p.92. 7. Commonwealth Year Book no. 18 v.406. 
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The early development of the payment of special grants 
%indoor Section 96 of the Constitution has been examined Ira proviOns 
Chapter. 	Centrally it can be said that these grants had been made 
to the two States which were least developed and which had the small 
eat populations, as compensation for the loss which they incurred as 
a result of the transfer of power to collect onetime revenue from th 
States to the l'ommonsealth. The amounts paid in this typ• of grant 
had been determined by the Commoawselth Government after investigatt 
had been made by various Soyel Commissions. The method adopted had 
been to fix a certain amount Ube paid over a period of years and 
usually thy,* was no revise during the period. The 'best that can be 
said of this method was that the recipient States were aware in adva 
eis of the amount of assistants they would receive over a numbtr of 
years. The =want of financial assistance to be given to each Stat 
was determined by the Feders1 Pa.rliament and it maybe assumed that 
the individuel members of Parliament were not fitted to assess the 
financial meads of the Stet**. Thty had neither the necessary explor 
knowiedgo or time at their disposal. Admittedly, some assistance we 
given by the Royal Commissions which inquired at infrequent interval 
Into the financial position of the weaker autos, but again, these 
Commissions were not composed of the types or people who Were 
competent to make such investigations. 
Until 1926-29, only two States, Western Australia and 
Tasmania were claiming financial assistance under Section 96. The 
amounts involved had introweed slightly over the years, but even the 
they were not unduly high. In 1942-13, for example, *astern Austral 
received A230,000 end Tasmania 195,0001 in 1928-29„ they had ingress 
to A3004000 and £220,000 respectively. These amounts were relstivel 
insignificaut compared with total Cemmonweolth txponditure, which at 
that time was to the vicinity of A75m., but to the States concerned, 
the size or the grant was of vital importance. The position was tom 
plies-tad in the following ytar„ 1929-30, when South Australia claim* 
and was granted special financial assistant* under this Seetion of t 
Conatitutitn. Another loyal Commission was appointed to investigate 
this claietand it recommended that an amount of A500,000 per =numb 
paid to South Australia for two years. Apart from the findings of t 
Royal Commission concerning the amount of assistant* the State shoul 
receive, e recommendation was made for the establishment of a perman 
1. Os* above, pp. 1414 11. 
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each succeeding year from the three States, south Australia, Western 
Australia and Tasmanias and has recommended specifie annual grants to 
be paid in each of its twenty-one years of existence. The first two 
years at the Commission can be regarded as a formative period during 
which it examined alternative possibilities or securing a permanent 
bogie upon which the amounts of the grants to be paid to necessitieus 
States should be determined. 
As early as 1930* L. 	eiblin t then Ritchie Professor et 
Beanpoles at Melbourne University, stated in a memorandum submitted ta 
the Committee of Public Accounts enquiring irate Tasmanian disabilities 
that * any State requiring help from the Commonwealth should shoe its 
good faith by satisfying the following conditions:- 
(i) It  should be taxing its people with considerably greater severity 
than the Australian average, 
(2) It should not be attempting social provision on a more generous 
scale than the average * 
(3) Its costa of administration should be below/ average, and 
(4) It should, for some years at least, have shown moderation and 
caution in leas expenditure. 
If these conditions are satisfied, I submit that the responsibility is 
en the Ceemsenwealth to make up what is reqiired to enable revenue to 
balance expenditure. It is not a question of making a contribution 
towards it. If the above conditions are fairly satisfied, the (*lig-
ation is en the Commonwealth to make up theedeficieney in full as a 
vital eendition of the effective working of the Federation.* it. 
This statement would appear to be the first hiller pron-
ouneement of any basis for the assessment of the amount of financial 
assistance to be given to the poorer States and was in fact the only 
practieal alternative that had been suggested. Without doubt, the 
adoption of this method a$ a mesas of determining the grants to be pie 
would have represented the adoption of the principle of payment accord 
lug to relative financial needs, although there are some points which 
could be criticised. Professor eiblin was one of the original members 
or the Commonwealth Grants Commission and as will be seen, the ideas 
incorporated in this sta 	t were also to be seen In the principle 
and methods liter adopted by the Commission. 
In its Third Report to the Commonwealth Government made 
in 1936, the Grants Commission enunciated in the following words, the 
principle which It has adopted as a basis for the maculation of the 
amounts it recommended for payment to the three States as special sent 
*Speelel grants are justified when a State through financial stress 
from any cause is tamable efficiesitly to discharge its functions as a 
member of the Federation and should be determined by the amount of 
help found necessary to make it possible for that tate by reasonable 
effort to function at a standard not appreciably below that or other 
States.* 5. 
The enunciation of this principle, which has been follow-
by the CellaniantOTI down to the present time, was the first occasion on 
which the principle of payment according to relative financial needs 
rt:6115rnalearTnemania , 1930, Appendix p.69 
5. Commonwealth Grants Commlesion, Third Report p.n. 
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was officially stated in any form end therefore it narks the beginning 
of a new ere in Federal-State financial relations in Australia. . 
Xlhodied in the t4tatement id the fall recognition of the principle of 
equality*** It maybe called. jhe operative word* are "Special grants 
should he determined by the amount of help found necessary to imikA 
it possible for that State.., to function at standard not appreelabb 
below that of other States'. This almost completely eMbraves the 
*quality principle. Rad the words "not appreciably below* been re-
place by *gene to*, it would have represented the complete adoption 
of the principle which has been shown to be the most desirable in 
determining the *mounts of grants from the .thiommonweelth to the States. 
This, however, is not the oonplete story. Although the Commission 
stated a prinelple which is In reseenable accord with the principle 
which has been sheep to he the meet advantageous both to the States 
concerned and to the Yederation as a whole, and which has been follow 
ed to the present tine, it does not necessarily follow that the 
principle is tying applied In the way designed to gilre the beat poss-
ible resets. In order to determine this., it will he secessary to 
conduct a fairly exhaustive examination of the methods *bleb the 
Commission uses in the implication of its stated 
Ithe method which. the Commission has used to assess the 
financial needs of the three States which have been consistently dials 
ing . finenelal assistance under Section 96, and which are referred to 
by the Commission as the elelliaat Stet**, have varied slightly over 
the tsmskr-eas years or its operation. The change (mobs regarded as 
having been brought about pertly by the development of new thought on 
alerted,* aspects of the application of the principle s, and partly by 
changing eircusistaboes within the Federation.. Therefore It has been 
thought advisable to consider first the method used at the time at ths 
Third Report* 1936, and then et the time of the Twenty-first Report, 
1954. Thievill bring out both the changes la approach and the 
changes necessitated by altered circumetances. 
tit onerally, the Commission adopted the approach to the 
measurement of relative fineneial seeds as that suggested by Prefessol 
liblin in the *Cas• 'or Tasmania* 1930.* which was quoted *bore. The 
first problem with ehlOh . it was faced was actual, a statistical one 
relating to the delay which was inevitable before neeessary statistic-
s/ daub/pease available, If the method suggested by Professor GUM 
was tabs *eel, then the fundamental basis of assessment of grants 
would be the deficit in Consolidated Reiman* account in 'each year. 
This implied that the financial needs of any tate would not be known 
Until the sad of the finest:ill year to shit:1 the grant would relate. 
In order to resolve this problem, the Commission adopted the method 
of assessing the needs for a particular year on the basis of esperimei 
two years earlier. Thus the assessment for 1936-37, for example, was 
aside es the data available for 1934-35. Such a procedure is subject 
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the claimant States were of two typest- 
(a) An allowance for items whieh evr• brought into account in the budget of some State& but not in the we of Others, and 
CO Adjustment& of the items of revenue and expenditure so that they referred only to activities in the year in question, and elisdnatm ion of the effects of windfall* of revenue, emergency expenditure, and of variations in accounting practice. 
By the application of thee corrections, the ("omission would arrive 
at a notional budget result for each State which would probably be 
quite different from the actual or published budget result. However, 
it must be agreed that this procedure was necessary to bring the 
accounts of the different States on to a common basis after taking 
into account the different methods of recording revenue and expendit-
ure tremesetions. The result obtained by the Commission can be 
regarded as the true picture, as opposed to the picture *boon by the 
published results of the States which were distorted by different 
practices and procedures in the application or accounting practice. 
the carreated budget rtsult teach tate was then expr-
essed in term of its population, and the average of the three stand-
ard States adopted as the and 	For example, the grants for 
1937-38, (Fourth Report) were based on the financial results of the 
utates in 191t-36, in which year, New South Wales had a corrected 
deficit equivalent to £0.729 per head, Victoria a surplus of S0.049 
per heed and Queensland a deficit at Li .066 per head. The mean of the 
three State* was thus a deficit of 40,582 per head and this became the 
standard for that year. In other verde,. the Myatt approximatioa to 
the grant would be an amount sufficient to salable the claimant iitates 
to produce a deficit of 1140.582 per head. Actually in that year the 
corrected deficit* of tie claimant States were South Australia - 
£2.388; %Sera Australia - 44.659 and Tasmania - L2.457 Per beat. 
This, however, less merely the first approximation to the 
grant. The Coo/elusion had propounded in its statement of prineiple 
of determination of the amounts to be reeemmended, that a claimant 
b tate was required to make reasonable effort to achieve financial 
independesee of the Commonwealth. In other words, the Commission had 
to be sure that the severity of taxation in the claimant States was 
at least equal to that in the standard ttate, that standards of serv- 
ices supplied were not comparatively extravagant, end so on. Obviou-
sly, If the assessment of the grant stopped at the stage of producing 
corrected budget results comparable with nese in the standard States, 
the claimant States could eajoy a much higher standard of living than 
the standard States, but at the expense of the standard States. 
The first approximation to the grant, as determined by 
the procedure outlined above, had then to be adjusted to take Ina° 
account the effort each elaimant State ea* making towards balancing 
its budget independently of special financial assistance from the 
Commonwealth. Zhe **poets of financial policy to which the 
8. Third eport - pp. 99/100. 
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UommiSelen gave attention in this regard sera
te) lhe maintenance of eapital equipment, 
(b) lite standard of economy in expenditure involving 
(1) The east of administration, and (11) The scale of social services, 
(c) The standard of effort in raising revenue, involving i i) Ihe severity or taxation, and 11) The scale of payment for services. 
"he method of applieation of adjustments to the first 
approximation to the grant was to calculate from statistical data, 
wherever possible, the difference which would have taken place in the 
lffele of maws and lapenditure in tte budgstS of the slaimint 
States had those States taxed with equal severity and supplied the 
saMe standards of services as operated, on average, in the standard 
States. Of the five types of adjustments specified above the first, 
relating to maintenance of capital equipment and the last, relating 
to the seals of payment for services, were relatively unimportant. 
In the former case, an adjustment was made to the base amount of the 
grant recommended for paymont to tasmania to permit increased maint-
enance expenditure during the first two years of the Commission s& 
operations, but thereafter, this type of adjustment was discontinued. 
Until recently tbe Commission made no specific adjustment for the rel-
ative severity of charges for services oupplied by public utilities. 
he adjustments which attested the determination of the 
*is* of the grants to the claimant States were therefor* limited to 
three types of State finaneial policy, the relative severity of taut-
ion on the side of revenue, and on the expenditure side, economy or 
extravagance in the provision of social services and eosts of adminis-
tration. The method of determining the severity of taxetion in each 
State was to relate an index of taxation collections per head of pop-
ulation to an index of taxable capacity. The former was based on act-
uel collections of taxation from all sources in each State, and the 
letter OD statements of income contained in income tax returas lodged 
for Commonwealth income taxation purposes. The severity of taxation 
for each State was then shown as en index nusib•r with a base of 100 
equal to the averegt severity in all States. The average of the index 
numbers of the three standard States was adopted as the standard to 
determine the percentage by which the severity in each claimant 3tate 
deviated from the standard. Thie peroentage deviation from the stand-
ard was then applied to the actual collection* in each claimant State 
to determine the adjustment which should be made. This adjustment 
could be either positive or negative resulting in an addition to or a 
reduction from the base amount of the grant. 
For the purpose of determining the adjuitment for expend-
iture On social servioes„ the Commission used *tatistical data prepar-
ed for it bd the Commonwealth Statistiolan. This date was a compil-
ation of the net expenditure on *cella services in each State 
9. Third aport, p.002. 
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expenditure per head of populetion, and the simple average of such 
expenditure per head in the three standard States represented the 
standard 'by which expenditure in each cleimant State was measured. 
The possibility was recognised, however, that the States with the 
smaller populations might experience some greater difficulty in prov-
iding the same standard's of services for the same cost per head as in 
the standard States, and therefore allowances for social density, 
expressed as percentages of standard expenditure per head were allowed 
At the time of their introduction, these allowances were arbitrarily 
determined as 34 for South Australia, and Tasmania and 711; for Western' 
Australia. The standard the became the average expenditure per kead 
In the stabdard States, plus the allowance for social density, and 
this was compared with the actual expenditure in the relevant claimant 
State in order to determine the necessary adjustment. Again, this 
• cwild be either positive or negative. 
The adjustment for the level of expenditure en adminis-
tration was less precisely determined than either the previous adjust-
ciente. In this regard, the CommissioL informed itself as far as 
possible free available statistical date, but the actual adjustment 
vas based en the intuitive judgment of the .Commission, In addition 
to thee, three types of adjustment which could be either positive or 
negative adjustments to the first approximation to the grant which had 
already been deternined from the *ornate budget results, the Commis-
sion mode eertain other adjustments which were inevitably unfavourable 
to the claimant i)tates. It will beremelbered that the statement of 
principle upon which the Commission proposed to determine the amounts 
of the grants it would recommend said that the want should he suffic-
ient to enable the claimant Slates, by reasonable effort, to function 
at a standard not appreciably below that of other States. The 
Commission decided that it would blappropriate fer a grant tea. paid 
which was sufficiently great to enable the claimant State concerned to 
operate at precisely the same standard as the standard States es 
average, and therefore it introduced the concept of providing that the 
claimant states made a special effort to reduce their dependency on 
the Commeawealth for financial support. 
In other words, the Commission introduced an adjustment 
that would ensure that the standard in the claimant. States would he 
below, but not appreciably-below the standard in the other States. 
This adjustment was made in two mays. ?irst, the average expenditure 
en social services An the three standard States was reduced by 10A to 
give the standard by which eomparable expenditure in the claimant 
States was to be judged, and seedhdly, the standard severity or tax-
ation, as determined by relating taxation collections to taxable *op-
acity in the standard States leas ineressed by certain percentages. In 
the Third Report, for example, the average as determined by the 
method outlined *be?* was increased by 7% in order terludge South 
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Australian severity and 5% for astern Australia as special additional 
effort required by he States. VC additional effort was required bj 
Tasmania. This latter edjustment was of the nature of a penaly impos-
ed to meet that portion of the deficit of a claimant State callused by 
past extravagance or mistekee, particularly with reference to the 
annual burden resulting from unnecessary pset borrowings. 	4 
In this manner the Commission arrived et - a figure Whieh 
represented, as tar as the calculations permilted, the amounts which 
the claimant 6tates should receive to permit them to operate at 
standards somewhot comparable to those in the standard States. Au 
attempt has been made to examine the statistical teehniques involved 
in this assessment as, while not irrelevant, this aspect is relatively 
unimportant from the point of view of understanding the broader implie 
ations of the adoption of certain methods in relation to the stated 
principle. Before analysing these implications, it will be convenient 
to consider the changes in method which have since taken rase* in 
order to appreciate the method in operation at the present time. 
The greatest changes were brought about by the impact of 
the 4939,45 war on the finances of the Australian States. In the 
immediate poet-war period, Auetralla experienced repid inflation, and 
the method of assessing relative financial needs based on the budget 
result of two years earlier became uneatisfastory as the differences 
in the *mounts neeessary to overcome differehees in relative financial 
need between two years grow. la it Vifteenth Report (t948) the 
Commissioa introduced a new method of determining the amount of the 
great for any partieular year. By this new method, called the "two-
pare method, an estimate is made of the fineneial needs of a claimant 
State in the year to which the payment is related. This estimate is 
based on budget estimates of the Stats concerned and estimates by the 
COwMiSaell of adjustments it will be required to make to the actual 
budget result when that year becomes the year of review. A-margin of 
safety is allowed, and the amount so determined is recommendod to be 
paid as an advance tc be fin-ally adjusted plum the year. in which the 
payment is made becomes the year of review - that is, two years hence. 
In other words, the Commirsion'e estimate will be corrected when the 
information become available to permit it to MINIS, by the methods 11 
hes edePted. the Amount 'which the Stete should have received to permit 
it to reach the required standard. Thus, in any one year, a claimant 
state would receive a grant made up of two parts, the first to be 
regarded as an advance to be applied to the accounts for the year In 
which the payment is mode, and the Becloud to be applied to the seconds 
of the year of review. ander this method it is possible for the 
sewed part of the grant to be a negative amount if the Commission 
overestimated the needs of a claimant State, in which ease, revenue 
from the aeconnts of the year of review have to be transferred to the 
accounts of the year of payment to ensure that the full *mount or the 
4wirm41a1ftrtas #0.VV, VIM tm the veer of veyment. 
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After the introduction of Uniformlaxation, to which 
reference will be made in the following Chapter lasveral modifications 
were made to the way in which adjustments were mode to the base amount 
of the grant. The adjustment for economy or extravagence in expenedit 
upe on administration was discontinued on the grounds that employment, 
and hence salary costs in the public services of the States had been 
differently affected by the impact of war conditions. The transfer of 
income taxing powers from the States to the Comloneedth ramieSitited 
the adoption of an entirely new approach to the mossurement of the 
relative severity '.11 taxation, and because this transfer limited the 
field in which the claimant States could reduce their dependence on 
the Commonwealth 1)y special effort, the special effort required of two 
States to compensate for past mistakes in capital expenditure, and the 
special effort required of all claimant States merely because they 
were claimant States and which was formerly equal to 10, of standard 
net social services expenditure, was gradually reduced and finally 
discontinued entirely. 
In its Sixteenth Report(1949), the Commission introduced 
a new adjustment which related to the relative impact on the financial 
results of State business undertakings on the budgets of the States. 
These adjustments are based only indirectly on statistical data. A 
strict statistical comparison in this field is not easy to make, and 
therefore the Commission had to rely largely on its intuitive judgmeni 
after consideration of all statistical data which it had available. 
One other aspect of the essepameat of financial needs and 
hence the amounts of the grants which is of great importance from the 
point of view of the principle involved, relates to the adoption of 
the budget standard from which the first approximation to the grant Jo 
derived. In the ear/lest years of its existence, the average budget 
results of the three standard States was inevitably a deficit, and 
therefore the Commission decided that it was appropriate to recommend 
grants which would prodice Comparable corrected deficits in the claim-
ant States. From the point of view of producing equality, this was 
undoubtedly the correct eppraoch. During the war years, however, the 
budgets of the standard States showed substantial surpluses. 1everth4 
less, the Commission decided that while this situation offered the 
. possibility of adopting a surplus standard, it considered that this Imo 
inappropriate to the purpose of special grants and it would only rec-
ommend grants which enabled the claimant States to produce st balanced 
budget. Thus, whenever a surplus standard appears warranted by the 
Commission's procedures, a balanced budget standard is adopted. 
In other respects, the methods used by the Commission in 
its earlier years of operation have not ben altered. The adjustment 
for expenditure on social services has continued unchanged, with the 
exception that the allowance for social density has bevn altered to 
an allowance for speeial difficulties and the percentage allowances 
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increased to 9% for south Australia„11% for Western Australia and TA 
for Tasmania. 104 Summarising the method at present used by the Comm-
ission, it can be said that the basis amount of the grant to a claim-
ant State in any gear is the amount of its deficit unless the budget 
results on average in the standard ;::tates is a deficit, in which case 
the base amount of the grant is an amount equal to the difference bet-
ween the standard deficit per head and the actual defieit in the State 
concerned. This base amount is then corrected for driftertmees in 
accounting practices between States, and the result so Obtained IS 
adjusted for differences in severity of taxation and other State 
charges, and differences in the level of expenditure on social service. 
This amount is determined two years after the financial year to which 
it relates, but portion of the amount has already been received by way 
of an advance in the year to which the calculation related. 2ho tiff 
crease, when finally paid is credited against the deficit of the year 
to which it relates, or if no deficit remained after receipt of the 
advance, then it is pplied to the accounts of the year in which it is 
actaally paid and will be regarded by the Commission as part of the 
advance for that year to be finally adjusted two years later. 
It is now possible to analyse the principles and methods 
used by the Commonwealth grants Commission to determine the amount of 
of the grants it recommend should be paid annually to the claimant 
States in the light of the principles and methods which have been 
shown as themost suitable for a federation such as that which exists 
in Austaalia. Before reaching this aspect, however, it is necessary 
to comment briefly on the way in which the establishment of the Comm-
Lesion itself fits into the generalscheme wahich has been suggested. 
Generally, its composition appears to be quite satisfactory for the 
purpose. It is composed of three men who are experts in their own 
field and who operate in a part-time capacity. One improvement could 
possibly be the appointment of a full-time Commission, or at least . a 
full-time Chaiman, as the task they are called upon to perff7ra is of 
the utmost importance both to the claimant States and the Federation 
as a whole. This shortcoming, if it is a shortcoming, is partially 
overcome by the fact that they are assisted by a full-time secretarial 
The whole body, comprising the Commission and the secretariat is app-
ointed by the Commonwealth Government and to this extent must be re-
garded as an agent of the Commonwealth. Inevitably the Commonwealth 
is associated with the body responsible for the making of grants to 
the States and tends to create the impression that the object of the 
Commission is to keep the size of the grants to a minimum compatible 
with the use of the stated principle.. The impression is probably 
quite erroneous, but unfortunately it must exist while the Commission 
and its staff is answerable only to the Commonwealth Government. 
Nevertheless, it appears that it is the only way in which it can func-
tion successfully. The alternative is for it to be an agent employed 
10. Twenty-first Report (1954) p.36. 
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by the States themselves, end this would raise insuperable difficult-
ies in appointments, salaries etc. In all events, the establishment 
of such a Commission is far preferable to leaving the determination 
of the grants to the Commonwealth Government which would mean, in pmac 
•to the officers of the Commonwealth 7reasury. The selection of 
•Commissioners of high integrity can always ensure that the interests 
of the claimant States are protected. 	Generally, it may be agreed 
that the establishment of a Commission of this type to determine the 
relative financial needs of the States and make recommendations to the 
Cwamonwealth Is in accordance with the operation of the principle. 
The next step is to determine whether or not the stated 
principle which the Commission has adopted to arrive at its conclusiam 
is in agreement with the principle of payment which has been decided 
is the most equitable in a federation such as that which has developed 
in Australia. It is apparent that whatever principles and methods the 
Grants Commission adopts, it will never be able to bring about equal-
ity between all States under the circumstances which exist at present. 
The extent to which it could influence the achievement of this situate-
ion would depend on the nuMber of States which claimed financial 
assistance from the Commonwealth under Section 96 of the Consthtution. 
In the event of all States claiming such financial assistance, it 
would thou be possible, provided always that the revenue potential of 
the Commonwealth Government was sufficient to enable it to make grants 
to at least five of the States to permit them to achieve *quality witt 
the sixth State. Where, however, only three States are dependent on 
this type of financial assistance, it is possible for the Commission 
to influence the achievement of equality between those three States 
and equality of those three States with some preconceived atandard. 
The remaining three Stetes will inevitably 'be operating with differen1 
Standards of services and severity of taxation and other charges, and 
the prOblem to be faced is the determination of a standard to which 
•the three claimant States shall be raised. In all probability, the 
three standard States can be classified in descending order according 
to the standards of services Awating in each, and arguments can be 
advanced for the use of eac# of these three States as a standard to 
which the three claimant States shall be raised. 
The mein Objective of the adoption of the principle of 
payment according to relative financial needs is to produce equality 
of standards in all States. In the first instance, the average stand-
ard adopted by the Grants Commission will probably be lower than the 
highest standard operating in any one State before its adoption. It 
would be appropriate, therefore, in the particular case of the exteni 
of the equality which can be achieved by the workings of the Grants 
Commission, to attempt to raise the three claimant States to the Love 
of the highest standard State. However, it must be remembered that 
the three claimant States are the smallest States if measured by 
population else and the size of their annual budgets, and the amount 
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three State* claiming cu,ecial financial assistance, and while this 
situation has not rot changed, Aiere is always the possibilty oft any 
or an of the remaining three States claiming financial assistance 
under Section 96. While the number of States claiming assistance is 
fewer than five, the adoption of the stated principle can only achieve 
equality between the States which have claimed financial assistance. 
When five States are claimant States however, it is possible to *chime 
equality between them and the sixth ntste. Thus the principle is de-
signed to meet the situation if the number of claimant,tstates increas4 
es deyond its present nuMber, and at the same time to function adequ-
ately but not completely, with fewer than five claimant -States. An 
pointed out above, it can do nothing to achieve equality between the 
stsdadard States. The only criticism as it applies at present, is that 
It does not propose to raise the level of the claimant States to 
equality with the other States, but only to near-equality. That is, 
it proposed to enable them to function a* a standard not appreciably 
below nest of other States. There is no justifiable reason why the 
claimant States should not be raised to a position where they can 
function at a standard equal to that of other States, and in fact, 
with some qualifications which will be elaborated later, the methods 
which the Commission has applied to enforce the principle do actually 
provide for this, In the earlier years of its operation, the Comm.. 
lesion made an adjustment equivalent to 10% of the standard expendit-
ure on social services as a penalty for claimancy. That is, merely 
because a State was in a position where it found it necessary to claim 
financial aswietanee from the Commonwealth, it was required to functim 
at a standard lower, by the equivalent of this amount, than the 
standard operating in the other States. This penalty has since been 
discontinued, and apparently with it went the concept of the requiring 
the claimant States to function at a standard slightly lower than thal 
of the standard States, although it is possible that this penalty for 
claimancy had been introduced in other, but less obvious ways. 
In the application of its principle, the Col/mission adop-
ted the approach suggested by Professor Oiblin in 1930. That was thd 
the financial needs of a claimant State should be related to its 
budget position with reference to such aspects of government financial 
policy as the relative severity of taxation, levels of expenditure on 
secial services, cost* of administration, and so on. In the first 
part of this essay,12  It was suggested that there were two alternative 
approaches to the application of the principle of payment according *Lc 
relative financial needs. The first was that relative financial needs 
could be determined by reference to the budget results of the State*, 
as in fact the Commission has done, while the second was that it could 
be determined by reference to inherent differences between States. 
whe relative merits of these two alternative approaches 
■AnsoWidramewailbelmidurminisiwawhisem Omer.wmp. 
12. See above, pp. 74 ff. 
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have already been examined, end it was shown that under certain circ-
umstahces, they could produce similar results. This would occur if, 
in the use of the budget result approach, every aapect of governmental 
activity in a claimant State and even those spheres of activiti in 
which governments do not operate but which contribure to diffuseness 4 
in standards of living, wise taken into account by the Commission when 
determining relative financial needs. Differences in standards will 
• ,occur in fields in which governments pla$ no part, and if the assess-
ment of relative financial needs is based only =budgetary results, 
then no consideration will be given to these extra.- governmental 
aspects of inequality. For example, the housing facilities and cond-
itions which residents of the several States enjoy will be influenced 
by the differences in resources of the States, but this will net be 
reflected in any way in the State budgets, and hence will be ignored 
when coMparing financial needs from budget results alone. Thus, there 
are two ways of interpreting financial needs, the first relating to 
the financial needs of governments to permit them to operate at en 
approved standard in the fields of activity in which it is customary 
for all governments to operate, and the second relating to the financ-
ial needs of each community as a whine to enable them to enjoy stand-
ards of living comparable to those in other t;tates. Obviously, if the 
first is adequately satisfied, then it will go quite a long way 
towards satisfying the second interpretation. 
• It is contended that while the second alternative is the 
more desirable, it might be impracticable to attempt to achieve that 
position. 'tie problems of direct measurement would be immense, and 
any appraoch to measurement would probably used $o be indirect. A 
suggestion was made earlier that perhaps the measure to be used could 
be the average levels of incomes in each !;tate. That is, the Object 
of redistribution of the total wealth of the Commonwealth would be to 
produce the same average level of income in each fAste. Again, there 
is the problem of measurement, but this could probably be overcome by 
the use of approved statistical techniques. Nevertheless, there are 
many arguments which could be advanced in opposition to such a scheme. 
FOTOMOSZ amongst them would be the magnitude of the amounts involved. 
?or example, it is estimated in the White Paper on Estimates of Nat-
ional Income for 1950-51 in Australia, tat personal income per head 
in Tasmania in that year was C274 compared with an average of all 
States of £351. The increase in Taemanian incomes necessary to permit 
it to reach the average in that year would thus be of the order of 4130 
. A transfer of an amount of such magnitude would be fantastic, and in 
order to disposc of the additional revenue, the Tasmanian Government 
would need to enter all fields of economic and personal activity. 
Such an approach would be feasible only if the differen-
ces between the Otates were comparatively small, but in present-day 
Australia, where the differences are great, attention must be concen- 
trated in the more limited sphere of government budgeting, which is 
I 5h . 
spreading over a wider field each year. This would aim at bringing 
about equality in a restricted field, leaving the wider concept to 
change, if necessary, in the natural order which can be assisted by 
systematic investment programmes. In this r striated field, equality 
is sought to the stage where the governments provide the same standamb 
of services at the same cost to the residents of the State and this cm 
be achieved successfilly by consideration of budget positions alone. 
However, the method of asseesment should embrace all aspects of govern 
mental activity, and in this respect the Commonwealth Grants t%ommissix 
does not function as adequately as perhaps it should. There is a wide 
field of expenditure which receives but cursory attention in the •st-
imation of needs and therefore it ;6 possible that the desired equal-
ity, even in the limited field of governmental activity is not being 
achieved. Consider two claimant Ctates, one which concentrates 
expenditure on the provision of services in theform of development of 
industrial potential, and the second on the provision 	social 
services such as hospital services, education ete.Although the resid-
ents of both States may enjoy the same net standards of services, the 
State which concentrated on the provision of social services will pro* 
ably have a permanent budget deficit equal to the extent to which its 
expenditure an social services is above standard, while the first 
State will probably balance its budget, because adjustments are made 
to the first approximation to the grant for expenditure on social . 
services but not for other types of expenditure. 
Another aspect of the problem of which approach should be 
used in determining the financial needs of each State is that when the 
budget appraoch is used, it inevitably means that there will be a timm 
lag between the year to which the payment relate and the year in 
which it is received. The two-part method adopted by the Commission 
in recent years has overcome this to some extent, but unless the 
Commission has been very accurate in its estimate of relative financii 
need, the States concerned will finish the financial year with a deft. 
cit which must be carried for two years tntil the final result, 
based on the actual budget results in the claimant and standard States 
in known. The amount of the advanwe may in this way influence the 
final result, for any State will be hesitant to budget for a very 
large deficit, both for political reasons and because it may have 
difficulty in finding the ready cash with which to carry on at its 
proposed rate of expenditure, even if it aware that at some time in 
the near future this deficit may be reduced if the Commission deter- 
I 
	 mines that their estimate of financial needs was less than calculated 
needs. Where only portion of the expenditure field is subject to 
adjustment, it can well be that the limitation of expenditure thought 
necessary by the government of a claimant State because of the size 
of the advance received is received to the field of non-adjustable 
expenditure, and therefore no consideration will be given to the 
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consequent reduction in standards of services when the final assess-
ment of financial neAs is made. 
However, apart from this aspect, which can be corrected 
by a full coverage of all fields of expenditure in the adjustments, 
there still remains the problem of the time lag, and so far as can be 
seen, it must remain while financial needs are assessed by reference 
to government budget results. If some way of estimating needs at the 
beginning of the financial year can be devised by reference to inhere-
nt differences, the amount of.the grant could be determined in time 
for inclusion in the budgetary programme of the claimant States on tlie 
understanding that it was to be the final payment for the year. In 
that way the time-lag could be overcome, and the method of assessment 
and payment of special grants placed on a more satisfactory basis from 
the point of view of the recipient States. 
In addition to these more general Observations on the 
procedure of the Grants Commission in the light of the adoption of the 
principle of payment according to relative financial needs, there are 
several particular points - elating to the methods adopted which have 
some bearing on the application of the principle and which should 
therefore, be mentioned briefly. The first of these relates to the 
adoption of an appropriate budget standard when the standard States 
are shown to have achieved a corrected surplus. The Commissien has 
decided that when such an average surplus is shown to exist, they will 
recommend grants that will, all other things being equal, permit the 
claimant States to balance their budgets. This appears to be a 
departure from a principle which is designed to bring about equality 
between states, audit is suggested that if a deficit budget standard 
is to be adopted when conditions warrant it, then a surplus budget 
standard should similarly be adopted. If a standard State achieves -a 
Surplus, it can be used to offset a deficit incurred in previous year 
held in reserve to meet future deficits, or used for capital expendit-
ure. If the claimant Ltates are not permitted to follow the same 
procedure, then ther is some deviation from the accepted principle, 
It should be mentioned, however, that on several occasions the Commis-
sion has adopted a balanced budget standard when a deficit budget stem 
dard would have been warranted because it had refused to adept a 
surplus standard in earlier years. It may be that in this regard 
there will be a balancing out over a period of years. 
• The second deviation from conplete adherence to the 
principle is probably more serious. This han arisen from the adoption 
• of the two-part method of assessment of grants and relates to the 
•adjustment which is made to the advance when that year becomes the 
year of review. . It is possible for a balanced budget standard to 
be adopted and yet a claimant State to be shown to warrant payment of 
a grant sufficient to produce a surplus for that year. he first 
approximation to the grant will be the amount of the corrected deficit 
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which y, under certain circumstances, be the same or greater than 
the pUblished deficit. If the adjustments mad* on account of revenue 
and _expenditure policy are positive, then an addition should be made 
to the first approximation which could easily produce an amount more 
than the deficit. Inder these circumstances, the Commission has 
decreed that despite the fact that it has been shown that the State 
has been operating at a level below the standard adopted, that State 
will not be permitted to achieve anything more than a corrected balm-
cad budget. This argument can probably be better understood by 
reference to an actual example of the operation of the calculation. 
In 1950-51, South Australia received a total grant of 
£5,332,000, of which 4;502,000 was to be applied to a corrected deficit 
incuvred in .1948-49, and the remainder, 4,830,000, was to be regarded 
at an advance to be used in 1950-51, but to be later adjusted accord-
ing to calculated financial needa in that year. In fact, South Aust-
ralia showed a published surplus of £230,000 in 1950-51, and therefore 
the actual deficit excluding the advance was £4,600 4000. This was 
subject to corrections which gave a corrected deficit of L4,573000. 
The Commission determined that a net favourable .adjustment for revenue 
and expenditure policy equal to an additional 11428,000 was warranted, 
and this increased the corrected deficit from 4-4,573,000 to Z5,000,000 
which is the adjusted deficit. In other words, according to the 
Commission's calculations, an amount of 1,5,000 ,000, of which £4830,000 
had atready been advanced, was necessary to permit South Australia to 
operate . at the same standards as those which were enjoyed In the 
standard States. The Commission has stated, however, /Nat a claimant 
. 3tato will not be permitted to produce better than a corrected balanc-
ed budget, irrespective of whether or not the standards States were 
able to produce a surplus corrected budget result. Conaequently, in 
this particular instange, the Commission determined that in that year 
• the advance to South Australia was £257,000 greater than was necessary 
to produce the necessary balanced corrected budget result, end there-
fore .c257,000 had to be repaid. In actual practice, the grant for 
1952-53 was made up of a negative first part of £257,000, and an 
advance of £6,600,000 giving a net grant of L6,343,000. This meant 
that £257,000 had then to be transferred from the accounts of 1950-51 
leaving a Oblished deficit in that year of 447,000, to the aecoutts 
of 1952-53, in order that the full advence*of 4°6,6004000 be available 
in that year. 
The implieation of this procedure is that although the 
Commission has determined the amount necessary to give the desired 
equality, under certain circumstances it will then reduce the amount 
and prevent the equality being reached. The presence of a net favour-
able adjustment means that the Commission has assessed the levels of 
services supplied as being below standard, or the severity of State 
texation as being  above standard so that on balance, the residents of 
13. See, for example. dpe Teenty-firet Report, p.16. 
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that particular State enjoy standards which are below those of the 
standard States, and because it has decided not to permit a published 
surplus, the grant is lower than the amount necessary to permit the 
governments of the claimant Cetates to raise standards to those operat-
ing in the standard Ztates. One aspect of this problem is that the 
adjustment relates to a financial year two years earlier, and nothing 
that can be done will alter the standards of services received by the 
people in that year. However, by adopting the budget approach, the 
t'ommission has elected to permit governments of claimant States to 
supply net services which are comparable between states, and therefore 
it would be reasonable to consider the possibility of permitting 
claimant Statea to establish reserves, extinguish past debt or incur 
new capital expenditure from surplus revenue if the standard States 
are in a position to do so. 	he extent to which this type of deviat- 
ion from the ebsolute operation of the principle of payment according 
to relative financial needs will occur, will depend on the extsht to 
which revenue and expenditure policy in a claimant State deviates from 
the standard. If a claimant State is prevented from reaching equality 
with the atandard Otates in any particular year by this procedure of 
the Commission, the procedure also permits alteration in subsequent 
years to eliminate the feveurible adjustments by increasing expendit-
ure on the provision of social services or decreasing the severity of 
taxation or other charges. For example, in the instance quoted above, 
if expenditure on social services in South Australie had been greater 
4.4e8,000, the corrected deficit vould have been greater by this 
amount and so too would have ben the first approximation to the grant 
On the other hand, the favourable adjustment would have been eliminat-
ed and standerds in that State eould have ben greater to the extent 
of the experditurc of this additional amourt and which, by the Cots 4- 
ission t s methods of meosereme4t would have had to be spent to produce 
equality of etandards with the standard 1-Aates. Thus, although the 
method may result in devintion from the principle, it mre also give 
the desired result. if deviation does exist, it maybe corrected by 
action of the claimant tate. 
It should be mentioned that under the preeent method used 
by the Grants Comeisaion in assessing relative financial needs, expen-
diture incurred by a claimaet State on de b t charges lies i. the field 
of non-adjustable expenditure. It otecer words, any level of this type 
of expenditure is permicsable, irtespective of the size of similar 
expenditure in the standard *.etatec. It has been suggested that in 
order to achieve maximum equality beteen Ltetes it is d,sirable that 
ndjust tents be made for all types of expenditure, and if this were 
introduced, exp,nditure on debt charges wculd 1,cessarily come ender 
survey. Aeverthclets, it this particular field of expeediture, the 
pre,ent method appears to be satisfactory, becaA3c the amount of 
public borrowing which a tate may undertake is determined by tls Lc 
Council, and therefore it must be asumed thet . th , Consaonwealth 
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eovernment and the Government:. of the stsndard .; -;tetts are fully aware 
of the impact on their budgets of Loan Cour,cil decisions which permit 
a claimart State to incur debt charges which are above average in thet 
relation to state budgets. It would be unrealistic if the Loan 
Council approved certain borrowing acd the Grants Commission disallow-
ed the annual commitments resulting from those borrowings in the 
assessment of relative finaccial needs. 
It can be seen from the: e fee observatidns that the 
methods which the erants Commission have adopted in the application of 
the principle upon which it calculates and recommeeds grants on 
result in some deviation from the apparent intended purpose of the 
principle. Thie could be either minimised or accentuated by a 
tendency which appears to have developed in receree :ears for the 
Commission to place letAs reliance upon purely statistical examination, 
and to depcnd more on 1tuitive judgmont. No-one would claim that 
perfect results could be obteined by purely statistical analysis, if 
for no ether reeson than the fact that some of the magnitudes with 
which the Commi sion is concerned cannot be subjected to precise 
statietica/ analysis, and it in inevitable that judement beset upon 
statistical data must be used to some extent. However, it is conceiv-
able that the intuitive method may lend itself to the possibility of 
greater devaition from the optimum than is apparent with the purely • statistical method. Reliance must thev be placed on the ability of 
. the individuals concerned to correct the error which eonld arise if 
tie result were related solely to statistical comparisons. Ie in 
eesential, however, that asatisfactore balance be maintained between 
the two approaches. The trend towards assessment accoriing to Intuit-
ive judgMeet, if carried to its ultimate, could make serious inroads 
into complete adherence to the principle of rilative financial needs. 
Yrom the viewpoints; of both the Commonwealth eovernment and the claim-
ant ::tates, it is advisable that the manner ir which the amounts of 
the grant recommended are determined, is reenaled. It is desirable 
that the eommonwealth eoveremert he awere of how the arJounts are 
arrived at in order that the Coer:onwealth earliament, which is the 
bod responsible for making the grants, mry exercise its control of 
expenditure ir this field. The State Governments, on the other hand, 
should be satisfied that they are being treated equitably in the 
ge - Peetienment of surplus Commonwealth revenue. In the past the itates 
concerned have beer reasonably content with the approach used by the 
Gommission, but if in future the grants become determined more and 
more by methode about which they are not fully informed, it will be 
difficAlt to maintain the harmony in :aderal-tates financial 
relations that is ess.rtial to the well-being of the eederation. 
it must be remembered, however, that the Comeionwealth 
Grents 'collie/lion is responsible only for making recommendations to 
the Comutonetath eovernment concerning the payment of grants under 
-action 96. It is only an aevisory body. Irrespective of the 
principles and reethods used to determine the amounts the Commission 
will recommend, it still remaine,the prerogative of tee eederal 
x'erliament to accept, modify . or reject the recommendatione or the 
Commission. leirieg the twenty years of its operetion, the Commiss-
ion's recomeendations have been accepted unreservedly by the Common-
wealth Covernmert, bet the possibility of amendmert is always present. 
Any alteration would probably take the form of a reluction brought 
about by financial stringency in the Vommonwealth Budget. If the 
Commonwealth ucivernment has consciously adopted the principle of 
payment according to relative financial mods, t_en thir situation . 
should never arise. The alternative to a reduction in the amo unts 
ca1c4ate4 to bring the claimant 7 .tetea int equality with the 
standard r.tates la for the Commonwealth Goverrmcnt t& increase the 
severity of taxatIon to produce the alditional revenue necessary to 
enable the recommended rants to be paid in full* 	In other 
words, a greater ceetribution should be celed ferth from all Zetates 
to enable the total amourt to be disbursed to reach the level where 
it is possible to reach the desired equality between fetatea. 	This 
procedure mZght net be followed for several reasons, including non-
recognition by the Commonwealth of the principles involved, the 
political npopularity of higher taxation, and the fact that the 
recommendations of the Commissi.n may be made too late in the 
financial year to permit alteration of the budget. 	Consequently 
the possibility always exists that the amounts recommended by tee 
commissna wil7 be reduced by the Aldtral Parliament. 
It is more than possible that the Commission is 
aware of the existence of this situation, mud perhaps unconsciously 
takes into cetscration the pessible Comloneealth Government 
reaction when it is determining the amouets it will recomeerd. 
Fepresentattves of the Comaonwcalth 'reasury each year submit 
suegeations to the eommissin, and in this way the eoeeonlualth 
viewpoint on certain aspects or the aseesement of grants is made 
known to the e;ommission. 	t is postible for this influence 
to be felt much more ca_ily if the assesement is iaele by the 
Commission according te its intuitive judgeteent rather than by the 
direct statintical aperoach. 	eurthermole, if this e!ces take 
piece, it .Levitably meano that there will be neme devistice from 
the seplicatien 	the principle of payment ancordine to rolarive 
fivances1 needs. 	It is impossi le tc cati:3ste the extort to 
which this Pins nperated it the past en it is eerely a a elective 
matter. 	It may have played no part weatsoever, eut in any case, 
the pro -er procedure would be for the Cemeisaion to recomeend the 
full smourts necesearee to bring the claimant states into equality 
with the stsedard !etates and if any pruning le neceseare beete,se of 
the Comlonwealth budeetary position, then it should be careied o.t 
by the Corn enwealth eeeernment which in in a position to know 
exactly the amount avaIlable for distribution to the '.etatee and the 
edivlashilltv or otherwise oe raising atiditional rull- nue. 
Briefly simJarising tc fregoing commente„ it ms$ he 
that so far an it is able within its tnrms . of reference, the 
Grants ,00Lieeirm has adopted a policy of aszxs: . inc granta which are 
deLigned to bring the three claimant tates to a positin of 
eq.islity with te three stardard ':2tates. 	The methods of 
aw_csement wnich it has adopted to give effect te this •principle may 
not produce exactly the desired restilt, and this may have been 
oceaeioned partly by the necewity to have rect ,urse to aauessmeLt 
based on intuitive JudEement when statistical data are not available, 
and partly by the "knowledge that recommendations are subject to 
amendment by t! -Al (omonwcalth Covernment if the necescar;: revenue 
with which to :AsKe the grants to the claimant ntatoit is not available. 
Generally however, it may be said that the establishment of the 
CO•ASSiOrl rOr the purpose of maXing . r(:colendations concerning grants 
under :^ection 9. of the Constitution, and the adoption by the 
Commission of the principle of wmert according to relative financial 
needs, was a step towards the establishment of a satisfactory system 
of redistribiltiot cr the total wealth of the i:om.onwcalth. 
Although the ;20,1ss1 n has be n fuactinning for twenty years, its 
methods have been modified from time t t1e, and presumaLily this 
process veil continue, aiming always at perfection of the ap licatin 
of the as ad prAlciple under which it operates. 
Throueoat this Chapter, the aspecto of ?ederal—atato 
financial relations which stem from Cection 95 of the Constitution 
have been dealt with in isolation. 	A full appreciation of their 
importance can only be gained by consideration of this type of grant 
in conjunction with others. 
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UhIPZP2 	 Irl AND eti 	Ats1 ;R:,1 
;ec ion. 51 (ii) of the f,lonatitetior provided that the 
0ollmonwea1th farlisment should have power t6 impose taxation "but so 
as net to discrieinate belmen f';tates or parts of Statesu e 	it was 
to enjoy this power concurrently with the , fetes. 	f;o far as 
taxation of incomes was concerned, the etetes entered the field between 
1884 and 1907. 	In the years before ;=ederation, the aemunts 	. 
collected as income taxation were not very significant, but after.1901, 
with the loss uf . customs and excise revenue, they began to ascume 
greater importance in tat e budgets as a elcans of compeeeating for the 
difference between the comiunity loss aed the Treacury loss occasioned 
by transf.r of pewer to levy customs duty to the Commonwealth. 	With 
the greater financial burden placed on the Coneonwcalth„ which was 
given exclusive deferce pewers during the 1914-18 war, the Gpeelenwcalth 
entered the field in the financial year 1915-n and thereafter all 
!ilatea and the ( -omeonwealth levitl income taxation concurrently. 
MIL the severity of income taxation levied by the ntates varied 
considerably between AAtes, that Impelled by the Comelonweelth :, as 
stipulated by the Constitution, was uniform throughout Australia. 
In th years immediateleepreceding the 139-45 war, the people or 
Auetralia were paying . approximately .;50 million in income and related 
forms of taxatior, and.ef this about e16.5 million, or approximately 
one-third, was collected by the -03- onwealth. 
An a consequence of the 1939-h5 war, the Comeonwealth 
found it necessary to assume control of all income taxation. 	Vrom 
the purely financial viewpoint, increased comAtments for defence 
expenditure made it neceeary to increase revenue considerably,. whilt. 
from the broader economic viewpoint it was necessary to adopt a policy 
wh,ch involved drawing off a lsree portion of income to prevent 
pocsible inflat-nary presearea. 	Yoecver 0 effectve actien was 
hampered by the presence afthe !:;tates ir the field r ewith each :tate 
levying diferent rates of taxatien. 	Itor example, the amount of 
ate incom . taxation payable on sr income of kf.410 in 1938-,39 ranged 
from £15.35 in 1:. icterla to 05.58 in ticellsland. 	It wes aeparent 
that the severity of Coeelonweelth taxes, which was required to be 
uniform in 	:Aates, wss lielited by the highest rate levied in arty 
one State, and when this limit was reached, there weuld be a large 
untaeped source of revceue and means of control of epending in tlee 
States where tate rates were comparatively low. 	ho Co.exnewddlth, 
therefore, proposed to the rtates that it should well= complete 
control of income texatien for the deraticl of the war, and in return 
make anneal reimbursement payments to the States to compensate there 
162. 
for their loos of incom,.. 
The preliminary overtLxes by the Com:onwealth 
Covelmment were summarily rejeoted by the r , tates on the ground that - 
the proposal * if effected, would represent ari invasion of tate rights, 
A CiomIlittee was appointed by the Commonwealth CovernmeL to inveetigate 
the implicati-ns of the cortinuatien of the existing system, and its 
reco.:mndations were to the effect that the system of both :Aatec and 
the Com-nnw - alth lcvying income taxatior concurently was not in the 
best interests of ttx nation's war effort, and that a single taxing 
authority, the Comf:lonwe lth Oove-nment, should tive power to levy and 
collect income taxation for the dAistien of te war and Vir one year 
thereafter, 	and that the states should be compensated for their 
retirement from the field of income taxation. 
Legislation was paased ir. the Federal :!:arliament 
providing for a high level of taxation and -dnyment to the .:',tates of 
fixed reimbursement grants on condition that they did not impose 
taxatiAl on incomes. 	The actual amounts of the reiMbursement 
grarts were rcconmnded by the investigating Co.:ittee, and 
represented the average collections in each r4tate from that source n 
the tw47! preceding years, 1939440 and 1940-41, less the saving in 
adaini:..tration costs. 'this meant that the collections in that year 
would be perpetuated for the duration of the war at the levels operat-
ing in these years, while the severity of taxation would be equals-ed 
in all States . The i -,iplienticn of this wei. that n formerly low-taxing 
state, such as Victoria, would be contributing to 1.'eders1 Pevenue -
proportionately to the other States and yet the amount that State would. 
receive by way of reimbursement would be governed by the rates of 
taxation imposed by the Ctate in the years preceding Uniform Taxation. 
In other words, the contribution of these States increaced considerably 
with no corresponding increase in services. Tht amounts of compensat-
ion recomnended by the't,ow.ittee were: 
avow ••■■-. 	 ornamessw 	 +••••nnOm■euomrawoMo+o. Ammotwa.or•IIN 
State Gross Compensation Administration 	bet Costs 	Compensation 
..191:0 40900  
   
kiew South isles 15,991 208 15,783 
Victoria 119 6,547 
Queensland 5,982 !;,821 
South Australia 2,4'17 48 2,369 
*estern Australia 2,57C 53 2,523 
Tasmania 823 12 811 
Total 34,455 C01 33,854 
01.1.0.11.1•MoRwohows.a. 
it was also recommended that if a :tate found itself in 
financial difficulties, it should be able to claim an increased reim-
bursement and that this claim sbould be investigated by an independent 
authority which would report to the Commonwealth coernmeut. A further 
suggeettorritae--the4.-Commonwealth should be responsible for the 
401.*) 	in 4 
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oollection of arrears of taxation due to the Statea and the amounts so 
collected held as a loan to be repaid at the conclusion of the scheme. 
Lubsequently the tionLionwealth Government introduced leg-
islation which imposed taxation at a high rate, gave the Commonwealth 
priority in the collection of income tax, and undertook to compensate 
the States by amounts which differed only slightly from the recommen-
dations of the Committee. These pay :cuts were to be made only on the 
condition that the States did not levy an income tax, in addition, 
minor recommendations of the Corartittee, such as these relating to the 
collection of arrears and their retention by the commonwealth till the 
end of the scheme were adopted. The provisions relating to reimburse-
ment, which were contained in the States Grant 411come fax ReiWburse-
ment)Aet, 1942, were to operate uatil the last day of the first finan-
cial year after the cease ion of the war. Four of the States, Victoria 
Queensland, South Australia and Aesiern Australia challenged the 
constitutional legality of the legislation, but the High Court upheld 
the action of the Commonwealth not simply as a defence power which 
could be invoked in time of war, but as a constitutional right'at all 
times . 2 That is, the Court ruling made it possible for the Convionwozall 
to introduce uniform taxation as a permanent peace-time measure. 
Later in 1942 the State Governments agreed to vacate the 
field of Lntertainments Taxation to the Commonwealth for the duration 
of the war and one year after. In return the Comnonwealth was to 
reimburse the States by litmus' payments of 4765,787, which was the 
total amount the States collected in Entcrtainments Ita in 1941 -42. 3° 
The history of Lin1for4 laxation during the war can be told briefly. 
All States withdrew from the fic/d of income taxation and the amounts 
prescribed for payment as compensation in the Act, less an amount 
equal to arrears of State tax collected by the Commonwealth on behalf 
of the States, was paid to the States by the Commonwealth. . The Act 
provided that the 7reasurer of any State could inform the Comlonwealtb 
Grants Commission it it considered that payments under the 'Act were 
insufficient to meet the revenue ne.ds of the State. Tasmania made 
early application for $ revision of the base amount and from the out-
set its reimbursement grant was increased from v811,000 to 4;888,000. 
In 1944 -45, South Australia applied for an increased Frant, and its 
grant was increased by £553,000, and ir the following year, the three 
claimant States were gretted increases totalling £2,123,920. During 
the. piulriod 1942-43 to 1945-46, fixed amounts 7iere paid to five :.; tates 
as Entertainments Tax Reimbursement. .treentfland did not participate 
because no State Entertainments Tax was previoesly levied in thet Steil 
2. South Ahstralia v the Commonwealth, 6r-, C. L. 7, 373. 3. .: -,ntertainments Tax reimbursements as ;such, were di contin-ed from 1946. The amounts formerly peL. in this type of grant were includ-ed in the Tax eimbursement Grant. Subsequently, the Com,;onwealth vacated the field of Entertainments Tax from 1st. October, 1953. Three States, .iiictorbi l 'es tern Australis and Yssmsnia have since reimposed the tax. 
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:hie briefly, was the eosition that existcd at the end of 
the war. It is thought that the implications of t;niform Trantion ir 
Australia up to this stage, and the related question of the determin-
ation of the amounts of 'I'ax Feimbursements as it affected the princip-
les of Commorwealth paements to the states can safely be ignored. It 
was introduced as a war-time measure, and the original intention was 
that it should be continued 'only until one year after the cessation of 
the war, at which stage the Commonwealth and the Utates would again 
both share the field of Income and enterteinments taxation. ;alder the 
circumstances, it could be expected t' at the .aotives of the Qommori-
wealth Uoeernment were not necessarile to in roduce an equitable dis-
tribution of the a ditional revenue collected as a result of the 
transfer of income taxing pnwers fro A the Idtates, but rather it was 
intend.* that the Commonwealth should be given control of this form of 
taxation in order that it should be able to drain off eefectively 
excess purchasing power at a time when goods available for civilian 
consumption were restricted, and unfettered spending could ircrease 
inflationare pressure. jurthermore, the ability of State Governments 
to carry out thuir normal functions were restricted and the pattern 
of public finance became distorted. :or theme. reasons it has been 
thought unnecessary to examine in detail the scheme of tax reimburse-
ment am it operated during the war. 
he Commonwealth legislation relating to uniform taxation 
and Tax Peimbursement greets was due to expire on 30th June, 1947 - 
that is, the end of the first complete financial year after the end of 
the war. However, at a Premiers' Conference le Auguet, 1945, lhe 
Prime einister expressed the vitro that it was importune that the 
existing uniform system of assessment and collection of income and 
entertainments taxation should be continued subject to a review of 
reiMbersement grants payable to the States under the etates rants 
(Income Tax ReiMburaement) Act, 1942, and the atates (=rants (Entert-
ainments Tax eeimbursement) Act, 1942. The reason given by the 
Commonwealth for desiring to continue 'Uniform Taxation was given at 
a Premiere Conference in January, 1946. It was said that:- 
there are two major reasons why the continuation of uniform tax-ation is eseentiel. Ir the first place tht contihuation of uniform income taxation is necessary not otly to ensure that sufficient revenue is raised ir the most econoeical way to finance the increased commitments of the Commonwealth, but also by reason of uniformity in the ircidenee of income taxation, to assist the Commonwealth to implement successfully the requisite financial policies in connection with matters (such as the maintenance of high levels of employment) which affect the Australian economy an a whole. 
Viecondly, the fact that Comsioneealth rates of income taxation will necessarily be higher than before the war, and that priority will be aceerded to Commonwealth atsessments would, if uniform taxation were abandoned, leave to tee States a much narrower field than prodousky in which teeir ratee would operate. 
Under such conditions it stAims certain thrt some, if not ell of the States would find it •mbarreseng, if not impracticable, to 
A.222!e 
 
serrate income taxes adequate to their requirements." 4 
4 Statement issued by Cemmoneealth oovernment at the Premiers' Confer- 
mtnnA ■ 22nd - January. 1946 ; pp 2 and 3. 
In addition, the Commonwealth statement listed certain merits of 
uniform taxation so far as the taxpayer was concerned. 
All state opposed the continuation of Uniform Tnxation 
but the right of the Con nonwealth to priority of collection of taxes 
as verified by the High Court in its 1942 judgment mentioned earlier, 
ensured that the Commonwealth could impose uniform taxation upon the 
ntates by the simple exeedient of imposine taxation at rates sufficied 
to exclude the $tates from the field. Furthermore., pnymenta to the 
States could be made corditional upon their remaining out or the field 
of ineome taxation. Consequently, in the face of the Coolonwealth I s 
determination to continue Uniform -cexation, the btates had no alternat 
ive but to accept the proposals and endeavour to obtain the most 
favourab - e system of reimbursements. 	
.10 
In deter-aining such a nyatem of reimbursements, there 
were two major problems to be faced,; the determination of the total 
amount (de be distributed to all .tates pnd the dietribution of that 
amount between ,ftatee. Under the originnl a rane .ement„ a formula was 
devised which was intended to solve bat these problems automatically 
In each year for some undefined peeled. the Com-enweelth agreed to 
pay to the 3tetes, as Income lex and Friertainments .J.ax Reimbursement, 
a total sum of f40m. in 'veil of the years 1946-47 and 1947-48. The 
total amount to be paid in 1948,49 and subsequent years was to be A400 
divided by the population of Australia at 50th. June, 197 and mult-
iplied by the pepuletion at the beginning of the financial year to 
which the reimbursements relate, and the allcunt :40 o'*teined to be 
increased or decreased by half the percentage itcrease or deereeaein 
average wages between 1946-47 and the financial year in which the 
reimbursements are made. This fixed the total sinou-t to be paid by 
the commonwealth in each successive year according tc the economic 
conditions curre t at the time. 
IL the first two years, when the total reimbursement was 
fixed at 440m., the distribution *as to be propertionate to the dist-
ribution which had beet made during the war years and which was based 
on the _average e - lections 6n 1939-40 and 1940441. From 1948-49 to 
1996-57 inclusive, the distribution between the tnte5 of the total 
reimbursement amount as deterained by the method outlined in the pre-
ceding paragraph was to be detremined by the weighted mean of (1) the 
percentages indicated by the "ejusted population'. for ench tate, and 
(ii) the percntages of the 1946-47 and 1947-48 distribution, giving 
the latter a weight of nine-teethe in 1948 49, eight-tenths in 1949-50 
and thug decreesing regularly by one-tenth to one-tenth in 1956-57. 
In 1957-” and subs , quent years, the distribution was to be hnsed on 
the adjusted p pulation of each state. br the purpose of the diet-
ribution, the adjusted population was to be calculated by adding fa,ir 
times the numbur of ehillren aged 5 -- 15. yearn inclusive to the aelva* 
population of eech state at the begincing of the finsocial year in 
166. 
In wAJth tee reInbur5erarit8 arc made, end ircreasice the population so 
justed b_ an elle -arc for 'ersity, which was calculated according 
to a stetel formula. 
The original legisletion opernted ir its entiret$ for otb 
one year, 1946-47. in the follnwine yeer, the base ailount of tii0m. 
was incrensed by kern. which WPIS te be divided in the same proporticns 
as the ahem. but was not to be subject to future adjusWent aceording 
to chaages in population ate, average vaecs. Aowever, in the follow-
ing year, i948-49, the te,o emouets were eombined and the totrl was to 
be subject to future adjustment. In that year alto, the provisions of 
the Act which seecified that the bese amount was to be increased by 
half the percentage increase in wages, wee altered to provide that the 
ircreese should he ie aceoraece eith the full increese in mtees. the 
amended formula hoc operated in each of the years 194P-49 to 191-55, 
but in each or the last five evars of tAs period, the 'ax 'lamberse-
meet grart has beer supplemerted by special finarcial assistence. 
In 19y;17.5i, tee total amourt to he distributed was 
slight': more than 70m. and the jtate representatives at the annual 
ercmiers' Conference urged the .Lora..ionwealth eovernment to iecreeee the 
base amount. The Comeoewealth Fe:reed to pay to the eatea ar addit-
'veal emouet of efm. distributed In the wee proportions tie the 4;/0m. 
In eccember, 1950, the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbit-
ration increaced the basic wage in eetralia by -1 - per week and in 
recognition of the alditional burden thin placed on tate eudgets, the 
Conkx>rwealth eovernmert agreed to grnet a IlIrther elfea. to be distrib-
uted after 'having regard to the finvecial needs of the e , lejes in that 
year", 5 * In fact the tates wire required to sapple the Commonwealth 
with estimates of added cost for thA wear reseline from the rise in 
•the basic 'wee, and this formed the besis of the dietribetion. 
-ee aoplicatior of the formula in 1951-52 would have 
yielded a total reimberstAent greet Oi* epproximately 	Tei was 
substautially less than they received in tne prev;.ous year, if the 
• speciel financial assietance of 20m. Aiven in that year mai taeen 
Into consideretion. 	Ltetix were outseoken it their claim thnt 
their finaaciel requirements hnd risee aad ehat the tmounts they 
received from the remn...iunwealth should rise vccerlingly. the CoAnon-
wealth agreed to ircresse the total amount evailable for distribution 
from e86.4m. to eete0m. and of thie the former al:loutit should be distrib 
uted as determined be the formula, and the reeainingee5e.6m. wee 
allocated ae a Prcalers' Conference be mutual agreement between the 
eremiers. A eiiallar procedure wns edoted ir the fellowine year hen 
tee formula erent was “8.6m. ntT wee increased to e1e5 991a. and the 
distribution of the a dieional amount made he agreement. Again., in 
1953-1:h, 	frmule erant 	le6.5m. and wrs increased to - 142.4m. 
by the addition e special financial assistence.. In 199-!.1;, the 
formula greet of el0.5m. was increaeed to .e15Cm. 6 . 
t. 44etteurer:e eudeet epeech, 26th. Ceptember, 1951, eppendix p.10 
6. Treaserer s 'ecieeeSpeech, 18th. August, 1954, Appendix p.11. 
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would require a rovlete re-allocation of the total amount available. 
Un the other hand the Commonwealth could increase revenue 
by increasing rates of taxation and no maintain the originally propos-
ed distribution. - rom the point oe view of the emeaunity a8 a whole, 
there eould be no gnin . or lose from the adoption of such a procedure, 
but there will be some further redistribution btetweee .C.tates and betw-
een individunle in each tate. The additional revenue to be reified 
will be contributed by each etate accoreieg to its taxable capacity, 
and it is reasonable te asseme thei the wealthier : 7 tatts will contrib-
ute relatively more than the lOttee with a relatively low taxable c.p-
acity. Elmilerly, within a -fJate the recipients of the services 
supplied from the additional r•nt would not necessarily be the 
individuels who contribued most in addetional taxation. 
Applying thie to the case of surplus CoaLonwealth revenue 
it cen be seer. that I 	policy le adopted which aims at producing the 
neereut possible approach to equalite by way of Comeionwealth grants, 
the minimum amount which should be raieed by the Lemmonweelth to pro-
duce surples revenul which, if dicIrib , ted equitably between L; ates, 
will be sufeicient to bring about equality in the desired fields is 
thet aelount which, when eistributed between five States according to 
their relative financial needs will raise the standards in those 
States to those operating in the eixth :eate. Any additional aelount 
above this minimum should be dictribuced betwee all six jtates, and 
if the diutribution is sufa-iently accurate, it will not alter the 
rtlstive position m of the :Antes, but will almoot certainly improve 
the absolute levtl of services give, in all Cestee. Thus, so long as 
all ; , atels are receiving some assistance, the to!a1 amount can be nafc 
ly recLced oelow the level of the amount first determined, previded 
tat the die ribution of the new total is made iedependently of the 
initiel uistributior. lt lb apparert that if the total amount is redeccd by a certain perce tage, it would not be sufficient for the 
proposed grant to eaoh "'tate to be reduced by the came percentage, for 
if such reductions continue, the stage would never be reached where 
one Ltate received no grant, and thia is a prerequisite of the minim
total asount to be distribeted by the Commonwealth. el'his does not 
purport to say that absolutely there would be no difference in the 
standards enjoyed by the ietes, but rather that ie is possible to 
obtain equality at some level, giveri a minim.= total amount available 
for distribution. 
ehere, however, the principle of payment according to 
relative financial needs is not being invoked to its full extent, but 
rather that some rough approximation is being achieved, it weuld seea 
that the greater the amount available for distribution, the greater 
the possibility 	rcachine the optimum position of maximum eqeality. 
In the case of the smounts available for Income .ex Leimbursemene 
payments, this argument would appear to be reasonable, and that in 
this particular case, it would be safe to say that thc larger the 
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total amourt availeble for payment to the Cates, the lower would be 
the differerces in stnederds operating in the :Aates. Conseleeetly, 
In the interests of reaching this position, it would be preferable for 
t' 
	 the Goramorwealth to determine first the needs of tte states according 
to the chosen stendarda and them, if neceasary, increase taxation 
rates to meet the requirements. Since the total amoent to be paid to 
the Ltates in releibursement grants was fixed according to the operatir 
of independent influences, the Coemonwealth had no alternative but to 
raise the required amount once the base amount Wn8 fixed, and under th 
circumstances, it ie thought that this was the proper aepreach. 	-his 
formula imposed a minimum which It could be expected would permit 9 
distribution which would allow the State Covernments to operate at 
approximately the same level. So long as thie minimum was maintained, 
and it is probable that it would alter from year to year, the priecipI 
was eatisfied. The absolute level or services supplied as a result of 
the determination of the Total amount is not directly relevant, but it 
can be meetioned that by the loss of income taxing powers, the etates 
lost L'ieir most flexible source of revenue, and if in futere the gen- 
eral standards of'services were to be raiPed absoluiely in thu 
they would be reliant urrce the Commonwealth ,Slowervment for increased 
tax reimbursement, or some othev form of grants. 
ain concern, however, should be concentrated on the 
method by which the total amount decided upoe . as being available was 
to be distrieuted betweer th tatea, for it is in that field that the 
principle upon which grants are made muet be considered. As mentioned 
earlier, in the period. before 1946, the distribution was determined by 
the extraordinary circumstances prevalent at the time, easically the 
t.ntt9 w• pa compersated for the 'reasury loss Ii volyed in the transfer 
of income taxing powers, but in all cases the rmount involved was 
considerably different from the comeunity loss. The leelediate•c7fect 
of the transfer of income taxing powers was actually to reduce the 
burden of taxatiou (with a few minor exceptions) yet the amounts rec-
eived by the Ctate '2reasuries in reimbursement grants, and hence the 
level alt State services supplied, was roughly the eame as before. 
However, the extent of the reduction varied widely beteeen Srates. ?or 
example, in some.inceme ranges in the ease of the Victorian taxpayer, 
the amount te be paid under Uniform r:axation way greater than the 
amount paid In the previous year, and in some other cases, particular-. 
ly the less-populated States in the lower itcome ratges, there was 
considerable reduction. The imp3Jcation of this variation in the 
effect it the different :; .t.ates yrs thnt the r sidents of those States 
*here the reductior wac greatest continued to enjoy the same stendards 
of Stnte services with a concidereble r.duction in the severity of 
taxation, while the residents of those tttates where t%e reduction was 
least, also enjoyed the tame etendards of State services as before, bl 
contributed more by way of taxation payments. In other word, all 
other thitge being equal, the ratates which erloyed lest immediate 
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reductiors were forced to contribute more than proportirnaeely to led-
erel Revenue in relation to the size of the grant they received. Howe 
ever, it must be remembered that the conditions at the time were extra 
ordinary, and that during the next few years, the increases in taxatio 
rates generally were so rebstantial thar the differences in State 
rates which existed before the introducqoe of Uniform Taxation, becam 
became small when compared with the total burden of taxation in the 
years. 
The situation was quite different after the eed of the 
war e As a temporary expedient to assiat in the rurthering ta the 
eation's war effort, an arbitrary distribution could be cordoned, but 
when it appeared that uniform taxation wee to become a permenent 
feature of Federal-State tinacial relations it bcame neceesary for 
the distribetioe to be determined by some method acceptable to both 
the Comeionwealth and the 'etatos. The method which had been used durke 
the star pe ied had, in fact, bcee ihe adoption of the compensation 
principle, with the amount of the coventiation based on the actual 
f:ressury lone incurred. it has bc.en stated earlier, 7t1at thc adoption 
of the compersation principle involves the payment by the kqeeeoeweaIth 
to the ates of the cormaun'ty loss and then, if the Treasury loEs is 
greater than the coaeunity loss, the 'reasury can recoup the differ-
ence by levying higher rates in the fields of taxation remaining to it 
and If the cemMunity loss is greater than the Treasury loss, the 
Treasury may reMit the difference by reducine taxation in other fields 
In the particulrr circumstances pertaining to the adoption of uniform 
.taxation in Australia, it was the 'reasury loss which wee paid in Tax 
Reimbursement grants, and : therefore there could be no reallocation by 
the "ressuries, because they were place: in approximately the same 
position as before. The her! no surpluu to remit or no taxable 
capacity with whiCh to take up ary difference that may have existed 
between Treasury lots and . community loss. Before UnifOrm ,axetione 
there was probably some rough balance between the standards of serv-
ices supplied and the severity of State taxation between States. 
Income taxation collections formed's large part of total taxation 
collections, and Uierefore the introduction of uniform taxation 
brought about equality od severity of taxation in this field, but 
there.wes no corresponding alteration in standards of services supp-
lied. -hus there were two approachee which could be made in attempt-
ing to devise a new method of distribution of the total amount avail-
able. The first. arose if it wcre . decided to adopt the principle . of 
Compersation for lose in which case it.weuld be necessary to introduce 
a distributioe which would compersate the etates for corelunity rather 
than '- zolotitsury loss, and the secord, if the principle of payment accord 
In to relative financial needs were edoptcd, a complete redistributes 
we's needed to take into account the relative financial needs of each. 
t the meeting of 4remiers held in January, 1946, the 
Commonwealth tlovernment submitted.a proposal for reimbursement which 
7. See above, pp. 50 ff. 
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• was hosed or th actual :xpenditure on social services In each State. 
In essence, the Commonwealth proposal was that the grants which oper-
ated during the war should be -subject to autometic increases as social 
services experditure increased above the 1944-45 level. he effect of 
Cie proposal would have been tG make the grarts to the 4tates equel to 
the then existirg grants plus the wnole of the iccrease in eocial 
services expenditure since 1944415, up to a specified amount higher 
.t:an the lart;erst expenditure hitherto incurred by any crate, and there-
afar on a contributor. basis. In addition, ir order . to meet the 
position of thoec 5tates whose reimbursemillt . grants were relatively 
low due to relatively low . levels of social services eXpenditure, and 
hence low rates of income . tox in the - hase years 1939-40 ard 194-410 
the COmionwealth Government proposed that the reimbursement grant to 
any Z; ate should not:be leas than 91,1- per head in the year upon *Web 
the grant would be based. The proposal also included a maximum grant 
of 97/6 per head. Thus, as social services expenditure it - ench State 
increased past the maximum, A ctrtuir stage would soon be reached 
where the per capita granta would be etabllised, and the absolute 
• amounts would increase only in proportion to the populption. 
scheme 'as not acceptable to the !,:trites, and the 
alternative eunveeted was the eye tern that was eventually adopted. 
At that time, the indications of the post-war inflation which was to 
coma, were just becoming apnerer.t, and the Lltats were noncerned lest 
they should be caught with a major , portion of their income fixed at 
a time when prices and loots were Meine sharply. It was thouitt thsi 
this possibility would be provided for adequately if the total amount 
of reinecursement grents fixed for the initial year was to be increased 
proportionately ,to the increase in population, which would govern any 
•absola c increase in the real cost of providing services, and to the 
increase in average wages which would be influenced by changee in 
prices and costs. On the other hand, ,he CojelonwealtEl Governm(nt was 
fearful. Iht if the'ntatt:s were giver too much by way of reimbursemen1 
grentsri they could •ocentuate my inflationary' pressure that might 
exist, and therefore it was thought desirable that the automatic in-
crenses be restricted to the increasee in the population plus only 
halftle increase in overage wages. 
;-o far as the dietribution or the total amount was con-
cerned, it would aAaear that from tile outset the Com -rionwealth Govern-
ment recognised both the principle, of relative financial needs and 
the principle of payment as compensetion for loss. Their eu[.:estion 
•called for the continuetion.of the existing reiMbursement grants, 
which were related TO the compensation principle, fe.d their stibselleeni 
alteration aecoleitn to expehditre on social se:rvices, 	gives a 
hint of recognitior of relative financial needs. That scheme wns not 
accolta!)10 to the States, although it wee 1.alired that it was eithin 
he power of the Co ,:elonwealth to impose upon the IAAtes an.y scheme of 
reimburooment it chose. 
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It was generally reco .Tased thet under the distribution 
which had operated between 1942-43 and 194f,--46, several States, and 
particularly eictoria end fismania were receivine considerably lese 
then if the total aeouw. had been divided proporti nately to the 
contribati:n made by those States or certain other measure such as 
telt relative sizes of population in each etatc.. This required correc-
tioe, but the problew to be faced was tnnt the amount ievolvel, be.any 
measure was, iv the case of Victoria, so sUbstantiel that the sudden 
increase le revenue at the expcnse oe other elates might cause cliff- 
• icultios in the managemert of tate einaeces for a few years. -eller.- 
fore it was proposed that the subetitueio: ,f the new method of dist-
ribution for the old should take place-graduallye This led to - tee 
adoption of the procedure of basing the distribution during the first 
tee years on a coebination of both metheds. 8 Thic again was to be 
but a. peeing phase and it wes intended that the distrebueion according 
to the adjusted population alone would operate to the full extent by 
19e6-57. It le informeteve to consider the percentage diatribution 
of the eetal as it . atood in 1952-53, when 50 e of the total available 
was divided according to the oreginal eistributon and 50% according 
to the adjusted population, compared with the percentage distribution 
ie tb.. total amount had been divided eceordire to the original dietrib 
ution, or a per capita dirtribetioe. These three possibilitiescome 
pared with the acgial division, are ihown in the following table:- 
Dleeeleelleneof Tax Reimbursement Lent letween etatee e 
State 	Actual 	Original . 	AdjUsted 	Per Distribution Distribution Population Capita 
■••••••■00,1■MO,.ft . 
New eouth tales 39.99 41.19 38.71 39.49 
Victoria 23.99 22.1 25.82 27.09 
lueensland . 16.08 16.50 1t-.66 14.37 
south Australia 8.59 8.65 8.54 8.58 
kept. Australia 8.04 8.6 7.2 6.96 
Tasmania 3.31 3.0 1., 3.57 3.51 
100. 100. 100. 100. 
•••••■••■•••••■■•........ 
eroe the poivt of view of analysis, re ard should be giv-
en mairly to the formula dictributtn e that is, the distribution acc-
ording to tee adjus ed population - for it is this aspect of :az 
E•eimbursement erants which could beexpected to influence Federal - 
State financial relations permanently. :ender the scheme which was 
finally adopted, th, basis for distribution of the total nmoeet was to 
be the populalion iv each etate , a1justed for di fcrencee in the ni)mb-
er of children in the school-age group, e - 15, aed tee relaLive dens-
i(y of the States, er the area of t e etates which were socially 
served. It can be appreciated that the originel proposal of the 
Commonweelth eovernment that Tax leeimeursement erants should be relat-
ed to expenditure on social services was being continued in this 
8. Bee above, p.W. 
4f; 
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formnle with the significant difference that the Comlonwealth propos-
ition had been that paements ehould he 'elated to nctual expenditure, 
with a provision. es to the maximum amouut payable, whereas in the lat-
ter propocalthey were to be related to differencer in expenditure on 
social services which could be expected to arise because of fundnment-
al d!fferencee in the operntion of factors which infleence the level 
of expenditure on the provision of 'meta serviees in each tate. 
ender the former method, the situatioy could arise where 
a Stete which is favourable situated as regards reletive costs of pro-
viding a certain standard of services could raise its standnrds above 
those operating in other ;totes and.still operate within the maximum 
provision or the proposal, whereas anc:ilher $74tate might be spending at 
a rate well above the level necersery to obtain the meximum reimburse-
ment, and yet be providing a lower standard of services than enjoyed 
in the more fnvourably situated tate. :Inder the second alternative, 
which we eventualle adopted, the possibility of this eventuality was 
taken into consideration, in par* . at least. 	:he re jor criticism of 
the use of the adus•ed pcpulation to eetermine the distribution be-
twee tee Gtatca f the otal amount availulble is that it relates only 
to factors influencing expenaiture in part of the rield of g -verement 
expenditure. ilot'onle did it ienore a eide field of eocial services 
expenditure, but it comeleteie disregarded expenditure on serviette 
other than social services. .everAlele.e, it emot be acknowledged as 
a considerable advaece or. the adoption o the principle of paeent as 
corn cnsation for lose. However, ie must be criticised becnuse it went 
ohle part of the wee - oards adoption of the principle or paemeat 
eccordine to relative financial ne,,ds.e 
The use of the formula method does have the advantage 
that it proposed that after the expiration of ten dears, the distrib-
ution would be completely divorced from the pa. meets made as compen-
setion for loss incurred by the Clates et the time when income taxing 
powers were transferred to the Comelonwealth. • it is, hcwever, open to 
criticiteu on the grounds that there would be .a long period before the 
dietribution would be made entirel.. accoeding to the adjus!:ed populnle 
ion. The reason for this was that at the time whey the formula was 
introduced, it was anticipated that the total amount pa. able from 
year to ear would increase slowly, and that an elteration, if made 
suddenly, might cause spine disruption to the pattern' of tate finan-
ces. i.'or that reasoe ir. was decide to spread the alteration over a 
period of ten years. It wee soon apparent, however, that the effect 
of inflation would be to ceuse the amounts paeable to the &tatea to 
increase rapidly, and that the transition period could have been very 
much shorter. The ,etate which stood to lose moat from the introduct-
ion of the formula method of die rioution war, New South *ales, and 
between 1947048 and 1952-53, the grant to that Ctate under the form-
ula rose from e18.3m. to 4.43.5m. Had the distribution in 1952,53 
beee according to the adjusted population and.completelJ divorced 
from the former method of distribution according to the loss which the 
State suffered at the time when taxing powers were transferred, New 
South Aeles would have received Sh2.2m. Thus, no vc,r,: , great hardship 
would have been inflicted had the change ben completed by 1952-53. As 
soon as it was seen that the amounts involved ere increasing rapidly, 
the period of transition could have been shortened consoderably. 
It has been pointed out previouel 9  that if the principle 
of pment accorling to relative financial needs is to be adopted, it 
Is impossible to reduce the distribution of urplus Commalealth rev ,* 
onus to a eimpl,e formal", and It lo here that the inadequacy of the 
'listing method of determining income tax reimbursements is revealed. 
The financial needr of a State are influenced by a: multitude of fact-
ors, and if a true measure of their influence is to be Obtained, it is 
essential that evei;; one be taken into consideration. Some of the 
factors cannot be subjected to statistical measurement and therefore 
swat be ignored or treated inadequately in at formula, no matter how 
carefully devised. .Purthermore„ the relative importance of each 
changes from tie to time and no aceount CRP be taken of this unless 
the formula is revised after it has been In operation for a comparat-
ively short period of ttme. Thug,. it is evident that if any formula 
is devised for the distribution of the total amount available for pay-
ment of income tax reimbursement grants it will be highly complicate 
if it is to be at all satisfactory for the purpose, and at best it wil 
ignore some Important factor* which should be taken into considers tier 
and will require modification after it has been functioning for a 
short period VD take account of alteration in the basic conditions. 
he formula used in calculating Tax Reimbursement grants 
suffers from all these defects, but it must be remembered that its 
intention was not necessarily to bring about equality between the 
States, but rather to iron out certain inequalities which had arisen 
from the introduction of uniform taxation. Nevertheless, uniform 
taxation did offer an excellent opportunity for the introduction of 
the principle or pa sent according to relative financial needs, and 
to some extent the formula which was adopted was a step in the right 
direction. So far as the three claimant States were concerned, to 
the extent that the methods used by tne Commonwealth ';rants Commiss-
ion brought about equality between each of the these three States and 
a standard equal to the average operating in the three standard 
States, it was immaterial which method was adopted for determining 
the distribution. In the claimant States * . the Tax:Reimbursement 
Grant is taken into Consolidated Revenue account, and thereby influe-
nces the budget result upon which the first approximation to the 
special grant is based. However„. there is no such guarantee it; the 
case of the three standard States, and it is here that the Tax Reim-
bursement Grants could gay an Important part in producing the des-
ired equali4.. The only factors taken into consideration were the 
9. See above, p.88. 
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numbers of children In the school-ege-group and the density of Ate pop 
ulation in each 'State, and the Influence of these two factors is prob- 
ably only a minor portion of the total forces at work to produce a 
complex pattern of financial needs. It is suggested that these two 
factors were chose. 	their influence was the most apparent 
cause of differences in the ability of State Governments to provide a 
given standard of social services at a cost similar to that incurred 
in all Dtatcs oi the average, and secondly because it was possible to 
*p17 statistica2 measurement to the operation of these two factors. 
there was no doubt that a more satisfactory result could be obtained 
by extending the scope of the formula to include other factors, but 
the difficulties involved in their inclusion would be too great for 
solution in a simple formula. 
It Is apparent that while it at intended that the distr-
ibution be made by reference to a formula which will operate automat-
ically, it can safely be asserted that it win be impossible to achieve 
a distribution that will satisfy the principle of payment according to 
relative financial needs,. The most that will be achieved win be a 
hybrid which has the advantage of rejecting the principle of payment 
as compensation for lose r_ but which goes only part of the way towards 
adopting the best possible alternative. Probably the only satiefactm 
method which can be used to put into effect the principle of finaaciai 
needs- is for the distribution to be determined as a recommendation to 
the Federal Government by a body of independent expertswho can devote 
their full time and resources to the problem of measuring the relative 
financial needs of each Stet*. It would be quite compatible with the 
principle for the total amount to be decided by some arbitrary method 
such as according to Commonwealth budget or general economic policy, 
or even by an automatic formula, provided that the distribution is 
made according to relative financial needs. 
The teak -which would confront such a body of experts 
would be very great. It would differ from the operation of the pres-
ent Grant Commlosion in that it would be required to examine, not only 
the relative positions of the States, but also the absolute levels of 
services provided, severity of taxation, etc. in all States. To a 
large extent, its operation would probably be of the nature of trial 
and error until some sort of picture was formed, and thereafter its 
function would be to adjust the existing picture to conform to changes 
in the relative financial positions of the States. This is probably 
an over-simplification of the problems which would face such a body, 
but generally it is thought that it would probably yield the most 
satisfactory results in the long run. The attainment of a reasonable 
accurate distribution would probably take some years to perfect, but 
with each successive year it would be approaching nearer and nearer tc 
the optimum as statistical techniques were perfected and the members 
of the body gained more knowledge of the problem. The composition 
and organisation of such a body which would best suit the purpose Ras 
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10 already be , n outlined in Pert 1, and there is no need to elaborate at 
this stage. It will be given further consideration when coordination 
of all types of grants is being considered in Part 3. 
Thu releining matter relating to income tax reimbursement 
grants which should be treated in detail is concerned with the distrib 
ution of amounts which have been paid to the States as "Special Finan-
cilia Assistance." In each year since 1947-48, the Commonwealth 
Government has supplemented the total amount of the grant which should 
have been paid to the States according to the eormu la, by substantial 
sums. In 1951-52, this amounted to £33.6m. and in 1952-53 to 1.27.1m. 
In 1953-54, the additional amount was £2 .9m and in 1954-51,, L19.5m. 
The distribution of these amounts was decided by the Commonwealth Oove 
ernment after consideration of opinions of the several State Premiers. 
7.:he distribution of the total amount of special financial assistance, 
compared with the actual dtetrib.tion of the toteI anoune available ex 
reimbursement determined according to the formula is shown In the 
ratio:Ping tabee for two repreaeetative years:- 
Distribution of Tax Reimbursement Grants by Percenteges - 1951-52 and 1952-53. 
411■•■■••■ Original 	Adjusted State 	iletribution Population Actuel Tax 	Special 	Actual special Reimburse- 	FinaacialTax Re.Financial /sent 1951/2 Ass. 'i/2192/3 Ass. 45E4 
L 	Z. W. . 4 1.19 38.79 40.27 38.94 40.08 38.74 
Victoria  25.82 23.19 27.17 23.98 26.20 
eueensland 16.50 te.66 16.19 14.91 16.08 15.50 
Sth. Aust. 8.65 8.54 8.59 8.31 8.ee 8.49 
4. Aust. 8.46 7.62 8.11 7.12 8.00 7.75 
'17e5mania 3.05 3.57 3.25 2.55 3.31 3.32 
Total 100. 	100. 	4 	100. 	100. 
e.rom this table it can be :wee that the additional amount 
was not distributed according to any of he poseibilitiee arising from 
the formula. For example, in 191-52, Victotia received 23.98- of the 
total amount of 4108.8m. se determined under the formula. In that 
year 50* of the total amount was divided according to the proportions 
which operated during the pre-1946 period of uniform taxation, referr-
ed to for simplicity, as the origihal distribution, when Victoria's 
share was 22.15„ and the other 50i, according to the adjusted populat-
ion, with Victoria receiving 25.77-. Of the additional amount avail-
able in that year, Victoria reeeived 26.28A, and hence it is apparent 
that the distribution was not in accordance with ar* of the predeterme 
ined messurts. In fact, the distribution was decided during the 
course of aeremiers' Confererce af;er the eriram einistcr had announc-
ed that the specified amou . t would be made available by the Common,- 
weelth, and reguestee that the Premierc neree between themselveo as to 
its distribution. The diCribution was a compromise eed followed 
roughly the patern of the division of the total tax reimbursement 
grant proper. Special consideration we given to Victoria which had 
10. 14se above, pp. 82 ff. 
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suffered most from the adoption of the compe ration principle in the 
earlier years. 
The distribution of the additional amount by this method 
cannot be supported on any grounds. If it assumed that the major am-
ount as determined by the formula, has been apportioned between the 
States according to some design, then the division of the additional 
amount according to some other criterion can only act as a disturbance 
to the anginal petty% Farthermore, the distributioa was made by 
the bargaining or political leaders who, at this stage, could not be 
Interested in the principles involved, but only in gaining the maximum 
financial assistance for their own State,. Even It they were advised 
in their actions be public servants acting in the capacity of expert 
edvisers, there is still the probability of bias influencing decisions 
in these matters. If the procedure can be condoned at all, it must be 
on the grounds of urgency. The meeting at which the extra amount whid 
the Commonwealth will make available is announced after the commence-
ment of the financial year to ehic:, the grants relate, and the decisi-
ons must be made at short notice in order that State Governments shoUU 
be in a position to prepare their budgets for presentation to Peril,- 
merit early in the financial year. Nevertheless, it cold be a simple 
matter for the additional amounts to be paid ir the same manner as the 
major amount. If it is intended that the p-inciple of payment accord-
ing to relative financial need is to be followed, and the total amount 
to be disbursed is altered, the original distribution should be disre-
garded and needs recalculated on the basis Of the new amount. 
In the came of income tax reimbursement grants, however, 
the principle of financial needs has only been partially adopted. 
Abenelity can be produced only to a limited extent, and the equality 
can easily be offset by inequalities in other fields. Under the part-
icular circumetances, it is suggested that there would be no signific-
ant disturbance to the intended effect, if the editional amount had 
been distributed in proportion to, if not the adjusted population, at 
least the original distribution and adjusted population together. Of 
the two alternatives, it is suggested that the adjusted population 
method would have been better, as its application to the distribution 
of the additional amount would have lessened the effect of the long 
transitionary period which could have been shortened with advantages. 
It should be mentimed that it is not necessary to assoc-
iate the supplementary grants with income tax reimbursement grants. 
Technically there is no direct connection between them, although it 
was claimed by the itates that the amounts as determined b s the form-
ula wcre insufficient for them to continue State services at the 
$tandards . ths* had been able to afford in previous years because of 
the effects of inflation. It was stakd that the States were unable 
to expand revenue to meet higher costs because their most flexible 
source of income had been taken over by the Commonwealth. In recoe-
nising the claim, the Sem 4lonwealth automatically placed the special 
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financial assistance payments in the same category as income tax rt-
imbursement grants. The are also similar in that they are only pay. 
able on condiflon that the States do not levy en income tax, and the; 
are both unconditional in that they are block grants which may be tal 
en into revenue and used for whatever purpose the States choose. 
So far as the conditional nature of the grants is colleen 
ned, it can be sail that since the conditions apply, not to the 
manner or purpose for 'bleb the grant is used, but to the unlertakini 
given by the States not to levy an income tax, there is no serious 
limit•tion on freedom of action by the States. It has been **Bartel l 
that a grant from the Commonwealth Government to the State Oovernmeni 
should be unconditional in order that the States say retain_ the max - 
ism degree of independence, but with the type of condition which has 
been applied to tax reiWbursement grants, there is a differtnt prin-
ciple involved. At tin: outset, when uniform taxation was first in-
troduced, this wee thought necessary to enable the Commonwealth to 
conduct its defence policy with maximum efficiency, and it W9O contim 
tied in the post-war period because of increased Commonwealth commit-
ments sad the necessity to levy a higher rate that. in pre-war years. 
An associated reason, which WAS not specifically stated but which was 
implied at the time was that the Cowionwealth Government desired to 
maintain its ovLrall control of State experviiture in the interests of 
the economy as a whole, and in particular to prevent the occurrence o 
inflation. Apart from this, the Commmiwealth Government would have 
been quite justified in retaining uniform taxation purely for the pur 
pose of raising sufficient revenue to enable it to make grants to the 
States of nufficient magnitude to enable the dietribution to bring 
*bout equality between the Statea in any chomen fields. In fact, thi 
may have been one of the motives which prompted the Commonwealth to 
retain uniform taxation, but if such was the case, it would have been 
politically advisable to give the reason in those words. 
In 1953.54, the total amount of assietance given to the 
States by the Commonwealth in all forms was 11,224m. and of this, £142m 
represented tax reiMbursement grants and special financial assistance. 
Had uniform taxatibn not operated in that year, Commonwealth grants 
would have tots/led £82m. and in view of the size of the ntste budget 
approaching £500m.„ it Is doubtful whether t820. would have been sufZ 
Icient to produce any degree of equality when distributed according t ■ 
relative financial needs. :Furthermore, the abandonment of uniform 
taxation would, from the point of view of the principle of relative 
financial needs, have been a retrograde step l: that uniformity in 
one important field, namely severity of inclose taxation, would have 
been lost. With uniform taxation, it is safe to assume that the burd-
en of taxation in spread fairly equitably throughout all States. Ad-
mittedly, there still remains a large field of taxation in which the 
States operate, but its significance is relatively small. In 1953-541 
11. See above, p.96. 
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State taxation revenue, where differences in severity can arise, tot-
alled 00e6 while Coarionwealth taxation, which must be uniform through 
out all Statel, yieldvd revenue totalling 469Sm. of which t528m. was 
revenue from income taxation. It can be seen, therefore, that the 
possibility of considerable differences in severity of taxation *rift-
ingwhile uniform taxation operates in remote. However, if taxing pow-
ers were to be returmed to the States, it is more than probable that 
the severity of taxation between States would again be different, and 
hones the inequality to be corrected by the distribution of Common* 
wealth revenue would be increased, and the means whieh . the Commonwealth 
could use for this purpose would be reduced. Consequently, it would 
appear that, apart from any other considerations * the present method. 
of uniform taxation su,d income tax reimbursement grants is desirable 
merely as a means of providing the Commonwealth with sufficient 
surplus revenue to permit an alloacation between the Statts which *Todd 
permit equality of standards of Services and severity of State 
taxation and other charges. 
Summarising the implications of uniform taxation and tax 
relebursement grants as they affect the adoption of a principle upon 
which grants are made. to the States, it may be said that it intro-
duction offered the possibility that a distribution of surplus revenue 
would be possible which vould bring about greater equality between the 
States. In the initial years of its operation, it can be appreciated 
that because of the peculiar aireumstances operating at the time * no 
serious attempt was made to do more than maintain the revenue posit,- 
ions of the States irrespective of the alterations in the relative 
burdens. of taxation. In 1946 * however, when it appeared that miform 
taxation was to become a permanent feature of Federal-State financial 
mlations In Australia, it should have been possible to introduce a 
method of distribution of the total amount avaialable according to the 
principle of relative financial needs. The formula which was intro-
duced went only part of the way towards achieving this position, and 
while it htd some advantages over the principle of payment as compen-
sation for loss, if the principle of financial needs is to be adopted, 
the only successful method of determining an adequate distribution 
seems to be by the appointment of a body of experts who are fitted to 
determine the relative financial needs of each tate, and who would 
advise the Commonwealth Government on the best Way to distribute sur-
plus revenue between the States, The necessity for the appointaetnt 
of such a body has been accentuated by the practice which hat grown 
up in recent years of distributing any amounts additional to those 
indicated by the operation of the formula by agreement between State 
Premiers. Such a procedure can be detrimental to a planned distrib-
ution according to relative financial needs. Further reference will 
be made tn the manner in which a satisfactory solution may be reached 
in Fart3. 
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States spending £1,500,000 for the same purpose. Thus the original 
payment was place on a permanent basis and the Commonwealth contrib-
ution increased by et50,000 per annum. 
During the early years of the depression of the 1930 1 s, 
the States found difficulty in meeting their Obligations in Uis field 
due to the economic stringency of the times, so in 1931 - 1 the agreement 
of 1926 was altered to provide that for the remainder of the ten-year 
period, the Commonwealth should pay . to the States an amount equivalent 
to 2id. per gallon customs duty and lid. per gallon excise duty on all 
petrel entered for hoes consumption in each year .  Vo corresponding 
contribution was required of the States. The immediate effect of this 
change was to reduce the total amount payable from £2m. in 1930-31 to 
C1,812,000 in 1931-32, but by 1933-34 the fixed amount of £2m. which 
had previously existed was exceeded by il2QCI,000. The distribution 
between Statea was continued as before. The agreement was renewed in 
1937 for n further period of ten years but the Commonwealth contribut-
ion was increased to the equivalent of 3d. per gallon customs and 26. 
per gallon excise duty on all petrol entered for home consumption. The 
distribution was also changed slightly, and under this agreement, 
Tasmania was to receive 9% of the total, and the remaining 951; was to 
be shared between the other five Staten en the basis of three-fifths 
according to pOulation and two-fifths according to area. 
A new agreement was made in 1947 under the Connor:wealth 
Aid Roads and Works Act, which continued the existing agreement for a 
further three years and also provided that the total amount as deter-
mined arse to be inereased by a further kits. In 1948-49, this extra 
amount was increased to £2m., and in 1949-50, to Om. In that year, 
a new agreement vas made to cover the next five years. The fetal am-
cunt was to be determined as the equivalent of 66. per gallon customs 
and 3;6. per gallon excise duty on petrol entering the country for 
home consumption and the distribution was to be as before. In 1954 to 
legislation was again amended to provide that the total amount payable 
to the States should be equivalent to 76. per gallon on both customs 
and excise duties on petrol. The immediate effect was to increase the 
total amount of the grant from £17.34. in 1953-54, to L24m. in 19547.55 
The following table shows the total amounts paid in certain years: 
Amounts Paid by the Commeawealth as rederal Aid k0562 
Year 
viomossw. 
Amount Cm. Year Amount km. 
1922-3 to 1925-6 1.75 1947-48 
eaerr...4••■• 
6.3 
1926-7 to 1930-1 2.0 1948-49 7.6 
1931-32 1.8 1949-50 9.3 
1932-33 2.2 1950-51 14.1 
1937-38 	' 4.1 1951-52 15.2 
1946-47 4.8 1952-53 15.6 
1954-55 t,est.) 24.0 
.....-411.1.014•IM*1.1101MOSS'alell•LOaaw• 
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Tie distribution of the total amount, which has operated 
with the minor exceptim of the proportion payable to Tasmania, since 
the inception of thio type of grant, gave the following amounts to 
each State in 1953-54:— 
New South Wales - £4,685,000 south Australia - 41,828,000 
Victoria 	- *2,892,000 Western Australia- 0,191,000 
queenrland 	- 0,191,000 Tasmania 	831,000 
The method which hes been adopted to determine the portion of the totO 
*mount which each State receives has some merits. The object of the 
grant was , t) place each State on an equal footing so far as develop-
ment of its roads system was concerned, but later the Commonwealth 
agreed that portion of the grants should be used for repair and main-
tenance purposes. Uowever, the mess*re used to determine needs for 
finance for roads development and maintenance does not appear to be 
very precise. The simple measure which takes into eccount only pop-
lation and area leaves much to be desired, for the size of the popula-
tion may be unrelated to the need for roads and there may be large 
parts of the States which have no road requirements whatsoever, as, fa 
example, large parts of estern Australia. Unless the error arising 
from the operatim of th4se factors is proportionate between States, 
the measure which has been adopted will give only a rough approximat-
ion to the perfect remit, 
rurthermore, such a measure gives no consideration to the 
ability of the .3tates to meet road development and maintenance coats 
from their own revenue. The main source of funds for these purposes 
at the present time in most States is taxation on motor vehieles, and 
the amoant received will depend on the number of motor vehicles regis-
tered in each f)tate and the rate; of taxation on those vehicles. In a 
densely populated State which is highly industrialised, the number of 
vehicles will be proportionately greater, and the need for funds for 
road maintenance purposes proportionately amaller than those of a state 
with a large area and a small population which is well dispersed. 'he 
measure used b# the Commonwealth in distributing the total amount Rival 
/able assumes that the number of vehicles and hence taxable capacity 
in this field, is proportionate to the population of each State, and 
that the need for roads varies with the area* of the States. Neither 
of these assumptions is strictly valid, but nevertheless it is probab-
le that the method used has given a result which is fairly close to 
the distribution which would have been achieved if every factor had 
been taken into consideration. The most pleasing feature of the 
method is that it bears no relationship to the amounts w;ich the indivi 
idualls of each State contribute it, customs and excise duties. Assuming 
that petrol consumption varies directly with the number of motor veh-
icles registered, it can be shown that the people of Victoria 
contributed approximately four times the co4tribution of the oeople 
of *cistern Australia, yet in 1951-52, the grant to 4estern Australia 
was greater than that paid to Victoria. 	Thus it is apparent 
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of each State rather than the relative amounts contributed by the 
residents of each :Aate. 
(2) 	*08Pltall BenefilLAEMEM t 
In 195,194  an aiTeement was reached between each Ztate 
and the Commonwealth, whereby the Commonwealth agreed to pay to the 
States the equivalent of six shillings per de.; for each occupied bed 
in public hospitals on condition that no charge was made to patients 
in public 'Girds of the hospitals, and the fees in non-public ',wards 
reduced accordingly. 	At the outset, only portiLm of the 
total amount wee t,c) be used for meinterAr.ce costs, while the remainder 
as to be used for capital expenditure. As a ri:sult of repreaentation 
by the States in 1947, the Commonweslth agreed that the whole of the 
amount of six shillings per occupied bed per day could in future be 
used for maintenance purposes. As from 1st 471117, 1 948, the amount was 
increased to the equivalent of eight ehillings per occupied bed per da 
for both public and non.14b11a beds. Prom tht outset, the comma 
also applied to private haepitale which were oleo required to re4uee 
fees to patients by the amount of the subsidy from the Corfraorweelth, 
but thane payments are not relevant to a consideration of financial 
relations between the Commonwealth and State Governments' 
In Pebruary, 1951, the Commonwealth gave notice of its 
intention io terminate the agreement at the earliest possible date 
according to the terms of the legislation. The Commonwealth and gar 
Hospitels Benefits Agreements Act provided that eighteen months notic 
of termination should be given, and therefore the arrangements were 
due to expire in august, 1952. In that year, new agreements were en-
tered into between the Commonwealth and the States under which the 
States agreed to charge at least eighteen shillings per day for publJ 
hospital beds. Of this charge, the Commonwealth agreed to subsidise 
patients to the extent of eight shillings per day, and a further foul 
shillings per day if the patiehnt is a member of an approved hospital; 
benefits society which pays benefits of at least six shillins per da; 
Thus, in the case of an insured person, there would be no direct cos' 
involved, as combined Commonwealth and insurance payments *Laid tots: 
eighteen shillings per day. 	here the patient has not insured, he 
would be required to meet chargea of ten ehillings per day, and the 
Commonwealth the remaining eight shillings. The revenue of the hasp 
itala would therefore be Increased by at least ten shillings per day 
as a results of the new arrangement, although the grant from the 
Caunwealth would only be increased by four shillings in certain caa 
So far as the amount paid by the Comnonwealth to the 
State is concerned, there is little difference between the schemes 
which operated before and after '952, with the exception that the ca 
ditions upon which the payments are now made are more s_vere than thi 
which prebiously governed these payments, and therefore the scheme o 
payment since its inception up to the present time can be treated in 
general terms. From the mint of view of principle upon which the 
paement of grants is redo, it le cc erne only with the relative am-
ounts paid to each State. The amount rhich each ntatereceives, is 
determined solely by the number of patients treated end the length of 
their stay in hospitel. The principle of payment as compensation for 
the relative amount contributed to Federal revenue does not arise, Mit 
as in other cease nf a similar nature, the principle of payment aecor-
diug to relative finaneial needs has been only partially adopted. It 
Oft VS expected that different:8 ir the ro4tive costs of eupplying 
boeritel dervice- between the States ini12 dei-evd el the relmtive Jracl- 
demo of aickneet:,, dieetee etc, the existence of private hespitaI 
facilities, the relative diatributiov of the powlations, end Us• av 
(wage size of hospitals in each State. Of these factors, the effects 
OR the first tltree will be reflected in the number of bed-days in 
public hospitals in each State, and to this extent the method of det-
ermining the reimbursement adopted by tie Commonwealth appears to be 
satisfactory. However, no recognition le given to the fourth, and it 
La possible that this le the mese of considerable difference in the 
relative (met of providing the same standards of service in the Steam 
In the case where a Ptatc has e large population concent-
rated in e few ceLtres„ it is poesitle to orgeniee all hospitals so 
that they operate at the most efficient level. It could be expected 
that as the size of a hospital grows, the cost per patient per day 
will fell until, at a certain size, costs will reach a minimum, and 
from then onwards as sire increases, rtlative costs will also increase 
Thus the tothl cost win be iininilse if all hospitals are of an opt-
imum size. In s State with a small populatt7n, however, it will be 
impossible for this state of affairs to be organised, and it is quite 
conceivable that all hospitals will be leee than this optimum. Thus, 
if there is any special need in the finances of r State arising from 
the operation of this factor, it is not recomised in the present 
scheme of Hospitals enefito Payments. Nevertheless, the method adop-
ted does take into consideration a laree part of differences in rel-
ative financial need arising from the provision of this service, and 
it has the advantage that no considtration is given to the relative 
amounts which the residents of each State contributed to the revenue 
of the Commonwealth in determining the amounts to be peidto each etete• 
The scheme can be criticised, however, on the grounds of 
the conditions upon which the .grant is made. The amount which the 
patient is now required to pay for the service, either directly or 
th-ough an insurance scheme, is uniform throughout all States. If 
the principle of relative financial needs is being adepted, than this 
assumes that the ability of persona to pay for even a portion of the 
cost of the service they receive is uniform throughout all States. 
This is Obviously not so, and by any measure, the ability of the res-
idents of a State aneh as Tasmania to pay for the services they re-
ceive will be less than the Chilily of the residents of a State such 
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as New "outh "ales. To this extent, the insistence of the Commonwealtt 
on e minimum charge of eighteen shillings per day per bed it public 
wards, has tended to create more differences in the net standards of 
services received in each State. This is not intended as a criticism 
of the National Health Scheme an such, but rather as a criticism of 
the requirements being the same in each State. Consideration should 
also be given to the relative ability of residents of each Otate to 
provide part of the services from their own resources. 
(3) MSDIALANDIWALBSUalts 0Plints.  
T.0 aentel Hospitals 411010 Agreemente were between the 
Commonwealth and each State separately during the years 1948 and 4949, 
and were to operate for a minimum period of ten years.' Under these 
agreements, the Commonwealth itovernment undertook to pay to the States 
a fixed amount for each patient day in mental hospitals on condition 
that the States ensure that no means test is imposed upon, and that no 
fees are charged in rcspect of any patient in a mental hospital in 
that State. The amount payable to each State was the amount collected 
by the State for the provision of this service in the period prior to 
the introduction of the Agreement. The amounts ranged from 8d per 
day in Western Australia to 1/2 per day In Victoria and have continued 
unchanged until the present time. 
The effect of the introdulction of this scheme was to piaci 
the States, so far as net mental costs were concerned, in approximately 
the same position as before, except that henceforward their incomes 
w -lald be fixed whereas before the agreements were instituted, the 
authorities could raise charges to meet rising costs. The only con-
cern of the Commonwealth was to provide that mental hospital services 
should be given fr,o of cost to patients in each State and no regard 
was paid to the possible reasons why revenue from charges differed 
between States. or the name reasons that were mentioned in the case 
of public hospital services, 1 relative costs of the provision of ment-
al hospital services would vary between States, and therefore in det-
ermining the amount that would be paid to each Stilt.), the Commonwealth 
should have been interested in differences in costs rather than diff-
erences in revenue, if it was intended that the principle of relative 
financial needs should be used. As the position stands at present, 
the relationship between costs and revenue which existed in 1948 will 
be continued so long as the agreement is in foi.co. 
It ia interesting to compare the coat of the provision 
of mental hospital services per patient per day with the amount of 
subsidy per patient per day in each State in 1951-52: 
Cost per day 	,tibeidy per day Hew South Wales 	16/5 1/. Victoria 13/9 1/2 Queensland 12/5 	-/I0 South Australia 10 -./10 Western Australia 	UV- -/8 lemaanie 	17/3 
-011.1.1.1■•■••••111.11•14/0. OHO OMAN. 1011.1.41.11.06 1.•■■••■•■•■ 
1. See alsovet, p.184. 
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It cen be seen that the Commonwealth subsidy represents 
only a small portion of the total cost in each State, and that there 
is little relationship between the cost and the amount received. or 
example, in Victoria the coat wes 13/9 per patient per day and the 
subsidy 1/2 per patient olpr day, while in WesternAustralia the figures 
were 14/- per day and -/8 per day respectively. If the payment was 
according to relative financial needs, and the same standards of ser-
vices are being supplied in each State, it could be expected that the 
cost and the subsidy per patient per day would vary uniformly between 
the States. As it stands at present, the method of distribution of 
this portion of surplus Commonwealth revenue is perpetuating the 
inequalities which existed before 1948. 
(4) DIsigiajdol_k_z,osucid 
The Tuberculosis Act (1948), provided that the 
Comonweelth could enter into an arrangement with a tate for the 
provision b; the tate of services and facilities for the diasTosis, 
treatment er r'. contra] of tuberculosis. 	Any such arratvement 
was tr: provide f r t%e reimbursement of the State by the CoritLon-
wc:alth in reupeet of ceQ'tall exi>enOitare by the state on or after 
1st. July, 1949, in the provisirm of land, buildings, furrishings 
and equipment for diagnosis, treatment and ontrol of tuberculosis, 
and net maintenance expenditure to the extent that it exceeds 
maintenance expeAltlre incurred during 1947448 for CA: same 
purpose. 	Areements were made with all 7tates in 1949 and 
1950, and peymen , e have cnntinued since that tine. 	Again, this 
was a fu7-, ction of government which resided sole] with the tates, 
and if the ComAonwealth wised to play an41- part, it had to be 
through the arency of the Ststei. 	The method which the 
Comenwealth chose to ensure that the aervice was given in all 
States was this form of subsidisation. 
Main consideration m st be given to the subsid for 
maintenance expenditure, for It the aultitance from tn. CoA:ionweulth 
for the prevision of capital irks were rot ferthcr4ming, this 
expenditure wculd be met from loan funds and the burden on the tnte 
budgets would be comparatively small. 	Thu Gm ionweal ih a;:reed 
to meet ar expenditure on maintenance over te level cf -';tate 
expenditure which was incurred OD the prvtsic-in of this tlervice in 
1947-4e, and by adopting this measure tended to perpetuate the 
inequalities which may have existed at that time. A hypothetical 
ease can be envisaged where, efore the intrcIductin of such a 
scheme, the net standards of strviccs received in all rtates were 
the same but the distribution of the services was diferent so 
that, fc)r exalple, one rAate conceAlrated on the proviaim of 
health services and another on educat.on, but on balance t;le net 
benefits received 	thc residents of each state as a whole were 
the same, 	Under such circ-mslancee, it c;;uld be thai one 
etate was spending a much grearer.acunt on tuere. oats co7trol 
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than another, and so the introduction of a scheme which provided for 
the subsidisation of all excess expenditure on tuberculosis control 
over the level in the base year would raise the relative standards of 
the State which formerly spent less on this service, but compensated 
for it by greater expenditure in another field. The subsidisation 
would permit all States to reach a common level in the provision of 
this specific service, but would ignore differences of standards in 
other fields which were partly catsed by the levels of relative stand-
ards of this particular service in the base year. Consequently, It oar 
be fitted that this form of grant does nothin more than permit an in-
crease in the differences in standards of net s,rvices which existed 
between the States, if the States concerned chose to take advantage 
of the method adnpted to determine the amount of the subsidisation. 
(5) Amiga_AmLklystslAlica. 
In the immediate post-war period, the finances of the 
Universities of Australia were improved by the increase in the numbers 
of students enrolled under the Commoweelth Reconstruction Training 
Scheme. The revente of the Universities is derived from several 
sources of Mich the main one is the annual grant from the respective 
State Governments. This is supplemented by donations and benefaction 
which vary considerably between States, student fees, and in recent 
years, grants from the (:ommonwealth Oovernment to meet the eost of 
Reconstruction students and for research purposes. Through the Recon-
struction Training Scheme, the Commonwealth uovernment was giving fin-
ancial support to the , Iiiversities, but by 1950, the numbers of stud- 
ents enrolled under the scheme wes declining rapidly. The University 
authorities were finding it difficuly to meet their commitments became 
of rising prices and costs. It was suggested that the Commonwealth 
might relieve this position by additional grants to the 3tates, and in 
1950, a eomAittte was set np to inquire into and repi,rt upon the fin-
ancial position of the Universities. As a r(,sult of its recoartendat-
ions, the Commonwealth Parliament passed legislation to make grants 
to the States for assistance to the IniversitieL. 
The States Grants (Universities) Act, 1951, provided that 
in each of the calendar years 1951, 1952 and 1953, the Commonwealth 
would pay to the .1 .tates as a whole, an amount of £803,000, divided 
between the States according to the number of full-time students, witt 
an adjustment to make allowance for special difficulties in the small. 
•r States, as it was recognifed that the cost per student in smaller 
Universities, such as the University of Tasmania, is very much great-
er than in the larger Universii.ies. The payment of these amounts was 
to be conditional upon each State spending the equivalent of three 
times its proportion of the base grant of 4,803,000 from its own 
resources upon the provision of University services. In addition to 
the basic grants, the Commonwealth agreed to pay 4second-level" grata 
eqtivalent to £1 for every £3 by which the State grant, plus fees re- 
ceived by the University, exceeds the qualifying amount for the basic 
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grant, with a maximum second 3cvel grant payable to all States of 
1300,000. The legislation was amended in 1953 to double the maximum 
second level grants. All money received waL to be spent on mainten-
ance. There were other minor points of the agreement, but the main 
financial points were those mentioned above. 
This is one of the few examples in Australian Pederal-
state financial relations where a grant is made to the States on the 
principle of the matching grants - that is, where expenditure by a 
State on a particular aervice is matched by a proportionate grant by 
the Commonwealth. In ,art 1, 2 he part of the matching grant in 
Federal-State financial relations was examined briefly and it was a 
shown that this method 	only be justified when the several States 
are capable of providing the same standards of services from their 
own resources. If this position does not exist, the matching grant 
may lead to the concentration of expenditure in the field which is 
su-)sidised at the expense of expenditure on other types of services. 
In the particular case of grants to assist Universities, horvever, 
there are peculiar features which tend to lessen the likelihood of 
this happening* the amount which the Commonwealth will provide is 
limited to £1,403,000 irrespective of the expenditure by the States in 
excest of three times this amount, and therefore there is no induce-
ment to the States to exceed this fi,:-7ure once it ha c been determined. 
he method of determining the distriution of the total 
basic grant appears to sitisfy the principle of payment according to 
relative financial needs, for it has been stated that it is distrib- 
uted "according to the number of full-time students, with an adjust-
ment to make allowance for smaller niversities." 3 It can be expect-
ed that, all other things being equal, the cost of maintenance of a 
University will vary acco.ding to the number of students. However, 
there is probably an optimum size where the cost per studen; is lowest 
When a University is less than this size, or expands beyond it, the 
cost per student will be greater than in a University of the optimum 
size. 
It Is extremely doubtful whether some of the smaller 
Universities approach animhere near this optimum size, and therefore 
their relative costa will be greater than those of the larger Univer-
sities. This is apparentl recognised in the distribution of the base 
grant. However, the condition which provides that the ntates must 
find three times thc basic grant to qualify for nesictence means that 
the government of a tAate containing one of the smaller Universities 
must find three-eueL.ters of the difference in costs arising from the 
operation of this size factor. If the principle of relative financia 
needs were being enforced in its entirety, provision would be made to 
ensure that all differences arising from this source would be met by 
the Commonwealth Government. In other words, the 1;tates sold be 
aa 
2. See above, p.93. 
3. Statement by the Prime Anister during the debate on the States 
Grants(Universities) 8311, Hansard, 27th November, 1951 p2786. 
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required to Cind that proporti41 of expensea which arises from the 
operation of factors which are cowyn to all Z.:Utas t while the propor-
tion nrising from the operation of factors which differ in the Gems* 
of their impact on the several r;tates will be found by the Commonweatt 
If any balance remained in the amount available for distribution be 
the states after the Comlonwealta had made these paaments„ this could 
be divided between the 3tates according to the number of full-time 
students, which is the main determiwat of coats after the size factor 
has been excluded. To the extent that this operates, the present 
method of distribution is defective, but apart from this, the method 
adopted seems to be reasonably satisfactory. 
(6) MiacellADVALAJILERIA. 
In addition o the grants which have been mentioned above 
In 1953-54 the revaionwealth Government made the following payments to 
• the Statist 4 
Grants to aesist in imp rting houses 	.. 615,400 
Coal -.timing Industry - Long :4rv1ce Leave 578,903 
Encouragement of Meat eroductien 	• • 413,011 
Weatarn Australian tYaterwOrks 333,047 
erlee Control Relmburgerunt 	410 83 ) 609 
There were also some pay, lents for assistance to primary producers in 
the form of bounties and subsidies, but since they were made to the 
producer or cone*mer independently of the :;tate L'overnmente they need 
not be considered here. 
1:ome of the amounts are small, some are of the nature of 
noe-recurring grants, others relate to payments to one particular 
:Aate, and the field covered is very wide. It is not considered 
neceasary to examine each in detail, but merely to state that the are 
all special purpose grants which the Comoonwealth Government has 
deemed advisable to assist a particular branch of industry or 
governmertal activity. 
It is now possible to consider the role that the differ-
ent types of grants for special purposes which have been considered 
above can play in a scheme of payments from the Commonwealth Govern, 
ment to the States based on the principle of relative financial needs. 
Some stte:tion was given to this matter, insofar as the principle 
involved was concerned, in the Virst Part of this essay. 5 It was 
. pointed out that while this type of payment could be in harmony with 
the principle of payment according to relative financial needs if the 
distribution of the total amount available between the 1;tates was 
calculated accerding to some predetermined method which took into con-
sideration all the factors which caused the relative financial needs 
of each State to differ bA it would ac completely effective only if 
special purpose grants were calcalated in relation to all fields of 
economic activity. However, the very nature of this type of grant 
4. Comaionwealth liudget tapers, 1954-55, a.146 
5. See above, p.91 ff. 
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was that the payment was conditionel upon its being used for the pur-
pose epecified, and this implied a vtatraint on the financial indepen-
dence of the States. This restraint would be far greater than would 
be evident if the method of bloc unconditional grants oere used. 
Ihe use of special purpose grants, if carried out complete 
ly, implies that the eederal Government aims at forcing the States to 
achieve equality of standards of services supplied in all fields of 
governmental activity. On the other hand, the use of the block 
unconditional grant implies that States are permitted to achieve over-
all equality by a judicious expenditure policy, but the decisions as 
to how the funds are to be expended remains one of their sovereign 
rights. An additional deficiency of the special grant method of 
disbursing surplus f ommoneealth revenue, even when the method is foll-
owed completely, will be that it can not take into account differences 
in the severity of State taxation while the ?edema Govervment is 
compelled to levy taxation at uniform rates in all States. 
A general examination of the use of special purpose 
grants in the Australian Adoration can be approached from two diff- 
erent viewpoints, the first relating to the method of distributing the 
total amount available between the States, and the second to the 
conditional nature of the grants. It maybe said that in all cases, 
in determining the relaiive amounts which each State is to receive, 
even in the case of Federal A1 Roads which operated from 1922-23 r the 
principle of payment as compensation for loss or according to the 
actual amounts contributed by each jtata to lederal revenue was not 
adopted. iirom the outset recognition was given to special circumsto-
Laicise which cauatd different needs between the States -, and in this way 
the principle of relative financial needs was adopted, in part at 
least. 
dowever, it invariably happened that this principle was 
only partiallj adopted in that when the amount which each State was tc 
receive was being determined, not all the factors which Would be expec 
ted to influence the relative levels of the cost of providing the 
specific service at a common standard, to which the grant related were 
takcn into consideration. 'or example, in the case of Uommonwealth 
Aid Roads, the factors which are considered are the relative sizes of 
population and the relative areas of the several L;tates. Obviously 
there must. be other factors which will help to determine variations 
in the cost of providing the same standards of road services in all 
States, 'and because they are not taken into consideration, there ia 
an imnlied assumption that the effects are relatively the same in all 
States. 	he cumulative t:ffect of the operation of the unknown fact- 
ors may have considerable effect upcn, the distribution based upon the 
measure of area and population alone, if they too were taken into 
count. 	-icallarly, in the C8SIOS of other special purpope grants whict 
have been mentioned above, the omission of the effects of certain 
influential factors haa.probably had the effect of producing a 
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distribution which varies in some way, ema/1 or Urge, from the dist-
ribution which *Geld have been obtained if the principle of reletive 
financial needs had been full. incorporated it the formula governinz 
the distribution of the total mounts available. 
The other condition which would make the use of special 
4 
purpose grants compatiale with the principle of payment according to 
relative financial needs, is that this type of grant should cover the 
whole field of governmental activity. It has been 8,3n from the fore-
going analysis that in Australia at the present time, there is only a 
restricted field of coverage. In fapt, the total amounts paid by the 
Comionwealth to the States as financial ascistance in the form of 
special purpose grants form only a small proportion of the total 
amount of financial assistance given. The bulk of the remainder is 
paid under Tax Reimbursement Grants and Special Financial Assistance 
Crants and it had already been explained that these grants are tncon-
ditional in the sense that ther is no compulsion upon the States to 
use the funds for the provision of any particular service or services. 
It is possible that the adverse effects of the special purpose grants, 
covering only a limited field, may be modified as a consequence of 
this, but the interrelationship of the various forms of grants will be 
considered ir greater detail in the next !Jhapter. 
Releted to this aspect of the special purpose grant are 
the implications' of the use of the "matching grant", which has been 
used in one particular case, that of finacial assistance to the Univ- 
ersities. It has b_en emphasiseeithat this type of financial assist
ance is definitely in opposition to the principle of financial needs, 
as in its purest form it gives preference to those States which are 
in a position where they maybe relatively independent of the Commas-
wealth for financial assistance. In this particular case, however, 
the adverse effects are modified in that the base amount which must be 
spent by the 3tates before they qualify for the assistance, takes 
into consideration to some extent, the ability of the States to spend 
money on the provi:Aon of University education from their own rtsouamm 
Nevertheless, it contains many of the undesirdble features inherent 
in the matching grant, and therefore must be coneEmned as a method 
which takes very little notice of the principle of payment according 
to relative financial needs. It could easily result in the poorer 
States transferring available funds from the provision of other serv-
ices to the provision of University education in order to qualify for 
the Commonwealth assistance, thus causing a net reduction of relative 
standards conipared with the position in other, wealthier States where 
the transfer might be effected without causing any great disturbance. 
Generally it may be eaid that the methods which have beer 
adopted to distribute available funds between the Ctates by means of 
special purpose grants have not represented the complete application 
of the principle of relative financial needs„ The uecond factor 
6. See above, p 93 ff. 
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which must be teen into consideration before a complete asseesment 
can be made as to the adequacy or othereise of this type of grent, is 
the conditional nature of the greats. 	=he general eondition upon 
-ehich the payments are made ie that the shall be uselsolely for the 
purpose for which they are specified - for example, the maintenance ol 
roads in the case of Commonwealth Aid Roads. By itself, teia does not 
appear to be a very stringeet condition, for it could be argued that 
even if the grants were made unconditionally, the money would be taken 
into Consolidated Itevenue and in all probabilit an amount approximat-
ely equal to the grant from The torn eonwealth would be used for the 
specified service. However, even it this were true, and there on be 
no positive assurance an the point, there is a major aspect of the 
nature of the grants which must be taken into consideration and which 
relates to the Constitutional division of functional and financial 
powers between the Commonwealth an4 atats. 
Thu division of functional and financial powers under the 
Const!tution was such that the Commonwealth was given potentiel finan-
cial powerc which would yield revenue conoideraely in excess of that 
necessary for the Adequate performance of itz functional powers. The 
!antes were in the reverse position with their financial potential 
lees than thcie finale' needs. A system of grants was the only satis-
factory was to correct the disbalance, since it must be assuattl that 
the division of powers, bate functional and financial, which was 
adopted under the Constitution WAS the most desirable for the efficied 
conduct of the Federetion as a whole. As soon as auch gr.//Its became 
conditional in the sense that they must be used for the provision of 
some specific purpose, the Commonwealth is endeavouring to overcome 
the diebalance of the Constitutional division by taking over, as far 
es posaible, certaiL functional powers properly belonging to the 
States. The extent to which it can ansume control is determined by 
its financial superiority and its Constitutional right to make cond-
itional grants. It can dictate that grants shall be conditional on 
the States expending a certain amount on a function determined by the 
Commonwealth. 
Ir other words, the Comoonwealth, by distributing portion 
of its surplus revenue in the form of special purpose grants, is en-
deavouring to ass me some measure of control ovtr the functions which 
were allotted to the States under the Clonatituticr. At the time when 
the Corelonweelth is determining the payment of e speciel purpose grant 
it Is prone to overlook the point that the amounts involved are it 
fact portion of surplus Commonweelth revenue which le revenue availeble 
for distributice to the rtetes after the commonweelth bee met its own 
necessary expenditure. The same effect could be achieved without con-
ditions, if eao, grant e ir aid of brivereities were diacontinued and 
the setae emount paid as additional -nx Veimbursement Crant or Opecial 
Financial Assistance Grant. Alternatively, the Cceloonwealth could 
reduce taxation by the equivalent of the same amount and thus widen 
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the field available to the Otates, although this approach would tend 
to increase inequalities between Zotates. It can be e,en, therefore, 
that there is no justification for the adoption of the special purpose 
grant unless it can be shown that it is advisable for the Commonwealth 
to have some contr01 over certain functions which wkre given to the 
3tetes under the Constitution. If this is not shown, ther it must 
be contended that the bmposition of conditions by the CoRrnonwealth on 
grants made to the States is an unjustifiable intrusion into the 
fields of Utnte ludependence, and this results from an unwillingness 
by the Commonwealth to rm'ognise that its ability to produce surpluo 
revenue is merely an incidental accompaniment to a logical distribut- 
ion of functional powers. 
One other matter which should be considered with respect 
to special purpose grants, and which has some ecoctation with the 
conditional nature of this type of grant, is the ctatom edopted by the 
Commonwealth of imposing a time limit on the period during which the 
States shall receive assistance for special purposes. It some ways a 
time limit is a desirable feature of a grant, not co much as regards 
the limitation of the period during which the grant will be paid, but 
rather with regard to the distribution between the States of the total 
amount avallwae. It has been shown that the methods used to determine 
the portion of the total amount which each State shall receive, is 
only pertially in aceoriance with the principle of pre!rnent according 
to relative financial needs, and therefore leaves much to be desired. 
It can be appreciated, howver, that there will be a certain amount 
or trinl and error involved in Obtaining the perfect distribution 
according to the accepted principle, and with the aim of achieving 
this perfect distribution, it maybe desirable to reconsider the 
methods at periodic intervals. If a time limit were imposed merely 
for the purpose of reconsidering the methods at periodic intervalapthw 
it could be an acceptable part of a system of special purpose grants. 
It is suspected, however, that this has been only part-
ially the resew wh the Commonwealth has imposed a time limit. Prob-
ably the Coamonwealth has been reluctant to COlUit itself to make 
grants during an iudefinite future period. . Most of the legislation 
governing the payment of grants of this nature, has contained some 
provision stating the total smouW which shell be paid to all States, 
or the precise we in which this Amount shall be detremined. In other 
words, the amount which the Commonwealth is required to find is pre-
determined. It cnn be understood that any Commonwealth Oovernment 
wenld be unwilling to conilit itself to make grants of unspecified 
amounts for unspecified period. However, there co ull be no objection 
to leelslation authorisin# the psyment of a sum to be determined from 
time to time within wide limits on n permanent basis. As it stands at 
present, the e3tat...e are constantly sethre of the possibility of any 
special purpose grant being discontinued as soon as its period of 
currency expires. The complete cessation of a grant, such as 
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t'o2acnwohlth %id lloadc, could serieuLly diairept the finaGcial stebil-
ity of 	!:tete, ;ref. ander the pilectne errvegement, thic could occur 
quite ()belly. Therefere, if a epecified time limit is necesaGry„ it 
should apply, not to the grants themselves, but to the total amounts 
of the grants and their distribution between Ctatec, The.States v4old 
then be assured of some revenue frow this source which, if necessary, 
could be at the expense of" deficit finGncipg in time of depressed 
economic conditions. 
''ummerJsing the foregoing comments on speciol purpose 
grants, it may be said that, when regarded in Violation, the distrib-
ution of the total amount available for this type of grant should be 
atrictly in accol,ciaLee ith the principle of payment according to 
relative finnncial needc, if it is found to be neceacery in the (*stem 
of Pederal-State financial relations. Fo -ever, the inherent 
corditionel neturc of the grnnte is not in accordance with the brsic 
concept of a Pederption thet is, the retention of the maximum emount 
of independence by the Strtes, and ever shouldthe optimum distribution 
be achieved, it will elweys be npparent that by the use of this 
method, the Commorreplth ie tendinp: to aesume the responsibility for 
the perform.nce of certain functions which are Constitutionally the 
prerogative of the States. Ir short, the use of special purpose 
grants introduces a tendency towards the breakdcym of iedoralism and 
a movement towards a unitary form of government where the States 
become merely agents of the C -mmontrealth. 
..... .1,41Vh 
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MAIMS ij  
A PROGRAMA* FOR RixTPIoN  92_AkaEg_aaEgIAL,_MAJagi. 
In the first Part of this essay, the nature of the part- 
lcular financial problem which arises in a Federation was outlined. 
Particular reference was made to the problem which has arisen in the 
Australian Federation. It was suggested that where the powers of the 
Federal and State Governments respectively are rigidly defined by a 
Constitution, there will inevitably be a lack of balance between 
functions requiring expenditure from revenue, and revenue raising 
powers. This lack of balance will give rise to a need for redistrib-
ution of pane revenue from the governments which have superior 
revenue raising powers to governments with revenue raising power8 . 
which are insufficient to meet expenditure requirements. In the 
Australian Federation, the distribution of functions is such that 
payments of grants from the Pederal to the State Governments have 
become necessary. This situation appears to be paralleled in the 
other major Yederations of the world. 
The financial problem referred to above relates to the 
determination of the distribution of the total amount which the 
federal Government has available for distribution to the several State 
4overnments in any particular year. The two major alternatives 
as principles of distribution were shown to be available for adoption. 
it* first was that pe*Tments to the State Governments could be made in 
proportion to the amounts contributed to Federal revenue by the 
residents of the respective States. The s_cond was that the grants 
could be determined according to the relative financial needs of each 
Stets. The conclusion reached was that only the adoption of the 
second of these alternatives could statist - adequaltely the principal 
policy objectives of governments in the modern State. These object-
ives were first, the achievement of an equitable distribution of 
goods and services between the people of the Federation, secondly the 
encouragement of a balanced use of available resources and coordinat- 
ion of capital investment and thirdly, the achievement and maintenance 
of full employment in the Federation. It was shown that the redistr-
ibutive objective of government policy car be achieved through the 
■ 
	 imposition of progressive rates of income and other types of taxation, 
and the provision of services and transfer payments according to 
individual needs. The other objectives entail some control b$ the 
Federal Government over the total of reverue and expenditure of all 
governments. 
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In the second Part, the existing practice in Australia 
was examined to determine the extent to which it satisfied the prin-
ciple of distribution according to relative financial needs. It was 
seen that the preset.t practice is for the federal Government to na$ 
to the State Governments several types of grants ranging from small 
special purpose grants to large unconditional grants. This practice 
has developed gradually over the years as a result of the interaction 
of political and economic forces. Some small recognition has been 
given to the fact that the financial needs of the several States are 
wabstantielly differeLS, but this recognition in indeed small. It 
follows that if the earlier reasoning is sound, the principal financial 
policy obji:ctivee of the governments can be more fully implemented by 
a reorganisation of 'elderal-State financial relations in the light of 
the principles and methods of rediatribution which have been °Waved 
in the preceding chapters. The object of the concluding chapter is to 
try to suggest practical ways by which this aim might be achieved. 
It would not be reasonable to expect that" a co,vlete 
revision of the whole system of 'cderal- tate financial relations in 
Australia could be made in a very short time. The system has grown 
with the Federation, and any attempt to bring about a suddeu and 
substantial reargenisetion would meet with strong resistance. 'v ,urthez 
a succcasful scheme for revision would take some time to develop. It 
is essentibl that care be taken to ensure that the revision, when 
fully introduced, satisfies ccmpletely the criteria which have been 
established. Por these reasons it would be advisable that changes 
be introduced gradually so that the immediate effects of each 
alteration will be small. 
In other words, it would not be practicable to devise a 
new scheme to determine the financial assistance which the six States 
are to receive from the Federal OovernsInt and expect the revision to 
be worked out in a short time and introduced at the comlencement of 
the rext financial year. such an aAwoach would be doomed to failure 
It is suggested that int:aced of attempting the complete revision in 
one step, immediate action should be taken to improve the position, 
but this action should involve the minimum of alteration to the exist 
ing system. This would be the short-term revision which would be 
merely a ski) towards major revision and complete introduction of the • prieciple of distribution according to relative financial needs. 
Once the short-term revisicn has been completed, steps 
can then be taken to prepare a plan for complete adoption of the 
principle. This will be brought into operation over a niriber of year 
and when fully operative, will ensure that all the conditions of the 
principle of relative financial needs are satisfied. Recognition 
must also be given to the possibility of the need or a longer-term 
plan to meet long-term changes to the wh(ble structure of the 
Federation. 
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The approach which is considered to be practically sound 
for each of the e periods, the short, medium ard long terms, will be 
considered separately. However, attention will be focused on the plan 
for revirion in the "medium" period - the period during which the 
principle of distribution according to relative financial needs Is 
fully invoked. 
A programme for revision in the short-term is one which 
could be put into operation imluediatcly. It will not reprerent a 
complete solution to the problem, but will be a pa,tial solution which 
will have some corrective effects during the period which must elapse 
before a more complete solutirn can be worked out and put intocperalim 
In the short period, the existing forms of grants from 
the Pederal to the tate Governments can be accepted. The different 
types of grants in operation in the fmtralian -'ederation at the 
present time have been explained in Pprt 2 of this essay, 1 and it was 
there shown that only in a few cases, and there qui e inadequately, is 
the principle of ditvribution aecording to relative financial needs 
employed for the purpose of detenlining the gr.rts. It is sugg,sted, 
therefore, that the programa: for revision in the short period should 
involve the retention of the prec.nt grants structure but with alter-
ation to the methods of calculation of the different types of grents 
to follow more closel the principle of distributicn according to 
relailve financial needs. 
The first appraoch which might be suggested is a revision 
of the method of calculation of each typo of grant. It would be posL- 
ible to revise the legislation to provide either that each t pe of 
grant made by the eederal (:overnment should be paid accoiding to a 
prescribed formula, or that the distributior should be made at the 
discretion of the Federal Government. In the former case it would be 
necessar, for a different formula to be deviled for each type of grant 
pnrticularL; ir the case of special purpose grants. In the lattLr 
case, the agents of the Federal Covernme7A would be responsible for 
the making of the necessar calculations to ensure that each grant 
paid to the State Governments was an approximate measure of the 
relative financial needs or *soh in the particubar field of expendit-
ure to which the grant related. 
Such a proce:ure would involve some amendment to existing 
legislation. If the former alternative were adopted, the amendments 
would be considerable. It is thought that any programme for inaediate 
revision should avoid, if possible,the need for legislative action. 
Apart from the delay which would inevitably occur, the inclusion of 
formulae in existing legislation would probably make it more difficult 
to amend or repeal the legislation at a letter date when further 
changes had become desirable in order to bring into action permanent 
arrangements for assessing grants. 
1. See above, p.100 ff. 
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It would appear to be sufficient for the purpose that in 
the short period, when it is possible to satisfy only some of the 
criteria, if only one or a few of the several t pea of Federal grants 
were calculated according to the princi)le of relative financial needs 
The Australian switem of federal grants includes several special 
purpose grants, grants under the Anancial Agreement of 1927, Income 
Tax Reisibursement Orants(arAlikonTtigAsIRWTS8tilanWof the 
Constitution. Only one of there t:pca of grants, provided it repres-
ents a substantial portion of the total, can be calculated according 
to the principle of relative financial needs, and it will fiake into 
account other types of grants paid to the States. In short, one tjpe 
of grant can be used as a balancing grant to bring about greater 
equality between States and to correct errors or omissions contained 
in the remaining grants. 
To the extent that the are calculated ace rifling to the 
principle of relative financial needs, the present grants under Sect-
ion 96 of the Constitution can be said to be &signed to achieve this 
result so far as the three claimant :Antes, South Australia, , estern 
Australia and Tasmania are concerned. Special grants are designed in 
such a 	as to give each claimant r.tate sufficient revenue to permit 
it to function at a standard not appreciably below that operating in 
the three standard Statcs, New South Sales, Victoria and 'Aleensland. 2 
In calculating the necessary amounts, the Commonwealth rants COM,111112- 
ion takes into consideration revenue collected by both claimant and 
standard States from most of the types of Frants provided by the 
Federal novernment. In short, the Special grant is a balancing grant 
which is au ,nosed to raise each claimant State to thy level of the 
three standard States. 
Under the present method of determining graLts, there is 
no comparable b-lancing grant between the three standard States. To 
some extent the Income Tax Reimbursement Grant does take account of 
certain differences between States, but only to a limited extent. 3 
The first step which should therefore be taken to correct the defie-
iencies of the present grants systym is to recognise a type of grant 
which is at present paid to all States as a balancing grant and calc-
ulate this grant accorOing to the principle of relative financial 
needs. To achieve the desired objective, this grant should be compar-
atively large, so that it ma, be sufficient to permit natural differ-
ences, and differences accentuated by not calculating other forms of 
Federal grants according to the principle of relative financial needs, 
to be corrected. Por simplicity of introduction, it would be advisab-
le for the grant envisaged as performing the function of a balancing 
grant to be free from legislative restrictions. That is, it should be 
a grant which is determined annually by the Federal Government at its 
own discretion. 
2. See Third Report or the Comionwealth "rants Occelission p. 75. 
3. See above, p.173. 
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At the present time there is only one type of grant which 
appears to satisfy all these criteria. This is the Special Financial 
Assistance Grant which has been paid to the State Governments since 
1950-51 as a supplement to the lwrome Tax 'reimburiement Orants. This 
grant is made entirely at the discretion of the Federal Government, 
and in 1953-54, the total amount distributed was g22m. 
There appear to be two allernative methods whereby the 
Special Financial Assistance Grants could be adapted for use as a 
balancing grant to be calculated according to the principle of relat-
ive financial needs. Both involve combination with the Special tqoants 
paid under Section 96 of the Constitution to the three claimant 
States. In the first place, the Federal Government could announce 
that as from a specific date, Special Financial Assistance Grants 
would be discontinued. The size of these grants is such4 that those 
States would probably find it necessary to appl for financial ass-
istance from the Federal Government under Section 96 of the Constit-
ution. In fact, the Federal Government could announce that its in-
tention was to discontinue the Special Financial Assistance Grants for 
the purpose of inducing the three larger f)tates to adopt this approach 
and formally claim financial assistance under Section 96. 
If this happened, the Federal Government would, if 
existing practice is continued, refer the claims for financial assis-
tance to the Commonwealth Grants Commission which was formed for the 
specific purpose of examining, and reporting on such claims to the 
Federal Parliament. It would be expected that the Commonwealth (rants 
Commission would extend its methods of calculating grants according 
to the principle of relative financial needs to include the three 
standard States. This would provide all States with a balancing grant 
which would take into account the re)Ltive financial needs of each. 
The elimination of standard States would, however, neces-
sitate a revision of the methods of the Commission. At the present 
time, the Commission assesses the relative financial needs of the 
three claimant States by reference to the conditions in the throe 
standard States. A grant is recommended which will permit each claim-
ant State to function at a standard approximately equal to that oper-
ating in the standard States. If all States were to claim financial 
assistance in this way, this standard would no longer exist. It would 
thus become necessary for the Federal Government to advise the 
Commonwealth Grants Commission of the total amount which it in prepar-
ed to make available to all States by way of Special Grants. The 
function of the Commission would then be to distribute the total 
amount between the States according to the relative financial needs 
of each. 5* 
001 ...011,■ .111.1111081041MMWOMMININNWIMMI.101.4111111411.118, 
4. In 1953-54, New South Wales received £8.6m.; Victoria, C5.7m. and camensland, £3.5m. 5. The details of existing Grants Commission procedure are given on p.144 ff. 
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The alternative approach which could be adopted by the 
Federal Government in order to produce a greater degeee of equality 
between the State in the short run would be to retain the existing 
rwstem of grants but calcelate the Specialftnancial Assistance Urant 
accGrding to the principle of relative financial needs. Its this 
approach were adopted, it would again be necessary to amalgamate the 
Special Financial Assistance Grants and the Special Grants at present 
recommended by the Commonwealth Grants Commission, or restrict the 
Special Fnancial Assistance Grants to the standard States. In the 
former case, the need for the Commonwealth tionts Commission as such 
would no longer exist If the Federal Government undertook to calculate 
the distribution of the total amount available. Alternatively, the 
whole task or calculation could be handed over to the Grants Commiss-
ion. If this latter approach were adopted, the result would be simil-
ar to that which would be produced if the Special Financial Assistance 
Grants were discontinued, with the exception that there would be no 
claim for financial assistance by the several State Governments. 
The restriction of Special Financial Assistince Grants to 
the standard States would be practically impossible. It would mean 
that one group or States would be claiming financial assistance and 
the amount received would be dependent upon the investigations and 
recommendations or the Commonwealth 6rants Commission. The other 
group would not be claiming such assistance but would be receiving 
comparable grants which would be determined by the Pederal Government. 
Either of the two approaches suggested above could be put 
into practice without any great difficulty. The choice between the 
two would then have to be made by reference to Immo other criterion. 
This could posr-ibly be the extent of administrative adjustment involv-
ed in the new approach, or the attitude of the various State Govern-
ments to the alteration. It is felt that the present standard States 
would be extremely reluctant to become claimant States in the existing 
meaning of the term. Claimancy, as it operates at present, involves 
the loss of a certain degree of independence as a result of the in-
vestigations and subsequent "adjustments" made by the Grants Committee-
ion. This reluctance would not appear If all that was involved was 
the distribution of the Special vinancial Assistance Grants according 
to new methods. This approach could lead to the abandonment of the 
Commonwealth Grints Commission In its present form, which might be 
viewed unfavourably by the present claimant States. 
Whatever objections are made to such a scheme in official 
circles, it should be emphasised by the Federal Government, when ann-
ouncing the change, that the alteration would be purely an intermed-
iate step in the eventual development of a new system of Federal-State 
financial relations. It would be a short-term programme for revision 
which would ultimately be replaced by an alternative which will 
invoke the necessary principles to the fullest degree. 
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When some revision such as this has been made, it will be 5 
possible for the '?ederaI Government to commence preparation of a long-
er term programme of revision. During this longer period, careful 
attention can be given to all aspects of the grants system and a new 
scheme prepared with the object of fitting it into the general scheme 
of government financial policy. It tr,; with L.spect to this longer-
term revision that attention will be concentrated in this analysis. 
The practicability of any sugrestiol for improvement is 
important. Cne recomendation which might be made in for the whole 
atructure of Federal-tate financial relations to be redesimed to 
minimise the need for grarts to be paid by one authority to another. 
Alch a suggestion would imply substantial amendment to the Constitut-
ion, and this may be impracticable, even over a fairly long period. 
It la notoriously difficult to amend the Constitution unless the pro- 
posed amendment to the Constitution receives the support of all polit-
ie. 1 parties. 6 The amendments necessary under such circumstances 
would be so far-reaching that it is doubtful whether the move could 
be made with any hope of success. 
Alteration to the present system should also be designed 
so that it could be instituted by the -,ederal Government. This is 
also necessary to avoid political complications. If the introduction 
of a new scheme of raderal-Stnte financial relations were dependent 
upon cooperation between the Federal and State Governments, it would 
almost certainly be doomed to failure. Inevitably the political party 
holding power in the 'Federal Parliament is opposed to that which is in 
power in some State Pnrliaments. and although this problem and its 
saccest;ful solution should be above party politics, it is feared that 
unanimous agreement would not be obtained. 
There is always danger that the Federal Government itself 
will be reluctant to institute any changes in the existing relation-
ships. This will be particularly so if the introduction of change 
brings with it any diminution of powers or spheres -f influence of the 
i'ederal Government. The tendency over recent years has bcen for the 
rederal Government to use its position of financial superiority to 
increase its authority in the fields of activity which were constit-
utionally restricted to Late Governments. Proposals for improvement 
might be suggested which would tend to reverse thin% trend. Under 
these circumstances, it maybe difficult to persuade the Federal 
Government *hat it is desirable ti implement the proposals. 
Although it has be n suggested above that it would be 
almost impossible to Obtain unanimous agreement between the State and 
2ederal Governments, any such scheme for improvement would usually 
have to be acceptable to a majority of State Governments before the 
Vederal Government would introduce it. Occasions have arisen where 
.011,010.1.......01,1101WOMMIWOMIMMIWO■4101.111WOMMO■ 
6. So far, 23 proposals have been submitted for referenda, and the 
consent of the electors has bec_n received in four cases only. 
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schemes which affect the finances of the States which have been impos-
ed by the Federal Government against the wishes of all State Govern- 
. merits. The oAstarding example was the introduction of Uniform Taxat-
ion and Income Tax Reimbrsement Grants in 1942, 7 but this can be 
regarded as having occurred under exceptional circumstances - that is, 
as a notional security measure in time of war. An opposing reactinn 
under peace-time conditions was seen in 1952 whin the Federal Govern-
ment was prepared to hand back income taxation poers to the State 
Governments. Because some State Governments were unwilling to accept 
this responsibilty, no further action has been taken. 
No definite conclusion can be reached on the question of 
whether the Federal Government would introduce substantial alterations 
to the existing struciure without reference to, or receiving approual 
from the tate Governmenta l or wherher the Federal Goverement would be 
influenced in adopting e scheme sponsored by State Goverment*. The 
answer must remain * matter for conjecture. 
This, then is the background against which suggestions 
for improving the present system must be made. However careful one 
might be in franing these suggestions from the practical viewpoint, 
there will always be some danger that forces rTill arise at a particu-
lar moment which will make the suggest d soluti n impossible, at least 
nntil there is some alteration in existing institutional conditions. 
tny proposition must therefore be construed, not in the light of con-
dition which exist at the moment, but. rather it. the light of the most 
favourable conditions which are likely to arise in the future. 
The deficiencies in the methods used to determine the 
amount of grants payable  to the tate covernments in the Australian 
4deration have alresidy been outlined. 8 Briefly restated, the method 
in use ht present is for the federal Government to cowlit itself te 
pay to the States, for a limited period, certain grants for specific 
purposes and in some cases, for general purposes. Thus, in any part-
iculer year, the federal Government is bound to find a certain amount 
of revenue for payment to the State Governments. This amount is the 
sum of the different types of grants which the :*eieral Government has 
statutorily committed itself to pny. These grarts include payments 
under the ?Inanciel.Agreement, Commonwealth Aid Roads, Hospital Benef-
its, Grsnts for Universities, Income rx reimbursement Grants and to 
a certain extent, Special Grants under Sectien 96 of the Constitution. 
In fact, there are very few grants which the Federal Government has 
not committed itself to pay for a number of ,ears and which do not 
have the total amount determined by some automatic formula. The most 
important exception is the Special 7inancial Assistance Grant which 
has been paid in recent years only and which is regarded as 
supAementary to the Income Tax Reimbursement Grants. 
7. See above, pp. 162/3. 
8. See above, Part 2, p.100 ff. 
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It can be appreciated that in any one year, the extent to 
which the Federal Government can control the total amount which it wil 
pay to the State Governments is considerably restricted, For example 
in 1952-53, direct payments by the Federal Government to the state 
Governments totalled £183m. Of this total, at least t140m. was prov-
ided for in legislation passed in previous years and under which the 
total amount payable was predetermined. of the remaining i"143a., 
Special. Financial Assistance grants accounted for 41270. and Special 
Grants under "Jection 96 of the Constitution accounted for Li 6m. This 
latter grant is recommended by the Commonwealth Grants Commission and 
although subject to variation by the 'ederal Government, is customar-
ily accepted without serious question, and therefore it can be regard-
ed as predetermined. The Federal Government thus had effective cont-
rol over only about 15% of the total amount of grants in 1953-54. 
These commitmente of the Federal Government are mad* 
onl b Federal legislation, and could therefore be rescinded by 
the passage of the necessary amending legislation. 	The present 
attitude is, however, that the Federal legislation in this respect 
is in the nature of a contractual commitment, and an: 	to 
reduce the total amount would be regarded b the States as a breach 
of contract, although legally such a procedure would be quite within 
the powers of the Federal Government. 	It is felt that the 
political reaction would be sufficiently strong to prevent the 
Federal Government from taking this line of action if it were found 
neoessar, to reduce the total amount which it has promised to pay 
to the State Governments. 
It was shown earlier that for the effective implement- 
' ation of a full emploAlent polic., the Federal Government should be 
in a position to determine the total amount which shall be raised 
by taxation by all governments, and the total *mount which should 
be expended Iv all governments on the provision of services. 	The 
taxation aspect is adequatel, covered under the existing system, 
where the Federal Government is responsible for the collection of 
income tax and customs and excise duties. 	On the expenditure 
side, however, there can be no such assurance while the Federal 
Government is committeit to pay o the State Governments a large 
percentage of the total amount which it does actually pay. 	It 
must be recognised that the Federal Governraent can always offset 
these effects b manipulation of its own expenditure. 	If, for 
example, commitments in the form of grants to State Governments 
taken in conjunction with expenditure tr,' those Governments frow 
their own resources, and anticipated expenditure by the Federal 
Government in exercising federal functions will be greater than 
necessar to maintain full ample merit, the Federal Government can 
restrict its own expenditure. 	Such a procedure may, however, 
be entirely unsatisfactory from other points of view. 	The 
relative urgency of federal functions compared with State functions 
t: 
2014. 
must also be considered. 
Thus, in order for contrel to be effective, the Federal 
Government should be free to vary the total amount which it will make 
available to the States during any particular period in the light of 
the particular economic conditions of the time. 	Under present 
conditions, the Federal Government does not possess this power fully, 
end therefore one of the necessar;, correetione should be to reorg-
anise the present grants system to restore this power to the Federal 
Government. 
At this stage, mention should be made of the part pinged 
by capital expenditure from loan funds in a full employment policy. 
It would be true to Say that in Australia government financial policy 
can be used to influence the level of employment far more effectively 
by contrn1 over expenditure from loan furds than by surplus and deficit 
budgeting in the revenue accounts. 	In order to implement a full 
employment policy completely, it is thus necessary to have regard to 
public investment expenditure as well as public revenue expenditure. 
It has been shown that through its grants system, the Federal 
Government could influence the total of public revenue expenditure, 
but greater di -'ficulty may be experienced in obtaining the same 
degre, of influence over public investment expenditure. 
9 In a previbous Chapter, the part which the Federal 
Government plays in determining the total amoutt which the tate 
Governments shall receive from loan funds in any financial ;;ear was 
discussed. 	It was suggested that although the Financial 
Agreement of 1927 gave to the Federal Government only one quarter of 
the total voting power necessary to determine the total loan programme, 
the Feleral Gzvernmtnt's position in relation to the central banking 
system in Australia has given it almost complete powers in deciding 
the total loan proGrame. 	Furthermore, it would appear that 
the Federal Government has consciously used tile power in recent 
years as part of a policy designed to combat inflation. 	It would 
not be proper to discuss here the propriety of the nctic,n of the 
Federal Government in using its influence with the banking system for 
this purpose, but the existence of such power does mean that the 
Federal Government can, if it so desires, determine the total amount 
of public borrowing, and hence the extent of public investment 
activity in any year. 
The Federal Government thus has direct or indirect 
influence over the amount of taxation revenue which will be raised, 
and the rimount of loan money which will be raised. 	It can never, 
of course, compel a State Government to spend money, either from 
revenue or 'man funds, but it can set an ap.Irosch to the upper limit 
9. See above pp 123/4. 
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to expenditure from both sources, through its grants system in the 
former case, and through its domination of decisions of the Loan 
Council in the latter case. It can also influence the lower limit 
through its own expenditure policy. Therefore, if the amount which it 
shall pay to the State Governments by way of grants is predetermined, 
one of the important element* for full stployment policy is missing so 
far as correcting or preventing the occurrence of a situatitAi of over 
full employment is concerned. Thus the first requirement for permanmit 
improvement is to free the total amount which the Federal Government 
Will pay to the States in any year. The rederal Government must be 
free to fix the total amount which the States as a whole will receive. 
If this position is to obtain, then future legislation 
relating to the payment of grants of any type to the States must be 
non-committal so far as the actual amount to be paid in future years 
is concerned. This may be difficult to bring about in view of the 
nature of existing liwislation, particularly so for as Income Tam 
Reimbursement Grants and payments under the ?inancial Agrel_ment are 
concerned. However, in all cases, and particularly in the case of 
the more important lkypes .of grants, there will be political difficult-
ies in effecting reductions. While specific sums are associated with 
specific purposes, there can always be political reaction to reducing 
the total amount of the grant, particularly when revenue is buoyant. 
?or these reasons, it might be preferable to discontinue 
the present multiplicity of grants, and reolace them all with a single 
grant which embraces all avenues of expenditure previously covered, 
but with no specific reference to any purpose for which it may be used 
In other words, to introduce a single unconditional grant. The total 
amount of this grant could be determined each year after consideration 
of the particular circumstances operating at the time. In this way, 
the Pederal Government could vary the total amount available without 
the political repercusaions which might arise with reduction of the 
total amount of a particular special purpose grant. 
The second major shortcoming of the present method of 
redistributing public financial resources is that the determination of 
the relative amounta which each State shall receive, follows no part-
icular pattern. It was showy earlier,lhat all governments have a 
redistributive function to perform. One of the accepted methods of 
achieving this objective is by bringing about greater equality of in-
comes of residents of the community. In a Oederation, the choice mus1 
be made betl , een attempting to achieve greater equality within each 
State separately, or within the Federation as a whole. If the decialot 
is left entirely to the State ()overt:malts, then the achievement of 
greater equality of incomes will be restricted to each Ctate separate. 
ly. Thus, although a deliberate policy may be adopted by each State 
Government to bring about the desired redistributior of wealth by thil 
method, there will still be inequalities, and hence the need for 
T15:7-3WITEW7,—p 20. ff. 
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further redistribution between States. This lies within the sphere of 
influence of the Federal Government. 
Because of its superior financial position, the Federal 
Government can choose between the two alternatives. In distributing 
the total amount which it has available for the purpose, it can elect 
to apportion it according to the amount which the residents of each 
State contributed to the total, in which case redistribution can be 
achieved only in each State separately. On the other hand, it can 
ignore the contributions of the residents of each State and distribuSe 
the total amount between the States in such a way that a greater depute 
of equality can be Obtained. That is, it can contribute according to 
the relative financial needs of each. 
It has been suggested in an earlier Chapter li that this 
latter alternative is the most appropriate one to adopt. It was arg-
ued that in this instance there seems to be no real reason to distin-
guish between different sections of the community because of the 
existence of State boundaries. In fact, under the Australian Constit-
ution, the Federal Government is debarred from discriminating between 
States. i2 
If these arguments are accepted, it would appear to be 
reasonable to expect the Federal Government to distribute the total of 
funds available for the puroose according to the relative financial 
needs of each State. At the present time, with a large number of 
different types of grants, there is very little attention paid to 
strict adherence to any particular principle. In only one ease, that 
of Special Grants under Section 96 of the Constitution, is recognition 
given to the principle of distribution according to relative finencia2 
needs. In other cases, such as the formula used to calculate the 
Income Tax Reimbursement Grant and Grants for Universities, there is 
implied partial recognition of this principle. In many other cases, 
as explained in earlier Chapters, the distribution is determined more 
or less arbitrarily. A very great improvement could therefore be 
achieved If each different type of grant were to be calculated in fut-
ure according to the principle of relative financial needs. 
It was suggested earlier in this Chapterl 3that as an 
immediate remedial measure, an approximation to this result could be 
achieved if one type of grant (provided Oat in total it is sufficiene 
ly large) were distributed according to the principle of relative 
financial needs. In the process of calculation, deficiencies which 
evolve from the arbitrary distribution of other types of grants would 
be corrected. Thus, in total, each State Government would receive an 
amount which would permit the net burden of benefit of government 
financial policy, impingeing on the residents of the Federation as a 
whole, to be more- equitably distributed. 
01.0•■■•■•••■•■•••••••■■•..iiimmalommiammolObtaiewalw.••■■ - 
11. See above, Chapter 2, p.20 ff. 
12. See above, Chapter 4, p;63 ff. 
13. See above, p.199, 
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That is, in total the rsident of each State would pay 
taxes and receive benefits at-cording to relative needs rather than 
according to the size of incomes. However, while such a procedure 
would be quite acceptable as a short-term remedial measure, it suffers 
from two defects which would require correction over a longer period. 
The first of thee is that thetotal amount of the grant chosen as the 
balancing grant may not allow sufficient flexibility. It was suggest-
ed that the Special oinanciel Assistance Grants, taken in conjunction 
with the Special rants under Section 96, would be adequate for the 
purpose. Their adequacy could well be restricted to a very short 
period, however. In 1954-55, the total amount of these two grants is 
only £32m. It can be expected that in 1955-56 0 the Tax Reimbursement 
Grants will automatically rise by about Om., and if the grant total 
of all grants to be distributed by the Federal Government regains un-
changed, the total amount of thee two specific types of grants may 
well fall to about £27m, Such an amount may be insufficient both for 
the purpose of introducing flexibility to the total sommittments of 
the Federal Government and permitting an adequate distribution 
between the State Governments. 
The secon deficiency of this temporary expedient is that 
it retains certain specific inequalities which are being perpetuated 
by en arbitrary distribution by the Pederal Government. Foe example, 
the distribution of the total amount available for the payment of 
Commonwealth Aid Roads is partially a per capita distribution and part 
tally a distribution according to are*. It can be expected that rel-
ative neoda for finance for road maintenance bears only an approximate 
relationship to population an area, and therefore some States will be 
receiving relatively more than they require. This will be taken into 
account in the calculation of the final balancing grant, but under 
Federal legislation, the amounts received as Commonwealth Aid Roads 
must be used for expenditure on roads. Therefore, in Ztates which 
benefit from the preeent fora of distribution, the amount available 
for general purposes will be lower than it would be if the Commonwealtt 
Roads Grants were distributed according to relative financial needs. 
In short, in those States, the standards of roads will berelatively 
high, but the standards of services in other directions will be relat-
ively low. In the other States the reverse position will exist. 
The solution of these problems appears to lie in the com-
bination of all grants into one all-purpose grant. This has already 
been suggested as * solution to the problem of deciding how to give 
the Federal Oovernment efficient flexibility In deciding the total 
amount it shall distribute. One grait, distributed according to the 
relative financial needs of each State would allow the Gr,vernment of 
each State to decide the manner of expenditure and the type and extent 
of the services it will provide. Obviously there would not be uniform 
ity between states although the /edema Government would be competent 
to advise the State Governments on the extent to which standards of 
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particular services varied between States and suggest prokrammes for 
bringing about greater uniformity in this respect. One State Govern-
ment may decide to concentrate on the provision of education services. 
When these services are above the average level in the remaining 
States, other services will be below average, and rice versa. 
If the problem is looked at from another viewpoint, under 
the present system of federal grants in Australia, the principle of 
distribution according to relative financial needs will only be fully 
invoked when each type of grant is calculated according to need. If 
this were to be done, the problem would, be greatly simplified if all 
the present types of grants were combined into one single grant. The 
only justification foa retaining the present multiplicity of grants, 
each calculated according to need ., would be to give the Federal Gover-
nment control over the avenues of expenditure by the States of the 
amounts reccLived from the Federal Government. In view of the nature 
of a federation, it Ls difficult to site how such control by the Fader- 
/ Government can be justified. 
The conclusion which has been reached is that, as a long-
term policy, 44,41eral-State financial relations in Australia could best 
be improved by amalgamation of all grants at present made by the 
Federal to the State Governments into a single grant. The total amoul 
of this grant will be determined by the Pederal Government as part of 
its ordinary budget protramme, and the distribution made between the 
several State Governments according to the relative financial needs of 
each. Before proeedding to discuss the methods which could beat be 
employed if such a procedure were adopted, it may be advisable to 
Consider in rather more detoil the implications of the amalgamation of 
the present miscellany of grants into one unconditional block grant. 
In particular, it will be necessary to examine any possible difficult-
ies which might arise and assess whether or not they are insuperable. 
In the first place, some legal difficulties might be 
encountered. At present, all grants paid by the Federal Government to 
the State Governments are prescribed in legislation by the Vederal 
Parliament. 1t may be assumed, therefore, that all such provisions 
may be repealed and replaced by legislation which provides for the 
payment annually of a single grant. Hower, there will undoubtedly be 
some complications. or example, the provisions of existing leA.slat-
ion relating to Income Tax Reimbursement Grants provide for grants to 
the States according to a prescribed formula,l'or so 'Ong as the ptate 
Government refrain from imposing an income tax on their residents. 
This is an arrangement which has been accepted by the Ctates as the 
"price" of their retirement from the field of income taxation. The 
present legislation is in the nature of a contract between the Feder-
al and Otate Governments which fixes not only the distribution of the 
total amount between the States, but also the total amount itself. It 
could be argued by the States that if these grants were incorporated 
14. uee above, p.I65. 
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in a general grant, there would no longer be an assurance that the 
total amount indicated in the formula would be forthcoming, and that 
each State wouI ' receive st least as much as they would have received 
under the operation of the formula. 
On the other hand, the conditional na*ure of the present 
Income Tax Reimbursement "rants would no longer be present. That is, 
the payment of a single all-purpose grant could not be condigonal 
upon the State Governments refraining from imposing an income tax. 
Thus, if the -'ederal Government reduced rates of taxation and as a 
result had to reduce the total amount available for distribution to 
the states, the tatte Governments could impose their own taxation to 
resto:e the total to the position which would have (misted before the 
Federal reduction in income taxation rates. 
Difficulty would also be experienced in altering the 
present arrangement concerning grants paid to the States under the 
Financial Agreement of 1927. At present, grants are paid as subsidies 
towards interest and sinking fund charges on borrowings by the State 
Governments and are eonditional upon the Dtate Governments abiding by 
decisions of the Loan Council concerning public borrowing. If the 
amount of the grants at present made in this way were to be incorpor-
ated in a single unconditional grant, there would no longer be any 
inducement to the States to participate in the decisions of the Coundl 
nowever, even if the inducement were no longer present, 
there are two reasons why the present organisation concerning public 
borrowing wouldd‘robably continue. In the first place there would be 
an implied condition that poption of the grant was related to contin-
uance of the existin, Loan Council structure t and if any ,tates were 
to withdraw, that portion attest grant would be retained by the Federal 
Government. Such an implied restriction would, however, be contrer$ 
to the nature of the uncanditional want and should therfore be 
avoided if possible. 
The second renson is that since before 1927, 1 the eederal 
Government has acted as the borrowing agent for the State Governments, 
and although it would not be impossible, the State Goverrments would 
probably find difficulty in raising their own loan money. Airthermore 
the relationship between the Federal Government and the Central sank 
is such that the Federal Government enjoys a large measure of control 
over the total amount which can be raised at any one time by open 
market borrowing. It could be expected that if ohe State dtcided to 
withdraw from the rinancial Agreement, it would find considerable diff 
iculty in raising its requirements in competition with the Aderal 
Government. At the least, it would have to offer more attractive 
borrowing terms, and if to this is added the possibility of a reduct-
ion in the Federal Urtnt it receives, it is likely that a decit,ion 
will be made to remain within the 4.'inancial Agreement. 
dm. OD ■•■•••1111 01111.M.110 	 111■1■0111. 
15. Zee above, p.12C note 2. 
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It would suem that in all other cases no difficulty would 
arise. The legislation provides for the payment of grants for a per-
iod of years. hen the existing provisions expite, the legislation 
can lapse, and the amounts formerly included in that legislation would 
then be included in the general all-purpose grant which, for the pur-
poses of exposition, may be called General Grants. Eventually, all 
the present special purpose grants would be absorbed in the General 
Grant with the exception of Income Tax Reimbursement Grants and Grants 
under the Anancial Agreement, both of which are not restric-ted by 
a time limit. 
At the appropriate time, these could also be incorporated 
in the General Grant. In order to make the change-over agreeable to 
all parties, it would probably be advisable to choose a year in which 
it is economically desirable that the tota4 of government expenditure 
be increased substantially. The payment of the additional amount coad 
be offered as an inducement to accept the final incorporation of all 
existing grants into one ileneral ftrant. 
One other aspect of the int-oduction of the block grant 
remains to be considered, namely, the extLnt to which such a scheme 
would effect the relative importance of the State and Federal govern-
ments respectively in the field of Federal-State financial relations. 
This aspect is relevant because a diminution of the power of either 
the Federal or State Governments could jeopardise the introduction of 
the scheme. If either party felt that such a scheme would transfer 
part of its sphere of influence to the other, there is no doubt that 
it would be vigourously opposed. Although the final decision must 
rest wioh the Federal Government, concerted opposition by all State 
may have sufficient pnlitical repercussi'ns to prevent the Federal 
Government taking the necereary steps. Similarly, if the Federal 
Government feels that the proposal will increase the power of State 
Governments, it will probably not be introduced. 
In one respect, the introduction of a General arant would 
appear to increase the power of the vederal Government, but this in-
cease would be more apparent than real. Under the suggested scheme 
of a General Grant which would be distributed arcording to the prin-
ciple of relative financial needs, the total amount would be &aided 
at the discretion of the Federal Government. It has ben shown that 
thir is orsential for the implementation of a policy designed to 
achieve or maintain ftll employment, but the State Governments may 
regard it as a diminution in their authority and therefore be reluct-
ant to place this power in the hands of the eideral Government. It 
might be thought that it would present too great an opportunity for 
Federal expansion at the expense of powers of the State Governments. 
In fact, theee would be very little more opportunity that 
exists at present under a system whure there ere a considerable nutlibet 
of special purpose grants. The only difference would be that while 
I 1. 
under the present system where the total amounts are fixed periodical 
or fluctuate according to a formula, any reduction would call for 
amending legislation, under the proposed scheme the total amount wou3 
2 
	 be determined each year. It would, however, be very much simpler fox 
the Federal Government to reduce the General Grant and leave declaim 
as to *here the actual reductions are to be made to the State Govern-
ments, than reduce the separate totals of several special purpose 
grants. 
It mey be thmaght desirable, at the inauguration of the 
chan!;e-over, to place some limit on the extent to which the "edema 
Government could reduce the total amount which it shall pay to the 
State Governments. The situation could arise where, when a reductior 
in the tntal of government expenditure is called for in the interests 
of the national economy, the Federal uovernment, through its power 
over the total amount of the General Grant, could ensure that the 
reduction is made solely in the level or expenditure of the State 
Governments, This could be prevented if an assurance were given that 
in any year the total of the General Grant should Al at least a given 
percentage of the total revenue of the 4deral Government. However, 
for such a provision to have an; permanence it would need to be 
inserted in the Federal Constitution. 
While these arguments are predominantly concerned with 
the case where it becomes necessary, in the interests of the economy 
of the Federation as a whole, to reduce the total amount paid to the 
State Governments, it can work also it, the reverse direction when th 
Federal Government finds it desirable to increase the amount it withe 
to disburse to the State Governments. It would be true to say that a 
method of determining grants would permit the Pederal Government to 
increase the total amount to ',Je paid to the States without any diffic 
ulty. However, where the grant takts the form of a single uncondit-
ional grant, the federal Government is relieved of the problem of inc 
reaming individual special purpose grants. Under existing circum-
stances, the Federal Government may be reluctant to pass legislation 
increasing the total of one or several of the special purpose grants 
because of the knowledge that it maybe necessary to reduce the total 
in the following year, and that such a reduc;ion would be unpopular. 
When only one General Grant id concerned, an increase In one year may 
be followed by a reduction ir the next without any such difficulty. 
Although the Federal Government may consider that, in th 
interests of the national economy, it is desirable for public expend-
iture levels to be raised, an increase in the total amount which it 
makes available to the State Governments will not necessarily achievi 
that result. There can be no compulsion upon a State Government ti 
spend money received from the '-lederal Government. Experience has sha 
however, that in the Australian Federation, the lack of balance 
between constitutional functions and the finance necessary to perfori 
these functions will ensure that the tate Governments will not 
A 
tj 
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usually produce a surplus of any significant else in their Consolid-
ated Revenue Accounts. For all practical purposes, it may be assumed 
that grants paid by the :;lederal to the State Governments will be 
spent duling the year in which they are paid. 
From the point of view of the recipients of the Federal 
Grants, the State Governments, the substitution of a General Grant 
for the present system of a series of conditional grants would have 
on, outstanding advantage. It would give back to the States greater 
inde endence of action in that decisions concerning avenues of expend-
iture would henceforward rest with the State Governments more complet-
ely than at present. In short, the ?ederal Governmant would surrender 
power to determine the way in whIch some grants shall be spent, and 
gain more complete power to vary the total amount which is to be paid 
to the State Governments. Conversely, the State Governments would 
lose some of the certainty which at present attaches to the total am-
ounts they will receive and in return they will gain greater independ-
ence of action in the field of determining avenues of expenditure. 
eor the suggested procedure to function smoothly. it 
would probably be necessary for the Federal Government to keep. the 
State Governments more fully informed on the reasons wk the total 
amount to be made available should be varied in any particular year. 
It would also be advisable for the Federal Government to accept resi 
ponsibility for attempting to bring about greater coordination betweet 
States do far as expenditure policy is concerned. hile it is realis- 
•d that if Federal grants are made unconditionally the :':tate °overt , 
ments are free to spend the grant in any way they choose, the proxim-
ity of States to each other and the ease of transfer from one to an-
other would probably ensure that great differences in policy between 
them would not arise. It could be expected, for example, that the 
standards of roads in each State would be roughly comparable even if 
Commonwealth Aid Roads Grants were incorporated in a general Grant. 
However, the federal Government could play a more important part in at 
advisory capacity and bring about closer cooperation by collecting 
comparative information for the use of the State Governments. 
If the concept of a single, all-purpose grant were 
adopted, the second major problem which would be encountered would be 
the method of determining the distribution of the total amount betweet 
the States and more particularly, the agency which would be responsith 16 for making the distribution. In an earlier Chapter, the alternatives 
available were examined in some detail. It was shown there that the 
choice must be made between &body of experts established within the 
framework of the Federal Public Service, and a similar outside body. 
The conclusion there drawn was that at the present time in the Aust-
ralian Federation, the former alternative would be the more practicabli 
although under certain circumstances, an independent body of experts, 
such as the Commonwealth Grants Commission might be practicable. 
16. 	4tel above, Chapter 5 p.83 ff. 
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In fact, the decision will probably be made before the 
complcte introduction of the scheme. It was suggested earlier in this 
Chapter that as a temporary measure the Federal Government should make 
the existing Special Financial Assistance Grant act as a balanoimg 
grant. If this step were taken it would be necessary at that stage 
to decide whether the distribution of this grant should be made by the 
Federal Government through its Treasury or a newly established agency 
within the framework of the Federal Public Service, or by enlarging 
the scope of the Commonwealth tirants Commission. 
Sulsequent consolidation of special purpose grants into 
a nenerak Grant would mean only that the General Grant, which at the 
beginning would include only the Special Financial Assistance Grant, 
would gradually be enlarged. The body entrusted with its distribution 
would be dealing with a total amount available for distribution which 
would be growing larger and larger as more and more spetal purpose 
grants were included. Finally, all existing grants would be incorp- 
orated in the General Grant without change in the body responsible • for the distribution. 
A major difficulty which must be overcome if this proced-
ure in to be adopted is the problem of budgetary timing. The first 
step in making the annual grants would be made by the ?ederal Govern-
ment when it determines the total amount to be distributed as part of 
the normal budgetary process. Normally the federal budget is intro-
duced about two months after the commencement of the financial year. 
The several State budgets are usually brought down within the month 
following the Federal budget. At the present time, the size of almosi 
all Federal grants are known by the State Governments before the 
introduction of the Federal budget and therefore there is little delaj 
The introduction of a single all-purpose grant to replacE 
the many existing grants would mean that the total amount available 
to all States will not be known until the introduction of the Federal 
budget. There would be some further dela$ 'Ale the distributing body 
determined the allocation of the total amount between the States. The 
State Government would then need some little time to draw up their 
budgets in the light of this distribution. It is conceivable, there-
fore, that under thtb system, the introduction of State budgets would 
be delayed until fairly late in the financial year unless it is 
possible to make the system more flcxible. 
The first possible refinement would be the earlier intro. 
duction of the Federal Budget. There seems to be no good reason for 
the long delay which has become a feature of Australian public 
financial practice. However, if this were altered, the State Govern-
ments would probably wish to adopt the same procedure. Nevertheless, 
while it would moan the earlier introduction of the State budgets, 
there would still be a long delay-between the introduction of the 
Federal and state budgets. Perhaps a better solution would be for th4 
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Federal Government to inform the distributing body so .e time before 
the introduction of the budget of the approximate amount which will 
A 
	 be available for distribution to the itates. That body could then 
proceed with the necessary calculations so that the delay between the 
time when the total amount become publicly known and the time when 
the distribution between States is determined is reduced to a minimum. 
It would be expected that greatest difficulty would be 
experienced in the initial years of the operation of the scheme. 
After several years have elapsed, the several tate Governments qould 
probably be able to estimate fairly accurately their share of the 
total amount available once this total becomes known. This would be 
sufficient for budget pur-oeses, and a delay of several months in the 
actual calculation would not then be of great significance. 
Inevitably the foregoing explanation of the processes 
involved make the problems seem simpler than they really are. Both 
phases of the process involve extremely difficult decisions. First 
the Federal Government must decide the total amount in the light of 
existing conditions, the relative needs of the Federal and State 
Governments, and other factors which will arise from time to time. The 
distributing body must then determine the relative financial needs of 
all States in order to calculate the proportion of the total amount 
available which each shall receive. The calculation of relative fin-
ancial needs is itself a tremendous task, but the body of experts 
envisaged should be able to reach conclusions which are sufficiently 
accurate for the purposes intended. 
This, then is the programme which could be introduced 
over a fairly short peribd with a minimum of change in the existing 
structure. It can all be Introduced by the Federal Government in the 
ordinary course of legislative business, and no constitutional alter-
ation is necessary. In short, it has been designed to continue exist- 
ing relationships between the Federal and State authotities. 
It is possible, however, to visualise the necessiiy for 
more substantial alteration over a ion er period, and the longer-term 
programme maybe regarded as a programme designed to eliminate rather 
than resolve the financial problem in a Federation. It •nvisagLs a 
reallocation of functions between the Federal and State Governments se 
that the need for financial redis ribution is reduced to a minimum. 
It should be emphasised that if perfect balance is to be achieved at 
any point of time, it will be quickly lost as the relative importance 
of function of the Federal and State Governments change. 
For greater balance to be achieved, either certain 
functions at present carried out by the State Governments should be 
handed to the Federal Government, or certain revenue raising powers 
held by the l''ederal ‘xovernment should be handed to the State Govern-
meats. The simplest of these approaches is the handing oiler by the 
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secondly, the constitutional provisions which at present reEtrict the 
range of functions to be carried out by the Federal Government could 
be amended. In this latter case, the proposed amendment would require 
agreement by a majority of electors ad in a majority of States. 17 
Again, the transfer of functions to the Yederal 
Government would not necessarily resolve the problem in its entirety. 
At the present stage of development, and within the foreseeable future 
the transfer of functions alone would still leave some degree of 
inequality between States in the functions remaining with the States. 
It would,of course, be poesible for the States most in need of 
financial assistance to transfer to the Yederal Oovernment more powers' 
than the States least in need of financial assietance. 18 
Although such a procedure would be extremely unpopular 
with the State Governments, it may be that such a conclusion is 
inevitable. The history of l''ederation in Australia has revealed a 
pronounced trend towards the expansion of "i4dcral functions at the 
expense of State functions. Greatest impetus has been given to this 
trend by national disasters, particularly two World Wars and, to a 
lesser extent, the depression of the 1930's. During these periods, 
organisation on a national basis was found to be necessary, and 
through this medium the ';'ederal Government strengthened its position. 
In the opinion of an eminent authority on Federalism, 19 
Austaalia is even now a iederation in nem only. He has suggested 
that the superior financial power of the Federal government has 
destroyed the basic concepts or federation which are provided for in 
the Australian Constitution, It may well be that the future will see 
a continuation of this trend and the eventual disappearance of the 
States as independent entities with the substitution for the States 
of a new form of regional government. In this respect the ,Alglish 
pattern may be followed and a unitary form of government with a 
strong regional or local form of government emerge. If such a 
structure were to emerge, the financial problem, whilst still existing 
would be quite different. The regional governments would be purely 
agents of the central government and would be subject to direction as 
to revenue raising and expenditure policy. It would, however, be 
quite beyond the scope of this essay to devise schemes of financial 
relationships based 'pan such hypotheses. 
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17, Commonwealth Constitution Act, Section 128. 18. For example, ir the Australian Oederation, Tasmania has handed power to collect statistics to the Federal Government as an economy measure. 19. L. C. Aware, "?ederalism." 
